Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 23CHCV02383, Date: 2024-01-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23CHCV02383 Hearing Date: January 18, 2024 Dept: F49
Dept. F49
Date: 1-18-24
Case # 23CHCV02383
Trial Date: N/A
DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE
MOVING PARTY: Defendant General Motors LLC
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Luisa Leon Arevelo
RELIEF REQUESTED
Demurrer to the Complaint
·
4th Cause of Action: Fraud –
Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment
Motion to Strike
·
Claim for Punitive Damages [Comp., p. 26:8]
SUMMARY OF ACTION
On March 28, 2021, Plaintiff Luisa Leon Arevelo
(Plaintiff) purchased a 2021 Chevrolet Silverado. (Comp., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff received
various warranties in connection with the purchase of the vehicle from
Defendant General Motors LLC (Defendant). (Comp., ¶¶ 5-6.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was
deceptive in its marketing of the vehicle because of problems that Plaintiff
has had with the transmissions. (Comp., ¶¶
10-12.) Plaintiff further alleges that the dealer sales representative did not
inform Plaintiff that the vehicle suffered from the Transmission Defect, and
Plaintiff claims that she would not have purchased the vehicle had she known.
(Comp., ¶ 13.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew of the vehicle’s
defects prior to placing it in the stream of commerce, through sources not
known to Plaintiff. (Comp., ¶
26.) Defendant had marketed the vehicle’s transmission as being “world-class”
and “high quality.” (Comp., ¶¶
30-31.) Plaintiff alleges that the Transmission Defect makes the vehicle
dangerous (Comp., ¶¶ 32-34.) Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew
about the Transmission Defect because of litigation related to similar defects;
Defendant’s knowledge of its own internal data; early consumer complaints to
dealers; aggregate data to dealers; dealership repair orders; testing conducted
in response to complaints; service bulletins; and other internal sources.
(Comp., ¶ 36.) From September 2014 to at least February 2019, Defendant issued
at least 60 service bulletins related to the transmission to its dealers.
(Comp., ¶ 41.)
On August 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed her complaint with
four causes of action for (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express
Warranty; (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty; (3)
Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2; and (4) Fraud – Fraudulent
Inducement – Concealment.
Defendant filed its demurer with motion to strike on September
11, 2023. Plaintiff has filed no opposition to Defendant’s demurrer or motion
to strike.
RULING
Demurrer: Sustained with leave to amend
Defendant brings a demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action
for Fraud – Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment. Defendant contends the
challenged cause of action fails to state facts relevant to the elements of the
claim and fails to allege a transactional relationship giving rise to a duty to
disclose. No opposition has been filed, and the time for filing an opposition
has passed.
A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for
which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which
the court may take judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311,
318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading
“by raising questions of law.” (Postley
v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a
pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be
liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (CCP
§ 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts
properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law…”
’ ” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally
construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated.
(Picton v. Anderson Union High School
Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)
A fraud cause of action requires a Plaintiff to plead and
prove: “(a) [a] misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or
nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or “scienter”); (c) intent to
defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting
damage.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal 4th 631, 638.) Fraud
causes of action must be pled with specificity. “…This particularity
requirement necessitates pleading facts which ‘show how, when, where, to whom
and by what means the representations were tendered.’” (Stansfield v.
Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73, quoting Hills Trans. Co. v.
Southwest (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 702, 707.)
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendant failed to tell
her about the alleged transmission defects with the vehicle. However, her
complaint does not allege that any specific misrepresentations were made to her
about the quality of the transmissions. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that “Prior
to purchase, Plaintiff spoke with the dealer sales representative about the
vehicle, inspected the Monroney sticker posted by GENERAL MOTORS LLC on the
vehicle and test drove the vehicle. Plaintiff was never informed by the dealer
sales representative that the vehicle suffered from the Transmission Defect and
relied upon this fact in purchasing the vehicle.” (Comp., ¶ 13.)
First, these allegations are not enough to satisfy the
pleading requirements for fraud. While Plaintiff alleges that the Transmission
defect was not disclosed to her, she does not plead any facts indicating that
the dealer representative that she spoke to had knowledge of or should have had
knowledge of the defect. She also has not pled whether, if the representative
did have knowledge of the defect, they intended to defraud Plaintiff. Plaintiff
has also failed to plead the requisite specificity required for fraud actions.
She has not pled how, when, where, and by what means the misrepresentations (or
nondisclosures, in this case) were tendered. Without the specific details regarding
the misrepresentations and nondisclosure, Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of
action for fraud.
The Court finds
the unchallenged demurrer presents sufficient argument establishing grounds to
sustain the demurrer. The demurrer is sustained with 30 days leave to amend.
Motion to Strike: Granted
Defendant has moved to strike Plaintiff’s request for
punitive damages on the basis that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled that
Defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or malice.
This Court may strike from the complaint any irrelevant,
false, or improper matter. Under CCP § 435, “[a]ny party, within the time
allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to
strike the whole or any part thereof.” Under CCP § 436(a), “[t]he court may,
upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion,
and upon terms it deems proper . . . [s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or
improper matter inserted in any pleading.”
Punitive damages are governed by Civ. Code § 3294: “In an
action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages,
may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the
defendant.” (Civ. Code § 3294(a).)
No punitive damages are available under the Song-Beverly
Act. Recovery under that statute is limited to a refund of the purchase price
paid and payable (or replacement of the subject vehicle), plus a civil penalty,
where applicable, not to exceed two times Plaintiff’s actual damages (Civ. Code
§ 1794.)
The Court has sustained Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s
fraud cause of action. Because punitive damages are not allowable under the
Song-Beverly Act, punitive damages are not available for any of Plaintiff’s
other causes of action. If Plaintiff is able to sufficiently amend her fraud
cause of action, then punitive damages may be requested. For now, Defendant’s
motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages is granted.
Moving party to give notice to all parties.