Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 24CHCV00293, Date: 2024-12-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24CHCV00293    Hearing Date: December 12, 2024    Dept: F43

Dept. F43

Date: 12-12-24

Case # 24CHCV00293, Doe v. Nishioka, et al.

Trial Date: 04-06-26

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO DEMAND FOR PRODUCTION, SET ONE

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Jane AW Doe

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Granada Hills Charter

RELIEF REQUESTED

Order compelling further responses to request numbers 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25.

RULING: Motion is denied without prejudice.

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Plaintiff Jane AW Doe (Plaintiff) brings this case pursuant to sections 340.1 and 905, subdivision (m), of the California Tort Claims Act.  Plaintiff alleges that while she was a minor attending Granada Hills Charter High School, Archer Yuji Nishioka, Plaintiff’s teacher, sexually abused, harassed, and molested her.  Plaintiff alleges the abuse occurred between August 2018 and May 2019.  Plaintiff sued Defendants Archer Yuji Nishioka (Nishioka), Granada Hills Charter (Granada), and Does 2 to 100 on May 17, 2024. 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint alleges causes of action for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, sexual assault, sexual battery, and false imprisonment.

On June 28, 2024, Plaintiff propounded on Granada her Requests for Production, Set One.  Plaintiff granted Granada two extensions to respond.  Granada served its verified responses and privilege log on September 30, 2024.  Granada served another privilege log on November 12, 2024. 

On November 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion to compel further responses to her Requests for Production, Set One numbers 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25.  Granada filed its opposition on November 27, 2024.  Plaintiff replied on November 5, 2024.  On December 6, 2024, Granada filed a request for permission to file a sur-reply to a new argument in Plaintiff’s reply.

Meet and Confer

A motion to compel further responses to requests for production must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration showing a “reasonable and good faith attempt” to resolve issues outside court.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) 

Plaintiff’s counsel, Michael M. Marzban states the parties met and conferred telephonically on October 3, 2024.  (Declaration of Michael M. Marzban, ¶ 8.)  Granada’s counsel stated she could not produce further records without a signed authorization from Nishioka.  (Ibid.)  Plaintiff’s counsel contacted Nishioka’s counsel, and the parties did not come to an agreement.

Summary of Arguments

Plaintiff moves for further responses to request nos. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25.  Granada produced redacted documents and failed to comply with section 2031.230 for the documents it could not locate.  Granada is withholding Nishioka’s personnel records and its administrative rules, class rosters, and board policies.  Plaintiff’s requests were reasonably calculated to lead to evidence showing Granada’s lack of foresight caused Plaintiff’s foreseeable harm.  Evidence of prior complaints against Nishioka and Granada’s response, or lack thereof, to these complaints is relevant to show Granada ratified Nishioka’s actions.  Plaintiff’s necessity for the information sought outweighs privacy issues because the information will allow Plaintiff to determine inadequacies in Granada’s oversight of students and staff, the information is in Granada’s exclusive control, and Plaintiff has no alternate means of obtaining the information.  The child sexual abuse incident reports are not privileged or protected by the work-product doctrine because their dominant purpose is ensuring student safety rather than preparing for litigation.  

Granada argues in opposition that the Court should deny Plaintiff’s motion because the separate statement is noncompliant and it is unclear which documents are at issue in Plaintiff’s motion.  Granada has offered to produce Nishioka’s personnel file if the Court orders Granada to do so or if Nishioka gives permission.  The Suspected Child Abuse Reports and the Confidential Investigation report and supporting statements prepared by Granada’s employees were prepared with the assistance of counsel following an attorney-directed investigation and are privileged.  Further, the Penal Code section 11167.5, subdivision (a), makes it a misdemeanor to produce “child abuse or neglect investigative reports that result in a summary report being filed with the Department of Justice.”  Such information is also not discoverable.  Further, the work-product doctrine protects the Confidential Investigation Report because the report and its supporting documents were gathered by employees to help attorney prepare for litigation.  Finally, Plaintiff completely ignores the privacy interests and rights of other alleged victims who are not involved in this case.  Education Code section 49076 protects the privacy rights of alleged victims not represented by Plaintiff’s counsel. 

In reply, Plaintiff argues the separate statement complies with Rule of Court 3.1345(c).  Because neither Granada nor Nishioka oppose production of Nishioka’s personnel file, the Court should order Granada to produce it.  The public interest outweighs the privacy rights at issue here.  The requested reports contain information relevant to determining whether Granada knew or had reason to know about Nishioka’s abuse of children prior to the end of his abuse of Plaintiff.  Granada’s evidence (Julia Howelman Declaration) contains statements proving documents were created prior to any privilege attaching.  Suspected Child Abuse Reports are discoverable because Penal Code section 11167.5, subd. (b)(11) requires disclosure of such reports to a person who is identified in the Department of Justice as listed in the Child Abuse Central Index.  Plaintiff’s name is listed in the files in the index and is entitled to the reports. 

ANALYSIS

A demanding party may move to compel further responses to requests for production where the demanding party is not satisfied with the responding party’s responses.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2031.310, subd. (a).)  The demanding party must serve the motion to compel further within 45 days after service of verified responses.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c).) If the responding party serves unverified responses, the 45-day time limit does not run until verified responses are served. (See Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 135-136.) The parties may extend the deadline through a written stipulation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c).)

The demanding party must file a separate statement with its motion to compel further responses to requests for production.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a)(3).)  “The separate statement must be full and complete so that no person is required to review any other document in order to determine the full request and the full response.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c) [emphasis added].)  The separate statement must contain: “(1) The text of the request, interrogatory, question, or inspection demand; (2) The text of each response, answer, or objection, and any further responses or answers; (3) A statement of the factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses, answers, or production as to each matter in dispute; (4) If necessary, the text of all definitions, instructions, and other matters required to understand each discovery request and the responses to it; (5) If the response to a particular discovery request is dependent on the response given to another discovery request, or if the reasons a further response to a particular discovery request is deemed necessary are based on the response to some other discovery request, the other request and the response to it must be set forth; and (6) If the pleadings, other documents in the file, or other items of discovery are relevant to the motion, the party relying on them must summarize each relevant document.”  (Ibid.)

A separate statement is not required where the court allows the demanding party to submit a concise outline of the discovery request and each response in dispute.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(b)(2).)  The Court may, in its discretion, deny a motion to compel further production if the motion is accompanied by a deficient separate statement.  (Cf. In re Marriage of Moore (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1275, 1296; see also Mills v. U.S. Bank (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 871, 893.) 

The Court has reviewed the documents related to his motion and finds the Plaintiff’s separate statement is deficient for several reasons. First, Plaintiff neglected to include Granada’s full initial responses to her requests.  Second, Plaintiff does not provide legal authority to support the arguments in her separate statement.  Finally, even though Plaintiff provides a plethora of legal authority in her motion papers, without listing which specific responses and request numbers Plaintiff’s arguments reference, the Court cannot fully evaluate Plaintiff’s motion on the merits. 

Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to Request for Production, Set One, without prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

The motion is denied without prejudice.

Plaintiff to give notice.