Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 24CHCV03577, Date: 2025-04-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24CHCV03577 Hearing Date: April 16, 2025 Dept: F43
Dept. F43
Date: 04-16-25
Case # 24CHCV03577, Richardson,
et al. v. Minaskanian Properties, LLC, et al.
Trial Date: None set.
DEMURRER AND MOTION
TO STRIKE
MOVING PARTIES: Defendants Minaskanian
Properties, LLC and Diana Jamgotchian
RESPONDING PARTY: No response has been filed.
RELIEF REQUESTED
Order sustaining demurrer to the entire complaint
and striking the entire complaint.
RULING: Demurrer
is sustained with leave to amend the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Seventh causes of action, and without leave to amend the Sixth causes of
action. Motion to strike is granted, in
part concerning attorney fees and punitive damages, and denied in part
concerning treble damages.
SUMMARY OF ACTION
Plaintiffs Marlo Richardson, Greenwood &
Company Management, LLC, Tremendo, LLC, and Takela Corbitt (Plaintiffs) filed
this action against defendants Minaskanian Properties, LLC and Diana
Jamgotchian (Defendants) on October 3, 2024, alleging Defendants breached a
lease for commercial property by fraudulently increasing rent. The complaint alleges seven causes of action
for (1) fraud, (2) negligence, (3) breach of implied covenant of quiet
enjoyment, (4) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (5)
intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) violation of the Los Angeles
Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance section 45.33, and (7) breach of contract.
The complaint alleges the following: On
January 1, 2020, plaintiff Richardson and defendant Minaskanian, on behalf of
plaintiff Greenwood & Company, entered into a written lease agreement for a
period of three years with a base rent of $4,750.00. (Compl., ¶¶ 14-15.) The lease gave plaintiff Richardson the
option to extend the term of the lease for one additional 3-year period based
on the CPI-U for November 2022—$4,959.00—if plaintiff Richardson exercised the
option 3-6 months prior to the date that the option period would commence. (Compl., ¶ 14.) In March 2023, Plaintiffs and Defendants began
negotiating the extension. (Compl., ¶
15.)
Defendants would not honor the CPI-U for 2022
and told Plaintiffs that rent would be $8,170.00 because another landlord told
Defendants that Defendants should charge Plaintiffs more because Plaintiffs
were in the cannabis industry. (Compl.,
¶ 15.) Plaintiff Richardson would not
agree to the $8,170.00 rate, and Defendants threatened to kick plaintiff
Richardson out of the property. (Compl.,
¶ 16.) To avoid losses, plaintiff
Richardson did not renew the lease.
(Compl., ¶ 16.)
Plaintiff Tremendo, LLC alleges it was forced
to agree to the $8,170.00 amount or lose Plaintiffs’ entire business. (Compl., ¶ 16.) Defendants then sent Plaintiffs a “Space
License Agreement” that allowed Defendants to terminate the agreement within
six months, barred Plaintiffs from turning on utilities, and allowed Defendants
to terminate the lease or increase the rent amount for any reason. (Compl., ¶ 16.) Plaintiff Tremendo refused to sign the “Space
License Agreement”, and Defendants then attempted to kick Plaintiffs off the
property. (Compla., ¶ 16.)
In May 2023, Plaintiffs met with Defendants to
obtain an agreement, under a new contract and new terms. (Compl., ¶ 21.) Defendants represented to Plaintiffs that
they had accepted the agreed upon terms from the meetings, but subsequently sent
Plaintiffs a “Space Lease Agreement” that did not include the agreed upon terms.
(Compl., ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs refused to sign the lease. (Compl., ¶ 21.) On June 23, 2023, plaintiff Corbitt responded
to the “Space License Agreement” with proposed changes which Defendants refused
to consider. (Compl., ¶ 18.) Defendants then threatened to evict
Plaintiffs if they did not agree to its terms.
(Compl., ¶ 18.) Plaintiffs
believe Defendants were attempting to extort Plaintiffs into signing a new
lease to obtain higher rent. (Compl., ¶
19.)
On July 27, 2023, defendant Jamgotchian
emailed Plaintiffs and informed them that defendant Minaskanian Properties had
made the “business decision” to take back possession of the three units at 9438
Irondale Avenue, 9440 Irondale Avenue and 9444 Irondale Avenue allegedly
because “Parties associated with Greenwood and Company Management LLC and
Tremedo LLC” failed to sign the leases that were offered in February and July
of 2023. (Compl., ¶ 22.) However, no lease agreement was ever offered;
Defendants only presented the “Space License Agreement” that would allow
Defendants to terminate the agreement with little notice. (Compl., ¶ 22.)
Between January 2024 and April 2024,
Defendants engaged in harassing conduct including calling the police to report
Plaintiffs operated an illegal growing operation (January 26, 2024); calling
the fire department to report “unpermitted” electrical work that was an alleged
fire hazard (January 28, 2024); filing a false police report which caused the
police to raid the facility and arrest one of Plaintiffs’ employees and cut
down cannabis plants (March 14, 2024); and using a personal contact with the
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power to turn off all the utilities on the property,
forcing Plaintiffs to vacate the property, despite having spent nearly
$1,000,000 in customizing the space for their needs. (Compl., ¶¶ 23-26.) Defendants’ landlord would appear at the
property on a weekly basis, sit in the parking lot and harass employees, asking
for access to the property based on purported “water leaks” and other made up
issues in order to gain access to the property.
(Compl., ¶ 27.)
Defendant demurs to the complaint for failing
to allege sufficient facts to constitute the causes of action and because
several causes of action are uncertain.
Defendant also moves to strike the entire complaint, or in the
alternative, to strike punitive damages, treble damages, and attorney’s fees. No opposition has been filed.
MEET AND CONFER
Before filing a demurrer or motion to strike,
the parties must meet and confer “in person, by telephone, or by video
conference.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, subd. (a), 435.5, subd. (a).) The
moving party must file and serve a meet and confer declaration stating either:
(1) the means by which the parties met and conferred, that the parties did not
reach an agreement resolving the issues raised in the demurrer or motion to
strike; or (2) that the party who filed the pleading subject to the demurrer or
motion to strike failed to respond to the meet and confer request or failed to
meet and confer in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, subd. (a)(3),
435.5, subd. (a)(3).) Defense counsel
claims that he sent Plaintiffs’ counsel a meet and confer letter on February
26, 2025, but that counsel never responded.
(Declaration of John J. Jamgotchian, ¶¶ 3-4, Exh. A.)
ANALYSIS
Demurrer
A party may respond to a pleading against it by demurrer
based on one or more of eight enumerated grounds, including that “the pleading
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action” and is
uncertain, meaning “ambiguous and unintelligible.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e),
(f).) The grounds for demurring must be
apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court
may take judicial notice. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d
311, 318.)
The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency
of a pleading “by raising questions of law.”
(Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the
purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed,
with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting
all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or
conclusions of fact or law[.]” (Berkley
v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.)
In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint
to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School
Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)
First
Cause of Action: Fraud
Defendant demurs to the First Cause of Action for Fraud for
failing to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.
The elements of a fraud cause of action are
(1) misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance
on the misrepresentation, (4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation,
and (5) resulting damages. (Lazar v.
Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.)
Fraud claims must be pled with specificity; general and conclusory
allegations do not suffice. (Id.
at p. 645.) The complaint must plead
facts showing “how, when, where, to
whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Ibid.) The facts must be clear enough to inform the
opposing party what he must answer. (See
Scafidi v. Western Loan & Building Co. (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 550,
558.)
The complaint does not sufficiently allege fraud because Plaintiff
does not allege with particularity what misrepresentations were made and by
whom they were made. Plaintiffs allege
that in May 2023, Defendants made a false, verbal report to the Police that
Plaintiffs were illegally growing cannabis plants on the property. (Compl., ¶ 29.) Relying on this false report, the police
entered the property, destroyed the cannabis plants. (Compl., ¶ 29.) Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants
intended to induce the police’s reliance on the false report in order to
destroy the cannabis plants and force Plaintiffs into paying higher rent. (Compl., ¶ 30.)
Plaintiffs do not state who made the false report, what
was said, or by what means the report was made. As alleged, filing a false police report is
not fraud as to Plaintiffs and cannot sustain a fraud claim.
Plaintiffs incorporate general allegations about
defendant Jamgotchian’s July 27, 2023 email misrepresenting that Plaintiffs
failed to sign leases. (Compl., ¶¶ 28,
22.) However, Plaintiffs do not address
this email or any other misrepresentations in their fraud cause of action,
rendering the cause fraud cause of action ambiguous.
Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to the First Cause of
Action is sustained with leave to amend.
Second Cause of Action: Negligence
Defendant demurs to the Second Cause of Action for
Negligence for failing to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of
action, particularly the existence of Defendant’s legal duty to Plaintiffs.
The elements of negligence are (1) the defendant owed
plaintiff a duty of care; (2) defendant breached the duty; (3) plaintiff was
harmed; and (4) defendant’s breach proximately caused plaintiff’s harm. (Restatement 2d Torts, §§
281, 283; Nola M. v. Univ. of S. Cal. (1993) 16
Cal.App.4th 421, 426; 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts,
§ 732, pp. 60-61.)
The extent of Defendant’s argument is that the complaint
does not plead any of the elements of negligence.
The court agrees that the complaint fails allege that
Defendant owed Plaintiffs a duty of care independent of the lease agreement or
that Defendant’s breach of such any such independent agreement proximately
caused Plaintiffs harm or damages. Plaintiffs
allege that the harm they suffered arose from Defendant’s alleged breach of the
lease agreement in misrepresenting information to law enforcement and knowingly
allowing law enforcement to enter the property and to destroy Plaintiffs’
cannabis crops. (Compl., ¶ 37.)
The negligence cause of action also reads more like an intentional
tort or conversion claim. Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants knowingly misrepresented information to law enforcement
with the intent to extort higher rent from Plaintiffs. (Compl., ¶ 36.) This led to police entering the property and destroying
Plaintiffs’ cannabis plants. (Compl., ¶
27.) Like the first cause of action,
Plaintiffs only address the police reports rather than any other misconduct.
Because the complaint fails to Defendant breached an
independent duty and fails to plead the elements of negligence, Defendant’s
demurrer to the Second Cause of Action is sustained with leave to amend.
Third, Fourth, and Seventh Causes of Action:
Contractual Causes of Action
Defendant demurs to the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Causes
of Action asserting that Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to
constitute a cause of action. The
complaint fails to allege the existence of a contract and whether the contract
was written, oral, or implied by conduct.
Additionally, the complaint is uncertain regarding which contract is the
basis of the contractual causes of action.
To plead breach of contract, a complaint must allege
facts showing (1) the existence of a contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or
excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) resulting damages to
plaintiff. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v.
Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821; Aton
Center, Inc. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1230
[listing the same elements for breach of an oral contract].)
Plaintiffs allege that their Third, Fourth, and Seventh
Causes of Action are based on a “written rental agreement”. (Compl., ¶¶ 14, 40, 46, 60.)
“In an action based on a written contract, a plaintiff
may plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise
language.” (Construction Protective
Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189,
198-99. But see Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307
[requiring plaintiff to attach a copy of the contract or to set out the terms
verbatim in the body of the complaint].)
Pleading contracts by legal effect involves alleging the relevant terms
in substance. (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489
[“Plaintiffs have still failed to identify the contract and contractual
provision under which Washington Mutual required them to pay underwriting and
wire transfer costs.”].)
The complaint does sufficiently plead the written lease
agreement because the complaint fails to provide the full details regarding
when the lease term commenced. Plaintiffs
do allege that under the alleged lease agreement, Plaintiffs agreed to lease
property from Defendants for a 3-year term beginning at a base rental rate of
$4,750.00. (Compl., ¶¶ 14-15.) Plaintiffs allege that the lease was written,
that Plaintiffs were given the option to extend the lease for 36 months at a
base rental rate of $4,959.00 if Plaintiffs exercised their option 3-6 months
before the date of the option period commenced.
(Compl., ¶¶ 14-15.) The complaint
does not state when this period commenced.
Plaintiffs also allege that in March 2023, Defendants refused to honor
the $4,959.00 rate. (Compl., ¶ 15.) Although Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
willfully and intentionally breached the January 1, 2020 written lease
agreement by failing to abide by the CPI-U agreements for 2022 (Compl., ¶¶
62-63.), without facts stating when the
lease term began, the court cannot determine if Plaintiffs exercised their
“option to renew” within the 3–6-month period.
Therefore, the complaint fails to sufficiently plead a contract.
All leases, including
commercial lease, include an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. (Multani v. Knight (2018) 23
Cal.App.5th 837, 854 [stating the covenant can be waived in commercial leases];
see also Civ. Code, § 1927.) The breach
can take many forms including actual or constructive eviction. (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co.
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 293; see also Goldman v. House (1949)
93 Cal.App.2d 572, 576 [breach when landlord attempted to evict tenant using wrongful
and malicious means with knowledge of probable injury]; see also id. at
p. 574 [breach when landlord wilfully and maliciously shut off the
electric current’ and the tenant ‘fell down the darkened stairway and sustained
injuries].)
Although the complaint contains several allegations of
Defendants’ conduct which may have resulted in Plaintiffs’ constructive
eviction from the property (Compl., ¶¶ 23-27), Plaintiffs cannot maintain their
breach of the implied covenant Third Cause of Action without sufficiently pleading
a contract.
The elements of breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing are: (1) plaintiff and defendant entered a contract; (2) plaintiff
performed all obligations under the contract or was excused from performing all
obligations; (3) defendant’s conduct prevented plaintiff from receiving the
benefits under the contract; (4) defendant did not act fairly and in good
faith; and (5) plaintiff was harmed by defendant’s conduct. (CACI No. 325.) Because the complaint does not sufficiently
allege a contract, Plaintiffs cannot maintain their Fourth Cause of Action.
Therefore, Defendant’s demurrer to the Third, Fourth and
Seventh Causes of Action is sustained with leave to amend.
Fifth Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress
Defendant demurs to the Fifth Cause of Action for failing
to allege sufficient facts to establish any intentional or outrageous conduct.
The extent of Defendant’s argument is that Plaintiffs do
not plead the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress and that
corporate plaintiffs, Greenwood and Tremendo, cannot suffer emotional distress.
The elements of a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress are that: (1) defendant engaged in extreme and
outrageous conduct (2) with the intent to cause, or with reckless disregard to
the probability of causing, emotional distress; and (3) as a result, plaintiff
suffered extreme or severe emotional distress.
(Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965,
1001; Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 579, 593.) “‘[The] conduct [must be] directed at the
plaintiff or occur in the presence of the plaintiff of whom the defendant is
aware.’ [This] factor . . . distinguishes
intentional infliction of emotional distress from the negligent infliction of
such injury.’” (Potter, supra,
6 Cal.4th at p. 1002; see also So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652,
671 [stating conduct must be directed to the plaintiff, but malicious or evil
purpose is not required].)
Conduct is outrageous if it is so extreme that it exceeds
the bounds usually tolerated by a civilized community and is directed at the
Plaintiff. (Cervantez, supra,
24 Cal.3d at p. 593; Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868,
903.) “Behavior may be considered
outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him
power to damage the plaintiff’s interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is
susceptible to injury through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or
unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness
through mental distress.” (Pulver v.
Avco Financial Services (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 622, 637.) The complaint must allege “with great
specificity” those acts the plaintiff believes are so extreme as to exceed all
bounds usually tolerated in a civilized community. (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real
Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.)
The complaint fails to sufficiently allege extreme and
outrageous conduct that caused plaintiffs Richardson and Corbitt severe
emotional distress. Plaintiffs allege
that Defendants’ inaction in not renewing the lease with the CPI-U 2022 rate and
Defendants’ lies to law enforcement about the illegal cannabis plants was extreme
and outrageous against plaintiffs Richardson and Corbitt. (Compl., ¶¶ 50-51.) The complaint also includes conclusory
statements that Defendants’ actions were knowing, intentional, and willful with
a reckless disregard for the probability of causing plaintiffs Richardson and
Corbitt severe emotional distress.
(Compl., ¶ 52.)
The complaint then confusingly alleges that Defendants’
failed to take action against “the perpetrators within a reasonable time”
despite Plaintiffs’ numerous requests that Defendants do so. (Compl., ¶ 54.) The court is unclear about who the
“perpetrators” are, and which Plaintiffs asked Defendants to take action
against the perpetrators.
The complaint fails to allege facts showing that plaintiffs
Richardson and Corbitt suffered from or continue to suffer from severe
emotional distress. “Severe emotional
distress means ‘emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring
quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to
endure it.’” (Potter, supra,
6 Cal.4th at p. 821.) Severe emotional
distress may include “any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as fright,
grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment or
worry.” (Fletcher v. Western National
Life Ins. Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397; cf. Wong v. Tai Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1377.) Such distress must be reasonable and
justified under the circumstances. (Potter,
supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 821.)
Finally, Plaintiffs only allege that Richardson and
Corbitt suffered extreme mental anguish and several emotional and physical
distress without stating any specific symptoms.
(Compl., ¶ 53.)
Because the complaint is uncertain regarding Plaintiffs
allegations of extreme conduct and whether plaintiffs Richardson and Corbitt
suffered emotional distress, Defendant’s demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action
is sustained with leave to amend.
Sixth Cause of Action: Violation of the Los
Angeles Tenant Anti-Harassment ordinance Section 45.33
Defendant demurs to the Sixth Cause of Action because the
Los Angeles Tenant Anti-Harassment ordinance only applies to residential
property, not the commercial property in this action.
To establish claim under Los Angeles’ Tenant
Anti-Harassment Ordinance, the plaintiff must allege that the landlord engaged
in harassing or bad faith conduct. (Los
Angeles, Cal., Mun. Code art. 5.3 § 45.33.)
Because Article 5.3 only applies to residential property, Plaintiffs lack
standing to sue Defendants under this ordinance. (See Los Angeles, Cal., Mun. Code art. 5.3, §
45.31 [discussing ordinance’s purpose to deter landlord’s from harassing residential
tenants].)
Therefore, Defendant’s demurrer to the Sixth Cause of
Action is sustained without leave to amend.
Legal
Standard – Motion to Strike
“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a
pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part
thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.) A
court may strike from the complaint any irrelevant, false, or improper
matter. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd.
(a).) The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not
drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an
order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
436, subd. (b).) A complaint must plead
ultimate facts to support punitive damages.
(Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255; Antelope
Valley Groundwater Cases (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 241, 265 [“[T]he term
‘ultimate fact’ generally refers to a core fact, such as an essential element
of a claim.”].)
California Rule of Court 2.112
Defendants first contend that the court should strike the
entire complaint because the complaint fails to state on whose behalf each
cause of action is filed.
Under California Rules of Court, rule 2.112, each cause
of action in the complaint must state the names of the party asserting the
cause of action, if more than one party is represented on the pleading, and
against who the party is asserting the cause of action. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.112(3), (4).)
The court finds that the complaint sufficiently
identifies which Plaintiffs are asserting which causes of actions against
Defendants. The first paragraphs under
the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of action state
that “Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate” allegations against Defendants, the
Fifth Cause of Action states that “Plaintiffs Richardson and Corbitt” repeat
and incorporate allegations against all Defendants. (See Compl., ¶¶ 28, 35, 39,
45, 50, 55, 61.)
Therefore, the court does not strike the entire complaint
on this ground.
Punitive Damages and Treble Damages
Next, Defendant moves to strike punitive damages and
trebling of damages from the breach of contract action. (See Compl., ¶¶ 64-65, Prayer, para. 2.)
“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising
from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in
addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and
by way of punishing the defendant.”
(Civ. Code § 3294(a).)
Plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages on any of
their causes of actions because the court sustained the demurrer to the entire
complaint. Additionally, the third,
fourth, and seventh causes of action arise from an alleged contract. Therefore, Plaintiffs have no basis for
punitive damages.
Defendants do not present any legal authority to support
their contentions regarding trebling of damages. Therefore, the court does not address this
argument. (See In re Estate of
Randall (1924) 194 Cal. 725, 728-29 [“Contentions supported neither by
argument nor by citation of authority are deemed to be without foundation, and
to have been abandoned.”][internal quotations omitted].)
Regardless, the court sustained the demurrer to all
causes of action leaving Plaintiffs without a basis for any damages.
Attorney
Fees
Finally, Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’ request
for attorney’s fees because the complaint does not allege a statutory or
contractual basis for such fees.
Attorney fees are available when authorized
by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10); Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th
599, 606; Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Protection v. Lebrock (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 1137, 1141.)
Because Plaintiffs do not allege attorney
fees based on law, statute, or an existing contract, the court strikes the
request from the complaint.
Therefore, the court grants Defendants motion
to strike punitive damages and attorney’s fees from the complaint and the
complaint’s prayer for relief. The court
does not grant Defendants’ request to strike trebling of damages.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ demurrer to the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Seventh causes of action is sustained with leave to amend. Defendants’ demurrer to the Sixth cause of
action is sustained without leave to amend.
The motion to strike is granted, in part regarding
attorney fees and punitive damages and is denied in part regarding treble
damages. The court strikes the following
from the complaint: Paragraphs 38, 44, 48, 49, 53, 54, 59, 60, and 65; Prayer
for Relief, paragraphs 2 and 3.
Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint within thirty
(30) days of this order.
Defendants to give notice.