Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 23CHCV02816, Date: 2024-04-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23CHCV02816 Hearing Date: April 4, 2024 Dept: F43
Dept. F43
Date: 4-4-24
Case # 23CHCV02816, Cheyenne Chelsea Oconnor, et al.
vs. Apple Nine Hospitality Ownership, Inc.
Trial Date: N/A
MOTION TO STRIKE
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Apple Nine Hospitality Ownership,
Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Cheyenne Chelsea Oconnor, et
al.
RELIEF REQUESTED
Motion to Strike
·
Third Cause of Action and related allegations (Paragraphs
34, 37, 44, 46, 82, and 84-97)
·
Fifth Cause of Action (Paragraphs 109-120)
·
Attorney Fees related to Nuisance Cause of
Action (Paragraphs 75-81 and 123 from the prayer for relief)
·
Punitive Damages (Parts of Paragraphs 39, 46,
47, 66, 68, 73, 85, 87, 89, 91, and 103, as well as Paragraphs 74, 88, 94, 96,
and 119 and 124 from the prayer for relief)
RULING: Motion to strike is granted in part.
SUMMARY OF ACTION
Plaintiffs Cheyenne Chelsea Oconner, et al., (Plaintiffs)
allege that due to a bed bug infestation at a hotel property owned by Defendant
Apple Nine Hospitality Ownership, Inc. (Defendant), Plaintiffs suffered
emotional and physical injuries. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant was aware of
the infestation because of reviews on websites such as Google and Yelp that
mentioned the bed bugs, but Defendant did not inform Plaintiffs of the
infestation. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants should be liable because
they were aware of the infestation but did not do anything about it.
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges five causes of action for
(1) Negligence – Premises Liability/Failure to Warn/Negligence Per Se; (2) Nuisance;
(3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (4) Breach of Contract; and (5)
Fraudulent Concealment.
Defendant filed its motion to strike on November 22, 2023.
Plaintiffs oppose Defendant’s motion. Defendant has moved to strike two causes
of action from Plaintiffs’ complaint as well as Plaintiffs’ requests for
attorney fees and punitive damages.
ANALYSIS
A court may strike from the complaint any irrelevant, false,
or improper matter. Under CCP § 435, “[a]ny party, within the time allowed to
respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole
or any part thereof.” Under CCP § 436(a), “[t]he court may, upon a motion made
pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it
deems proper . . . [s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter
inserted in any pleading.” Under CCP § 436(b), the court may “[s]trike out all
or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of
this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”
Third
and Fifth Causes of Action
In moving to strike the Third and Fifth Causes of Action,
Defendant appears to confuse the standard for a motion to strike with the
standard for a demurrer. As indicated above, the standard for a motion to
strike is any irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or any part of a pleading
not drawn in conformity with the laws of the state, etc. The standard for a
demurrer involves causes of action that cannot be maintained because they do
not allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action, and demurrers also
test the sufficiency of a pleading by raising questions of law. (See Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d
280, 286.)
Defendant has moved to strike Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of
Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Fifth Cause of
Action for Fraudulent Concealment. In both instances, Defendant is arguing that
these causes of action should be stricken because Plaintiffs did not allege
sufficient facts to constitute the causes of action. Defendant makes no mention
of whether the causes of action were irrelevant, false, improper, or not drawn
in conformity with the laws of the state. That is the proper standard for a motion
to strike.
Plaintiffs’ opposition responds in a similar manner by
arguing that Plaintiffs sufficiently pled the causes of action. Both parties
appear to misunderstand the standard for a motion to strike. If Defendant had
wished to demurrer to these causes of action, Defendant should have done so.
Defendant’s motion to strike is denied for Plaintiffs’ Third
and Fifth Causes of Action because the motion was not made within the standard
for a motion to strike.
Attorney Fees
Through their nuisance cause of action (Comp., ¶¶ 75-81), Plaintiffs
have requested attorney fees pursuant to CCP § 1021.5, which reads, in
pertinent part, as follows:
“Upon motion, a
court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more
opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an
important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit,
whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or
a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private
enforcement…are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should
not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.”
Defendant argues in its motion that Plaintiffs’ request for
attorney fees should be stricken because only Plaintiffs would benefit from the
result of this litigation. Plaintiffs argue in their opposition, and represent
in their complaint, that the public at large would benefit from Plaintiffs’
nuisance suit against Defendant because of the alleged bed bug infestation in
Defendant’s hotel. It is unclear, because Plaintiffs’ suit only requests
damages on behalf of Plaintiffs, how it would benefit the public at large.
Perhaps the monetary consequences would encourage Defendant to ensure that
there is no infestation in its hotel, but beyond that, it appears that only
Plaintiffs would benefit from this suit.
Because it would only benefit Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’
request for attorney fees pursuant to CCP § 1021.5 should be stricken.
Plaintiffs also argue in their opposition that attorney fees
are properly requested based on CCP § 1717. (See Comp., ¶ 107.) However,
Defendant has not moved for this request for attorney fees to be stricken, so
it is unclear why Plaintiff brought it up in opposition.
Defendant’s motion to strike attorney fees is granted for
Paragraphs 75-81 and 123 in the prayer for relief of the complaint.
Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are governed by Civ. Code § 3294: “In an
action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages,
may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the
defendant.” (Civ. Code § 3294(a).)
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that Defendant acted in a
malicious manner and intentionally, knowingly, and willfully caused Plaintiffs
harm. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant acted in a malicious manner by failing
to rid its hotel of the bed bugs and by failing to disclose the bed bug
infestation to Plaintiffs.
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ allegations related to the
punitive damages are conclusory rather than specific. Therefore, Defendant
requests that the punitive damages request be stricken due to this
insufficiency.
In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages,
a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in Civ. Code § 3294. (Coll.
Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) “Malice is
defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to
the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a
willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id.
at 725.) Oppression is “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and
unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code §
3294(c)(2).) Fraud is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or
concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the
part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights
or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3).)
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6
Cal.4th 965, 1004 explained that “punitive damages sometimes may be assessed in
unintentional tort actions.” Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d
890, 894-895 noted that “something more than the mere commission of a tort is
always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of
aggravation or outrage, such as spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive
on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of
the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton.”
Indeed, “punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to
levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent
citizens should not have to tolerate.” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135
Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210 (internal quotation omitted).)
The “conclusory characterization of defendant’s conduct as
intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of
oppression, fraud or malice…within the meaning of section 3294.” (Brousseau
v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)
“It is not sufficient to allege merely that defendant ‘acted
with oppression, fraud or malice.’ Rather, plaintiff must allege specific facts
showing that defendant’s conduct was oppressive, fraudulent or malicious (e.g.,
that defendant acted with the intent to inflict great bodily harm on plaintiff
or to destroy plaintiff's property or reputation).” (Croskey, et al., Cal.
Prac. Guide: Insurance Litigation Ch. 13-C (Thomson Reuters, 2016) ¶ 13:197.2;
and see, Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 598, 643 [allegations that defendant’s conduct was “intentional,
and done willfully, maliciously, with ill will towards Plaintiffs, and with
conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights” did not satisfy specific pleading
requirements].)
Throughout Plaintiffs’ complaint, Plaintiffs make mere
conclusory statements that Defendant acted “knowingly, intentionally, and
willfully.” Plaintiffs do not include specific facts showing that Defendant’s
conduct qualified as such or was otherwise malicious, oppressive, or
fraudulent, in a way that intended harm to Plaintiffs. However, Plaintiffs do
allege that Defendant acted with reckless disregard for Plaintiffs’ safety (See,
e.g., ¶ 74), but Plaintiffs never plead that Defendant knew that there were bed
bugs in Plaintiffs room. It would seem that to maintain a claim for punitive
damages, Plaintiffs would need to plead some indication that Defendant knew that
Plaintiffs specifically were at risk from the alleged infestation and
disregarded Plaintiffs’ safety.
For Plaintiffs to maintain their claim for punitive damages,
Plaintiffs must provide specific allegations for how Defendant’s actions go
beyond normal negligence such that Plaintiffs would be able to recover punitive
damages.
Plaintiffs have not satisfied the pleading standard for
punitive damages. Defendant’s motion to strike the requests for punitive
damages and related allegations is granted. Allegations related to Defendant
acting knowingly or intentionally are stricken from Paragraphs 39, 46, 47, 66, 68, 73, 85, 87, 89, 91, and 103.
Paragraphs 74, 88, 94, 96, and 119 and 124 from the prayer for relief are
ordered stricken in their entirety.
Conclusion
Defendant’s motion to strike is granted in part for the CCP
§ 1021.5 attorney fees request and the punitive damages request. Defendant’s
motion is denied for the Third and Fifth Causes of Action.
Plaintiffs are given 30 days leave to amend their complaint.
Moving party to give notice to all parties.