Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 23CHCV03310, Date: 2025-04-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV03310    Hearing Date: April 16, 2025    Dept: F43

Dept. F43

Date: 04-16-25

Case # 23CHCV03310, Perez v. USP Mission Hills, Inc., et al.

Trial Date: 12-08-25

MOTION TO STRIKE AND TAX COSTS

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Byron Perez

RESPONDING PARTIES: Defendants Providence Health System Southern, Providence Health & Services Foundation, Providence Health & Services

RELIEF REQUESTED

Order striking tax costs in Providence defendants’ memorandum of costs, or in the alternative, taxing the costs claimed in the total amount of $3,881.45.

RULING: Motion to strike costs is denied.

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On October 30, 2023, plaintiff Byron Perez (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against defendants USP Mission Hills, Inc., Tenet Healthcare Corp., and Providence Health System Southern, Providence Health & Services Foundation, Providence Health & Services (Providence Defendants).  Plaintiff alleges a single Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) claim based on violations of the Labor Code.  The Providence Defendants filed a joint answer in December 2023.

Plaintiff asserts he had a good faith belief that the Providence Defendants were his employers and were responsible for the employment practices at issue in this case.  Plaintiff’s investigation revealed that defendant USP’s employees used identification badges that prominently displayed “Providence Holy Cross Medical Center” with the Providence Defendants’ emblem, that Plaintiff’s daily work assignment was written on a sheet entitled “Providence Holy Cross Surgery Center Daily Assignments,” and that Plaintiff’s request for Paid Time Off form was entitled “Providence Surgery Center” with Providence Defendants’ emblem.

Providence Defendants served verified discovery responses in August 2022 stating they were not Plaintiff’s employer during the dates at issue in this case.  Between June 2024 and August 2024, counsel met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel admitted that she was informed by defendant USP’s counsel that USP was Plaintiff’s sole employer during the relevant time period and that the Providence Defendants did not employ Plaintiff.  Providence Defendants also provided Plaintiff with a signed declaration from their Senior/Regional Director of Ambulatory Surgery Centers stating that Plaintiff was never employed by the Providence Defendants during the relevant time period.  Despite this declaration and other production, Plaintiff’s counsel refused to consider dismissing the Providence Defendants and filed several motions to compel originally scheduled for fifteen different hearing dates.

In September 2024, Providence Defendants moved for summary judgment with supporting declarations from the Providence Defendants’ Senior/Regional Director of Ambulatory Surgery Centers and defendant USP’s Facility Administrator.  Plaintiff then deposed these individuals in December 2024, where they confirmed the content of their declarations.  Plaintiff asserts that he determined that the Providence Defendants were not Plaintiff’s employer after taking these depositions.

On December 30, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel offered to dismiss the Providence Defendants with prejudice in exchange for a waiver of the Providence Defendants’ costs.  The Providence Defendants instead offered to withdraw their summary judgment motion in exchange for payments of their costs.  On January 2, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel rejected the offer and stated they would dismiss the Providence Defendants because they should not remain in the litigation.  On January 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed three requests to dismiss defendants Providence Health & Services Foundation, Providence Health & Services, and Providence Health System-Southern California.  Dismissals were entered that same day.

On January 13, 2025, the Providence Defendants filed their Memorandum of Costs.  On January 29, 2025, Plaintiff moved to strike the costs, or in the alternative, to tax the costs.  Providence Defendants filed an opposition on April 3, 2025.  On April 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Plaintiff contends that he brought this case in good faith and that the Providence Defendants are attempting to recover defense costs to penalize Plaintiff for his efforts to enforce his labor rights under PAGA.  Additionally, because PAGA is a “one-way” fee shifting statute that only allows a prevailing employee to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, Plaintiff cannot be compelled to pay for a defendant employer’s cost of defense.  If the court chooses to award Providence Defendants costs under Civil Code sections 1032 or 1033.5, the court should tax inappropriate filing fees, deposition fees, and service fees because the proper documentation has not been provided to support these costs.

Providence Defendants oppose asserting that because Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed them from this case, they are the prevailing party and because they timely filed their memorandum of costs according to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032.  PAGA does not expressly prohibit prevailing employers from recovering costs, so section 1032 governs.  PAGA’s statutory language does not create an exception to section 1032 or preclude its application.  Further, the Court of Appeal’s Second Appellate District has held that PAGA does not preclude recovery of costs by prevailing employers.  (Knowles v. Longwood Management Corp. (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2024) No. B314165, 2024 WL 33300, at p. *19.)  Plaintiff’s public policy argument—that awarding prevailing employer’s costs with chill employee lawsuits—also fails because PAGA’s statutory language is unambiguous.  Finally, Plaintiff fails to meet its burden of demonstrating that the requested costs are not permitted.  The costs are recoverable as a matter of right under section 1032 because, Providence Defendant are a prevailing party under section 1032.  The costs requested are enumerated by statute, and properly supported by documentation.

In response, Plaintiff reiterates that Cruz v. Fusion Buffet, Inc. governs this motion because its analysis of Labor Code section 1194 is analogous to Labor Code section 2699(g)(1).[1]  Plaintiff contends that the Cruz court rejected the reasoning in Plancich v. United Parcel Service, Inc. and held that section 1032 does not apply to Labor Code sections for an unsuccessful employee to pay costs or attorney fees.  The Cruz court refused to interpret the Legislature’s silence regarding prevailing employers as anything other than a one-way cost and fee shifting provision.  Section 2699(g)(1)’s language is analogous to section 1194 in that it only awards attorney fees and costs to a prevailing employee and does not mention a prevailing defendant.  Plaintiff urges the court to follow this reasoning.  Awarding Providence Defendants costs based on section 1032 would defeat and completely undermine the policy underlying PAGA.  Even if section 1032 does apply, the court should strike the requested costs or tax them.

ANALYSIS

A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs, as a matter of right, in any action or proceeding absent a statute expressly noting otherwise.  (Civ. Proc. Code, § 1032,¿subd. (b).)  Unless a statute provides otherwise, a court has no discretion to deny costs to a prevailing party.  (Nelson v. Anderson¿(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 129.)¿¿ A prevailing party is (i) a party that receives a net monetary recovery, (ii) a defendant who obtains a dismissal in its favor (iii) a defendant, when neither the plaintiff nor defendant attained any relief and¿(iv) a¿defendant, where the plaintiff(s) obtains no recovery from the defendant.  (Civ. Proc. Code, § 1032,¿subd. (a)(4).)  “If¿any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the ‘prevailing party’¿shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed,¿may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under¿Section 1034.”  (Id.)  Section 1033 sets forth the allowable costs and notes that allowable costs must be reasonably necessary to “the conduct of litigation.”

¿ 

A party asserting it is the prevailing party must file a memorandum of costs “within 15 days of notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk or dismissal by the clerk¿under¿Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.5¿or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700.)

A party opposing those costs may file a motion to strike to challenge all costs or a motion to tax costs to challenge specific costs listed in the prevailing party’s memorandum of costs.  The opposing party bears the burden of demonstrating why certain items should not be permitted and must state specific facts to support the motion.  (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal. App. 4th 111, 129; Rojas v. HSBC Card Services (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 860, 896.)  The motion must be filed and served within 15 days after¿service of the cost memorandum. ¿(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700.)

The court must determine whether sections 1032 and 1033.5 expressly allow the prevailing party to recover the requested cost.  (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 71; Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a).)  “Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation. [¶] (3) Allowable costs shall be reasonable in amount.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2)-(3).)

PAGA does not provide an “express exception” to Civil Code section 1032, subdivision (b).

Plaintiff asserts that Civil Code section 1032 does not apply to PAGA cases involving statutory provisions which are silent on prevailing employers.  Plaintiff contends that the court should follow the reasoning in Cruz v. Fusion Buffet, Inc. (2020) and read Labor Code section 2699(k)(1)’s silence regarding prevailing employers as limiting recovery of attorney’s fees and costs to prevailing employees.  Plaintiff analogizes Cruz’s analysis of the Earley case and Labor Code section 1194 to support its contention.  Providence Defendants oppose stating that Plancich v. United Parcel Services, Inc. (2011) and the unpublished case Knowles v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2024) 2024 WL 33300, provide the proper analysis for reconciling Civil Code section 1032(b)’s express exception and PAGA’s silence concerning prevailing employers.

The Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) was enacted “in response to widespread violations of the Labor Code and significant underenforcement of those laws.”  (Adolph v. Uber Techs., Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1116.)  “The purpose of PAGA is not to recover damages or restitution, but to create a means of ‘deputizing’ citizens as private attorneys general to enforce the Labor Code.”  (Achal v. Gate Gourmet, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2015) 114 F.Supp.3d 781, 807.)  PAGA authorizes prevailing employees to recover “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs” while allowing employees to also pursue and recover other available remedies under state and federal law.  (Labor Code, § 2699, subd. (k)(1).)  However, PAGA is silent regarding recoverable “costs” for prevailing employers.

When a statute is silent on a particular issue, the court resorts to principles of statutory interpretation.  (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 663.) 

Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 awards costs as “a matter or right” to a prevailing party in any action or proceeding, “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by statute.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subds. (a)-(b).)

“In the absence of a specific Labor Code provision” governing awarding costs, section 1032 applies.  (Cruz v. Fusion Buffet, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 221, 239 [quoting Ling v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253]; see also Chavez v. Cal. Collision, LLC (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 298, 307.)

Plaintiff asserts that court should follow the reasoning in Cruz v. Fusion Buffet, Inc. and strike Providence Defendants’ costs because Labor Code section 2699(k)(1) is a one-way fee shifting provision that does not expressly allow prevailing employers to recover costs in PAGA cases.

The Cruz court held that “where the one-way cost shifting provisions of Labor Code sections 1194 and 218.5 apply, they serve to override the more general cost-shifting provisions of sections 998 and 1032.”  (Chavez, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 309.)  Labor Code section 1194 states in relevant part that: “any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover . . .  reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.”  (Labor Code, § 1194, subd. (a).)  The Court of Appeal reasoned that even though section 1194 is silent regarding prevailing employees, the Legislature intended for the provision to operate as a one-way fee and cost-shifting statute that governs minimum wage and overtime causes of action.  (Cruz, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 242 [discussing the legislative history and legislative intent to disincentivize violating minimum wage laws].)  The Cruz court declined to read application of section 1032 into the Legislature’s silence on prevailing employers because such an interpretation would not serve public policy expressed in PAGA’s legislative history.  (Ibid.)

However, the Cruz court did not discuss or analyze section 1032(b)’s “express” exception provision.  Additionally, Cruz also involved arguments to bar costs under section 1032 for the period after section 998 offers were made.  (Cruz, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 240.)  No such offer was made here.

The California Supreme Court case Murrillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. is instructive in determining whether one-way fee shifting Labor Code provisions preempt Civil Procedure Code section 1032 through an express exception barring prevailing employers from recovering costs.  In Murrillo, the Court addressed whether the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, a law with a one-way fee shifting provision expressly awarding costs to prevailing buyers, allowed prevailing sellers to recover costs under section 1032(b).  (Murrillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985.)  The Song-Beverly Act’s section 1794, subd. (d) expressly states: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover . . . costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended[.]”  The statute contains no comparable provision for prevailing sellers.  The prevailing seller sought costs under section 1032(b).  (Ibid.)

In order to reconcile the two statutes, the Court reasoned that “[b]ecause section 1032(b) grants a prevailing party the right to recover costs ‘[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by statute’ (italics added), we must first determine whether [the statute at issue] provides an ‘express’ exception.”  (Id. at p. 991.)  Based on principles of statutory interpretation, the Court found that section 1794(d) did not expressly bar prevailing sellers from recovering costs and that any such suggestion was implied.  (Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 991.)  The Court then held that the plain meaning of the words in both statutes makes clear that section 1794(d) “does not provide an ‘express’ exception to the general rule permitting a seller, as a prevailing party, to recover its costs under section 1032(b).”  (Ibid.)

The Court of Appeal applied Murillo’s reasoning to Labor Code section 1194 in Plancich v. United Parcel Service, Inc.  (Plancich v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 308.)  The Plancich court held that because section 1194 only refers to prevailing plaintiffs and is silent about prevailing employers, with respect to overtime and wage claims, Civil Procedure section 1032 applies to fill section 1194’s silence about prevailing employers.  (Plancich, supra, at p. 313 [“[B]ased on the plain meaning of the words of the statutes in question, section 1194 does not provide an ‘express’ exception to the general rule permitting an employer, as a prevailing party, to recover costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b), because . . . section 1194 makes no mention of prevailing employers.”].)

This case involves one cause of action under Labor Code section 2699(k)(1) which contains language similar to Labor Code section 1194: “Any employee who prevails in any action shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.”  (Labor Code, § 2699, subd. (k)(1).  Like Labor Code section 1194, section 2699(k)(1) is silent about prevailing employers and does not “expressly” bar a prevailing employer’s recovery of allowable costs under section 1032.  Under section 1032 (a)(1), Providence Defendants are prevailing parties because they are defendants “in whose favor a dismissal [was] entered.”  (See Civ. Code, § 1032, subd. (a)(4).)  Because Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Providence Defendants from this case, Providence Defendants may seek costs as a matter of right 1032(b).

Plaintiff contends that statutes expressly permitting fees for only a particular prevailing party are interpreted as denying fees for the other party, even if the other party prevailed.  (Motion, p. 5:23-26.)  Plaintiff cites Brown v. West Covina Toyota and Earley v. Superior Court to support this contention.  However, Murillo distinguished Brown’s reasoning because the Brown analysis completely ignored Section 1032(b).  (Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 995-96.)  Similarly, Earley’s holding, which is partially based on Brown, does not address Section 1032(b) but focuses on the Legislature’s intent to encourage injured employees to seek redress to enforce minimum wage and overtime laws.  (Earley v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1429-31.)  The Murillo plaintiff made a similar public policy argument based on the Legislature’s pro-consumer intent in the Song-Beverly Act.  (Murillo, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 993-94.)  However, the Murillo court refused to accept this argument when the plain language of sections 2699 and 1032 are clear.  (Id. at p. 993.)

Here, section 2699(k)(1) does not “expressly” bar prevailing employers from recovering allowable costs under section 1032.

Therefore, Providence Defendants are entitled to costs in this action.  (Civ. Code, § 1032, subd. (b).)

Providence Defendants have met their burden of requesting allowing costs under Civil Procedure Code section 1033.5.

Providence Defendants seek $3,881.45 in costs.  (Memorandum of Costs - filed 1/13/25, p. 1.)  The request consists of $1,805.00 in filing and motion fees, $1,782.00 in deposition costs, and $294.45 in electronic filing and service fees.  (Ibid.)

Plaintiff contends that the requested costs are not reasonably necessary because this is a PAGA case, and Plaintiff is serving a public purpose rather than his own individual interest.  The requested filing fees are excessive because the fees cover separate but duplicative filings, and the summary judgment motion was moot upon Providence Defendants’ dismissal.  Plaintiff also contends that the fees were not incurred in defending the case.  The costs for defending depositions are excessive because Providence Defendants’ counsel only defended for the Tersa A. Lesch deposition, not the Walter Topp deposition, and Providence Defendants do not present proper documentation to support the deposition costs.  Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Providence Defendants failed to explain why the electronic filing and service charges are necessary or whether the court ordered courtesy copies of any documents.

Providence Defendants argue that their requested costs are allowable and properly supported by a valid cost memorandum.  The filing fees were paid pursuant to the court’s procedural requirements, as each entity defendant is required to pay a filing/first appearance fee even when filing a joint answer.  Providence Defendants filed a joint answer and paid three filing and first appearance fees.  Next, the summary judgment motion was necessary because Plaintiff refused to dismiss Providence Defendants even after months of meeting and conferring and production of undisputable evidence that Providence Defendants were not Plaintiff’s employers.  The motion was based on Providence Defendants’ defense that they were not Plaintiff’s employer and could not be held liable.  Plaintiff has not met his burden of proving the deposition costs were unnecessary especially when Plaintiff concedes that the depositions were necessary.  Whether Providence Defendants defended only one deponent is not relevant to this motion.  Providence Defendants’ counsel attended the depositions, incurred transcription costs for both depositions, and presents invoices to support the requested costs.   (Lu Dec., ¶ 8, Exh. G.)  Finally, Plaintiff mischaracterizes the electronic filing and service fees as courier and messenger fees.  All Providence Defendants’ filings were completed through an electronic filing and service provider, One Legal, because the court requires electronic filing of all documents in this action.  (Citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.253(b); In Re L.A. Sup. Ct. - Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil, First Amended General Order.)

Under section 1032, allowable costs include: (1) filing, motion, and jury fees; (3)(A) taking and video recording necessary depositions; and (14) electronic filing or service of document through an electronic filing service provider “if a court requires or orders electronic filing or service of documents.”  (Code Civ. Proc, § 1033.5, subds. (a)(1), (3A), (14).)

The court finds that the requested fees are allowable, and that Providence Defendants provide sufficient support for their memorandum of costs.

Plaintiff’s contention concerning duplicative answer filing fees lacks merit because all Providence Defendants filed a joint answer (see Amended Answer - filed 12/5/23), and all defendants who respond to an original pleading, jointly or separately, must each pay a filing fee.  (Gov. Code, § 70612, subd. (a); see also Townzen v. County of El Dorado (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1356-58 [allowing each defendant to recover filing fee for joint demurrer and joint motion to quash filed in response to plaintiff’s complaint].)  Additionally, Providence Defendants’ summary judgment filing fee was not unnecessary.  Providence Defendants filed the motion because Plaintiff refused to dismiss the case once discovery revealed, and counsel admitted, that defendant USP state the Providence Defendants were not Plaintiff’s employers.  (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 [stating purpose of summary judgment motions is to allow the court to cut through pleadings to determine if trial is necessary].) 

Plaintiff admits that the Lech and Topp depositions were necessary to confirm that Providence Defendants were not Plaintiff’s employers.  Because Providence Defendants’ counsel attended the depositions and transcribed the depositions, Providence Defendants incurred deposition fees as allowable by section 1033.5.

Finally, Providence Defendants correctly note that the court requires all represented parties to electronically file all documents through an Electronic Filing Service Provider.  (See In Re L.A. Sup. Ct. - Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil, First Amended General Order, § 2(b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.250(b)(8).)  Therefore, Providence Defendants’ electronic filing and service fees were reasonably necessary to defend in this action.

Therefore, Providence Defendants’ costs are allowable under section 1032.

            Providence Defendants’ requested costs are not taxable.

Plaintiff asserts that if the court finds the costs necessary, the court should tax them.  Providence Defendants respond stating that Plaintiff has not met his burden of setting forth specific facts to support taxing the costs.

The party moving to tax costs has the burden to set forth facts supporting taxing costs.  (Rojas v. HSBC Card Servs. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 860, 896.)  “If items on their face appear to be proper charges, the verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of their propriety, and the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show they were not reasonable or necessary.”  (Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266; see also Rojas, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 896-97.)  Statements in a motion to strike or an attorney’s declaration are insufficient to rebut a prima facie showing that requested costs are proper and reasonably necessary.  (Rojas, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 896.)

Plaintiff presents evidence showing why he believed the Providence Defendants were his employers: his work identification badge that displayed “Providence Holy Cross Medical Center” with the Providence Defendants’ emblem; his daily work assignment sheet entitled “Providence Holy Cross Surgery Center Daily Assignments”; and his request for Paid Time Off form which was entitled “Providence Surgery Center” with Providence Defendants’ emblem.  (See Declaration of Christina N. Mirzaie, Exhs. A-C.)  These exhibits appear to support Plaintiff’s contention.

However, Providence Defendants claim that their counsel telephonically met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel on June 18, 2024, during which Plaintiff’s counsel admitted that defendant USP’s counsel told her they were Plaintiff’s sole employer.  (Lu Dec., ¶ 3.)  Plaintiff’s counsel then requested a signed declaration from Providence’s Senior/Regional Director of Ambulatory Surgery Centers, Tersa A. Lech, about Providence Defendants’ non-employer status.  (Lu Dec., ¶ 4.)  Providence Defendants sent the signed declaration to plaintiff’s counsel on August 5, 2024.  (Lu Dec., ¶ 4, Exh. A.)  Providence Defendants also produced discovery responses, including Plaintiff’s W-2s, showing that defendant USP was Plaintiff’s sole employer.  (Lu Dec., ¶ 5, Exh. B.)  Plaintiff still refused to dismiss Providence Defendants.  Providence Defendants then moved for summary judgment on September 30, 2024, and Plaintiff deposed Lech and Topp in Decmember 2024 requesting that they confirm the content of their declarations, which they did.  (Lu Dec., ¶ 6, Exhs. D , E.)  It was only after these depositions and several telephonic meet and confer meetings that Plaintiff dismissed Providence Defendants on January 3, 2025.  (Lu Dec., ¶¶ 7-8, Exhs. F, G.)

The court finds that the costs incurred by Providence Defendants were reasonably necessary to defend in this case because the costs consists of basic filing and electronic service and filing fees required for responsive pleadings, and the deposition fees were incurred in determining whether the undisputed facts show that Providence Defendants were not Plaintiff’s employers.  Plaintiff fails to present sufficient evidence to rebut the requested costs and supporting evidence.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to strike or tax Providence Defendants’ costs is denied.

CONCLUSION and ORDER

Plaintiff Byon Perez’s motion to strike defendants Providence Health System Southern, Providence Health & Services Foundation, Providence Health & Services’ costs and tax costs is denied.

Plaintiff Byron Perez to give notice.