Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 23CHCV02806, Date: 2025-03-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23CHCV02806, Hearing Date: March 25, 2025 Dept: F43
Dept. F43
Date: 03-25-25
Case # 23CHCV02806, Lopez Ibarra, et al.
v. General Motors, LLC
Trial Date: None set.
DEMURRER AND MOTION
TO STRIKE
MOVING PARTY: Defendant General Motors, LLC
RESPONDING PARTIES: Plaintiffs Julio Alfonso
Lopez Ibarra and J&N Building & Remodeling, Inc.
RELIEF REQUESTED
Order sustaining demurrer to the first
amended complaint’s Fifth Cause of Action and striking plaintiffs’ prayer for
punitive damages.
RULING: Demurrer
is overruled. Motion to strike is denied.
SUMMARY OF ACTION
Plaintiffs Julio Alfonso Lopez Ibarra and
J&N Building & Remodeling, Inc. (Plaintiffs) filed this lemon law case
against defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant) on September 18, 2023. Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint
(FAC) on July 1, 2024, alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Act and
fraudulent inducement - concealment.
Plaintiffs allege that they entered into a warranty contract with
Defendant for a 2020 Chevrolet Silverado Plaintiffs purchased from Rydell
Automotive Group. There was a Transmission
Defect in the vehicle, Defendant knew about the Transmission Defect prior to
Plaintiffs’ purchase, and the Transmission Defect makes the vehicle
unsafe. Defendant failed to repair or
replace the vehicle.
Defendant demurs to the fifth cause of action
for fraudulent inducement – concealment and moves to strike Plaintiffs’ request
from punitive damages from the FAC.
Plaintiffs oppose Defendant’s requests, and Defendant filed replies.
MEET AND CONFER
Before filing a demurrer or motion to strike,
the parties must meet and confer “in person, by telephone, or by video
conference.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§
430.41, subd. (a), 435.5, subd. (a).)
The moving party must file and serve a meet and confer declaration
stating either: (1) the means by which the parties met and conferred, that the
parties did not reach an agreement resolving the issues raised in the demurrer
or motion to strike; or (2) that the party who filed the pleading subject to
the demurrer or motion to strike failed to respond to the meet and confer
request or failed to meet and confer in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, subd. (a)(3),
435.5, subd. (a)(3).) Defendant’s
counsel claims that counsel met and conferred telephonically on July 30, 2024,
but counsel did not come to an agreement. (Declaration of Xylon Quezada, ¶ 2.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs fail to plead
their fraudulent inducement cause of action with specificity because Plaintiffs
do not state how, when, where, to whom, and by what means material facts were
concealed. Plaintiffs also fail to establish
that Defendant intentionally concealed material facts and that a transactional
relationship exists between Defendant and Plaintiffs giving rise to a duty to
disclose. Because Plaintiffs fail to
establish fraudulent inducement and only allege conclusory statements regarding
Defendant’s “oppression, fraud, and malice” and “intent,” the court should
strike punitive damages from the FAC.
Plaintiffs oppose arguing that their
fraudulent inducement cause of action complies with Dhital v. Nissan. The FAC details that Defendant knew about the
Transmission Defect before it sold the 2020 Silverado to Plaintiffs, that
Plaintiffs relied on this omission of this material fact, that Defendant
intended to defraud Plaintiffs, and that Plaintiffs were damaged by Defendant’s
nondisclosure. Although a transactional relationship
is not required to show a manufacturer has a duty to disclose, a transactional
relationship existed between Plaintiffs and Defendant because Plaintiffs
entered into a warranty contract directly with Defendant. Regarding Plaintiffs’ request for punitive
damages, Plaintiffs sufficiently established fraudulent inducement, and
Plaintiffs can seek punitive damages under the Song-Beverly Act.
Defendant responds contending that Plaintiffs
fail to show any fiduciary or transactional relationship between the parties
giving rise to a duty to disclose. Plaintiffs
also fail to explain how Defendant made a partial disclosure or any disclosure
to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs did not plead
facts showing that Defendant knew about the Transmission Defect in Plaintiffs’
vehicle at the time of Plaintiffs’ purchase.
Plaintiffs attempt to plead intent to defraud by stating Defendant allowed
Plaintiffs’ vehicle to be sold with a defective transmission. Plaintiffs do not explain how Defendant
actively concealed any alleged defect. Regarding
punitive damages, Plaintiffs do not allege Defendant’s intent or what specific
representations were made by an “agent” or “representative” of Defendant. Representations by dealership employees are
not representations of an agent of a defendant manufacturer unless an agreement
exists. Punitive damages are not
available under Plaintiffs’ Song-Beverly claims because the Song-Beverly Act
provides for civil penalties that are punitive.
ANALYSIS
Demurrer
A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the
grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a
matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also
Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the
sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153
Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the
construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its
allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice
between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 452.) The court “‘treat[s] the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law[.]’”
(Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court
liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has
been stated. (Picton v. Anderson
Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)
Fifth
Cause of Action: Fraudulent Inducement - Concealment
Defendant demurs to the Fifth Cause of Action for failing
to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for fraudulent
inducement - concealment and for failing to allege a transactional relationship
giving rise to a duty to disclose.
A fraudulent inducement cause of action based on
concealment requires a plaintiff to plead and prove: “(1) concealment or
suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the
fact; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally
concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact
and would have acted differently if the concealed or suppressed fact was known;
and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression
of the material fact.” (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024)
17 Cal.5th 1, 40.) Fraud must be pled
with specificity, alleging “‘how, when, where, to whom and by what means the
representations were tendered.’” (Lazar
v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645 [quoting Stansfield v.
Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73].)
Fraud claims against corporations must “allege the names of the persons
who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to
whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or
written.” (Rattagan, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 40.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to allege the
identity of individuals who concealed material facts or made untrue
representations about Plaintiff’s 2020 Silverado, the individuals’ authority to
speak and act on Defendant’s behalf, Defendant’s knowledge about the alleged
defects in Plaintiffs’ Silverado at the time of purchase, any interactions with
Defendant before or during the purchase of the Silverado, or Defendant’s intent
to induce reliance by Plaintiffs to purchase the specific Silverado at issue.
Plaintiff opposes argues that nondisclosure cases do not
require pleading when and by what means an omission occurred. (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement
Sys. Planning Ass’n (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1384.)
Although less specificity is required when “it appears
from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess
full information concerning the facts of the controversy” (Committee on
Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197,
217.), Rattagan emphasized that the heightened pleading standard is not
relaxed for fraudulent concealment claims based on a duty of disclosure. (Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 43. But see Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 828, 843-44.)
1.
The FAC
establishes a transactional relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose.
“[N]ondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable
fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the
plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not
known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material
fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial
representations but also suppresses some material facts.” (LiMandri v.
Judkins (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336 [quoting Heliotis v.
Schuman (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 646, 651]; see also Warner Constr. Corp.
v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 285, 294.)
In transactions that do not involve a fiduciary
relationship, nondisclosure of material facts may constitute fraud if “(1) the defendant makes representations but
does not disclose facts which materially qualify the facts disclosed, or which
render his disclosure likely to mislead; (2) the facts are known or accessible
only to defendant, and defendant knows they are not known to or reasonably
discoverable by the plaintiff; (3) the defendant actively conceals discovery
from the plaintiff.” (Warner, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 294.)
If the duty to disclose arose from a fiduciary
relationship or Defendant’s exclusive knowledge or access to material facts,
the complaint must allege: “(1) the content of the omitted facts, (2)
defendant’s awareness of the materiality of those facts, (3) the
inaccessibility of the facts to plaintiff, (4) the general point at which the
omitted facts should or could have been revealed, and (5) justifiable and
actual reliance, either through action or forbearance, based on the defendant’s
omission.” (Rattagan, supra,
17 Cal.5th at pp. 43-44; see also Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7
Cal.App.5th 276, 312.) Conclusory
allegations that omissions were intentional for the purpose of defrauding and
deceiving a plaintiff are insufficient.
(Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 44; Goodman v.
Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 347.)
“[A] vendor has a duty to disclose material facts not
only to immediate purchasers, but also to subsequent purchasers when
the vendor has reason to expect that the item will be resold.” (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v.
CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 851.) However, the duty to disclose to subsequent
purchasers requires plaintiff to show that the “seller” of the product had
reason to believe fraud would be passed on to subsequent purchasers. (Geernaert v. Mitchell
(2007) 31 Cal. App. 4th 601, 605-609.)
Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Defendant had a duty
to disclose based on Defendant’s superior knowledge of the Transmission Defect.
Plaintiffs allege that they purchased
their 2020 Silverado from Defendant’s authorized dealer without knowing about
the Transmission Defect. (FAC, ¶
6.) Plaintiffs establish that the
Transmission Defect is a material fact because the Transmission Defect was a
safety concern that could suddenly affect a driver’s ability to control the
vehicle’s speed, acceleration or deceleration, and expose Plaintiffs and their
passengers to serious risk of accident or injury. (FAC, ¶ 67.)
Had Plaintiffs known about the Transmission Defect, Plaintiffs would not
have purchased the 2020 Silverado.
Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Defendant had
superior knowledge about the Transmission Defect from “various internal
sources,” including pre-production and post-production testing data, early
consumer complaints about the Transmission Defect made directly to Defendant
and its network of dealers, and aggregate warranty data compiled from
Defendant’s network of dealers. (FAC, ¶ 68.) From September 2014 to February 2019, Defendant
issued several Technical Service Bulletins to its dealers acknowledging Transmission
Defect issues such as harsh shifting, jerking, and delays in acceleration. (FAC, ¶ 72.) In 2015, Defendant’s engineers considered
pulling the 8-speed transmission from production due to the Transmission Defect
but did not. (FAC, ¶ 70.) These sources
were not available to Plaintiff and other consumers. (Ibid.)
Therefore, Defendant had superior knowledge of the
Transmission Defect that gave rise to a duty to disclose the Transmission
Defect to Plaintiffs. (FAC, ¶¶ 70-72.)
2.
Plaintiffs
sufficiently allege reliance on omission of the Transmission Defect from
Defendant’s marketing materials.
It is sufficient for a plaintiff to allege that there was
a defect; that the car manufacturer knew of the defect and its hazards; that
the car manufacturer had exclusive knowledge of the defect and intentionally
concealed and failed to disclose that information; that the car manufacturer
intended to deceive the plaintiff by concealing the known defect; that
plaintiff would not have purchased the car if they had known of the defects;
and that plaintiff suffered damages in the form of money paid to purchase the
car. (See Dhital v. Nissan North
America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 844, review dismissed by Dhital
v. Nissan North America (2024) 559 P.3d 1083.) However, claims based on nondisclosure must
allege a concealed fact that is (1) contrary to a representation defendant
actually made, or (2) an omission of a fact the defendant was required to
disclose. (Hodsdon v. Mars (9th
Cir. 2018) 891 F.3d 857, 861.)
The complaint must also include specific allegations,
including (1) the content of the omitted facts, (2) defendant’s awareness of
the materiality of those facts, (3) the inaccessibility of the facts to
plaintiff, (4) the general point at which the omitted facts should or could
have been revealed, and (5) justifiable and actual reliance, either through
action or forbearance, based on the defendant’s omission. (Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
pp. 43-44; see also Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th
276, 312.) Conclusory allegations that
omissions were intentional for the purpose of defrauding and deceiving a
plaintiff are insufficient. (Rattagan,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 44.)
Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the inaccessibility of
the Transmission Defect and Defendant’s knowledge of the materiality above. Plaintiffs
also sufficiently state what Defendant’s marketing materials and product
disclosures said about the 2020 Silverado’s transmission, including what
Defendant’s representatives omitted from their statements. (FAC, ¶¶ 69-70.) Plaintiffs allege that plaintiff Lopez Ibarra
saw Defendant’s TV commercials for the 2020 Silverado which informed plaintiff
Lopez Ibarra about the 2020 Silverado’s key features but did not discuss the
Transmission Defect. (FAC, ¶ 8.) Defendant’s authorized sales representatives
at Rydell dealership told Plaintiff about the 2020 Silverado’s key features,
components, mileage and reliability, but the representative did not mention the
Transmission Defect. (FAC, ¶ 9.)
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant advised complaining
customers that the transmission issues were “normal,” but does not state that this
representation was made to Plaintiffs, that Plaintiffs relied on this
representation in deciding to purchase their vehicle, or that Defendant’s
representatives made this representation.
(FAC, ¶ 70.) Plaintiffs’
fraudulent concealment allegations are sufficient in this regard because
Plaintiffs pleads specific topics they discussed with Defendant’s
representatives and what Defendant’s advertisements discussed. (See Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Services,
Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1262.)
Plaintiffs relied on Defendant’s marketing materials,
which omitted the Transmission Defect, in deciding to purchase the 2020
Silverado. (FAC, ¶ 73.)
The FAC also establishes Defendant’s intent to conceal
the material fact of the Transmission Defect from Plaintiffs. Prior to Plaintiffs’ purchase, Defendant
knew the 8-speed transmission exhibited issues from the Transmission Defect
including harsh shifting, jerking, and delays in acceleration. (FAC, ¶ 70.)
Plaintiffs’ vehicle began exhibiting these same issues in October
2022. (FAC, ¶¶ 25-28.) Plaintiffs allege Defendant intentionally concealed
the Transmission Defect from Plaintiffs by not informing Plaintiffs that their
2020 Silverado was equipped with an 8-speed transmission that had a
Transmission Defect. (FAC, ¶ 77.)
Therefore, Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged reasonable
reliance on Defendant’s nondisclosure of the Transmission Defect.
3.
Damages
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to plead any
damages. Plaintiffs’ blanket assertion
that they would not have purchased the 2020 Silverado but for Defendant’s
omissions is insufficient because Plaintiffs do not mention out-of-pocket costs
for repairs, what they paid for the vehicle, or that they purchased the vehicle
from Defendant. Plaintiffs oppose
asserting that they sufficiently allege damages because they would not have
purchased the 2020 Silverado had they known about the Silverado’s Transmission
Defect. (FAC, ¶ 81.)
It is sufficient for a fraudulent inducement -
concealment causes of action to plead that a plaintiff “suffered damages in the
form of money paid” to purchase a vehicle.
(Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 834.) This is just what Plaintiffs allege. Plaintiffs state they suffered actual damages
because they were harmed by purchasing their 2020 Silverado. (FAC, ¶ 81.)
Without Defendant’s omissions, Plaintiffs would not have expended funds
to purchase the 2020 Silverado.
Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment allegations are
sufficient.
Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to the Fifth Cause of
Action is overruled.
Motion
to Strike
“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a
pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part
thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.) A court may, upon motion or at any time,
strike from the complaint “any irrelevant, false, or improper matter” or “all
or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of
this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 436, subds. (a)-(b),
187; Greshko v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 830
[noting the court’s inherent power to limit the focus of the proceedings to the
issues framed by the remaining viable pleadings].) An “irrelevant matter” is an allegation that
“is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense,” “is neither
pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense,” or “a
demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the
complaint or cross-complaint.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)-(c).)
The Court must read the factual allegations in the complaint as a whole
and assume their truth. (Clauson v.
Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)
“The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the
face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is
required to take judicial notice.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).) If the
motion to strike is based on a matter on which the court must take judicial
notice, either the notice of motion or the supporting points and authorities
must specify the matter. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437, subd. (b).)
Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs’ request for
punitive damages because Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled their fraudulent
inducement cause of action. This
argument lacks merit because the court overruled Defendant’s demurrer. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs cannot
recover punitive damages on their Song-Beverly Act claims because the
Song-Beverly Act limits recovery to refund of the purchase price and
discretionary civil penalties.
Plaintiffs assert that they sufficiently allege that
Defendant engaged in oppressive, fraudulent, and malicious conduct by willfully
and consciously concealing the Transmission Defect from Plaintiffs even though
Defendant knew that the Transmission Defect made Plaintiffs’ 2020 Silverado
unsafe to drive. Additionally, courts
have held that punitive damages may be awarded under the Song-Beverly Act. Clauson v. Superior Court held that Plaintiffs
may simultaneously seek to recover punitive damages and statutory penalties at
the pleading stage. (Clauson v.
Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App. 4th 1253, 1256.)
Punitive
Damages
Punitive damages are governed by Civ. Code § 3294: “In an
action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages,
may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the
defendant.” (Civ. Code § 3294(a).)
To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a
complaint must set forth the elements as stated in Civil Code section
3294. (College Hospital, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)
“Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant
to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by
the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others.” (Id. at p. 725.) Oppression is “despicable conduct that
subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that
person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294,
subd. (c)(2).) “[P]unitive damages
sometimes may be assessed in unintentional tort actions.” (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1004.) “Fraud”
means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material
fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of
thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing
injury. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd.
(c)(3).) “[S]omething more than the mere
commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or
outrage, such as spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of
the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of
others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24
Cal.3d 890, 894-895.) Indeed, “punitive
damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme
indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should
not have to tolerate.” (Lackner v.
North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210 [internal quotation omitted].)
Conclusory statements characterizing a defendant’s
conduct as intentional, willful, and fraudulent are insufficient to plead fraud
or malice. (Brousseau v. Jarrett
(1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) The
complaint must state “specific facts showing that defendant’s conduct was
oppressive, fraudulent or malicious (e.g., that defendant acted with the intent
to inflict great bodily harm on plaintiff or to destroy plaintiff’s property or
reputation).” (Croskey, et al., Cal.
Prac. Guide: Insurance Litigation Ch. 13-C (Thomson Reuters, 2016) ¶ 13:197.2;
see Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th
598, 643 [allegations that defendant’s conduct was “intentional, and done
willfully, maliciously, with ill will towards Plaintiffs, and with conscious
disregard for Plaintiff’s rights” did not satisfy specific pleading requirements].)
An employer is liable for punitive damages based on the
acts of its employee if the employer “had advance knowledge of the unfitness of
the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights
or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which
the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd.
(b).) “A corporation may be held liable
for punitive damages for the acts of its agents and employees when the act is
motivated by actual malice or done under circumstances amounting to oppression,
providing that the act is done with the knowledge or under the direction of
corporate officials[.]” (J. R. Norton
Co., supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 445.)
Song-Beverly civil penalties and punitive
damages.
A consumer is not precluded from recovering both
statutory penalties under the Song-Beverly Act and punitive damages against a
manufacturer, if the consumer bases their Song-Beverly claims in a post-sale
failure to repair or replace a vehicle, and the consumer bases their request
for punitive damages in pre-sale or pre-contractual conduct involving
concealment or misrepresentation. (See Anderson
v. Ford Motor Co. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 946, 963-70 [distinguishing the
conduct giving rise to punitive damages versus Song-Beverly penalties].)
Plaintiffs have done both.
Plaintiffs’ request for Song-Beverly civil penalties is
based on allegations that Defendant’s authorized repair facility did not repair
or replace Plaintiffs’ 2020 Silverado according to the warranty contract. (FAC, ¶¶ 25-28.) Plaintiffs’ punitive damages request is based
on allegations that pre-warranty and pre-purchase Defendant omitted material
facts regarding the Transmission Defect.
Therefore, Plaintiff cannot request punitive damages on their
Song-Beverly claims.
The FAC sufficiently alleges a request for punitive
damages based on Plaintiffs’ fraudulent inducement cause of action. Plaintiffs allege that prior to Plaintiffs’
purchase, Defendant exclusively knew that the Transmission Defect existed in
8-speed transmissions, that 2020 Silverados, including Plaintiffs’ Silverado,
were equipped with the 8-speed transmission, and that the Transmission Defect
made the Silverado unsafe to drive.
(FAC, ¶ 67.) Defendant
intentionally concealed the defect from Plaintiffs. (FAC, ¶ 77.)
Defendant’s representatives, product disclosures, and marketing
materials, including a 2020 TV commercial, omitted the Transmission Defect or
the safety hazards the defect posed.
(FAC, ¶¶ 8-10.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s officers, directors,
or managing agents authorized and ratified the acts of Defendant’s
representatives including approving Defendant’s marketing materials and product
disclosures which also omitted the Transmission Defect. (FAC, ¶ 80.)
Plaintiffs relied on the omission in deciding to purchase the 2020
Silverado, Plaintiffs purchased the vehicle, the vehicle exhibits symptoms
related to the Transmission Defect, and Plaintiffs suffer harm from their
purchase of the 2020 Silverado because the Transmission Defect makes the
vehicle unsafe to drive. (FAC, ¶¶ 25-28,
80.)
Accordingly, the court denies Defendant’s motion to
strike punitive damages based on the Fifth Cause of Action.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action is
overruled.
Defendant’s motion to strike punitive damages is denied.
Defendant General Motors, LLC to give notice.