Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 24CHCV03626, Date: 2025-01-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24CHCV03626 Hearing Date: January 22, 2025 Dept: F43
Dept.
F43
Date:
01-22-25
Case
# 24CHCV03626, Aguilar, et al. v. MV Transportation, Inc.
Trial
Date: None set.
DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE
MOVING
PARTY: Defendant MV Transportation, Inc.
RESPONDING
PARTIES: Plaintiffs Karla Aguilar and Olga Marina Aguilar
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Order
sustaining demurrer to the Third Cause of Action and granting motion to strike
punitive damages.
RULING: Demurrer to the
Third Cause of Action is sustained, with leave to amend. Motion to strike is
moot.
SUMMARY
OF ACTION
On
October 7, 2024, plaintiffs Karla Aguilar (Aguilar) and Olga Marina Aguilar
Jimenez (Jimenez) filed this case against defendant MV Transportation, Inc.
(Defendant) and Does 1 through 25, alleging causes of action for negligence,
negligent hiring, and fraud - concealment.
The
complaint alleges that on October 17, 2022, Aguilar, a 41-year-old disabled
adult, scheduled a pickup by a transit van operated by Defendant. (Compl., ¶ 10.) Defendant’s van arrived at Aguilar’s
residence at 8:20 a.m. (Compl., ¶
11.) The van was equipped with a
wheelchair lift mechanism. (Ibid.) Doe 1, who Plaintiffs believe is Defendant’s
employee, parked the van along the curb in front of Aguilar’s residence. (Compl., ¶ 12.) Shortly after the van arrived, Jimenez,
Aguilar’s mother, wheeled Aguilar from the house to the curb where the van was
parked. (Ibid.)
Doe
1 placed Aguilar on the lift mechanism, facing inward, and engaged the
mechanism to lift Aguilar into the van.
(Compl., ¶ 13.) Once the
mechanism was in place, Aguilar wheeled herself into the van and maneuvered
across the aisle to the left side of the van towards the wheelchair docking
based and. (Compl., ¶ 13.) As she began turning left, her wheelchair
tipped backwards, and because the van was located on an incline/decline and
uneven center of gravity, she fell backwards and violently struck the back of
head on the interior of the van. (Compl.,
¶¶ 13-14.) No other passengers or persons
were in the van at the time of the incident.
(Ibid.)
Defendant
filed this demurrer to the Third Cause of Action and a motion to strike
punitive damages from the complaint on December 17, 2024. Plaintiffs filed an opposition on December
30, 2024. Defendant replied on January
14, 2025.
MEET
AND CONFER
Before filing a demurrer or motion to strike, the
parties must meet and confer “in person, by telephone, or by video
conference.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§
430.41, subd. (a), 435.5, subd. (a).)
The moving party must file and serve a meet and confer declaration
stating either: (1) the means by which the parties met and conferred, that the
parties did not reach an agreement resolving the issues raised in the demurrer
or motion to strike; or (2) that the party who filed the pleading subject to
the demurrer or motion to strike failed to respond to the meet and confer
request or failed to meet and confer in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, subd. (a)(3),
435.5, subd. (a)(3).)
Defendant’s
counsel states that on November 13, 2024 he sent several correspondences to
Plaintiff about filing a demurrer and motion to strike. (Declaration of William S. McIntosh, ¶
3.) On November 15, 2024, Plaintiffs’
counsel replied, and the parties met and conferred on the merits of the fraud
cause of action and the punitive damages.
(Ibid.) The parties did
not reach a resolution, and Plaintiff granted Defendant an extension to respond
by December 17, 2024. (Ibid.) It is unclear whether the parties met and
conferred in person or telephonically.
SUMMARY
OF ARGUMENTS
Defendant
argues that the complaint fails to plead a fraudulent concealment cause of
action according to California’s heightened particularity standard and that the
complaint is uncertain about what conduct constitutes fraud. Further, the Court should strike punitive
damages because the complaint fails to plead fraud based on the conduct of
Defendants’ officers or managers of a corporation.
Plaintiffs
oppose arguing the complaint sufficiently pleads fraudulent concealment based
on facts within Plaintiff’s current knowledge.
Defendant’s demurrer contains a myriad of contradictory statements including
stating Plaintiffs must plead fraud based upon “absence of a fiduciary or
confidential relationship” when the complaint alleges a “special relationship”
existed between Defendant and Plaintiffs.
Further, Plaintiffs argue punitive damages based upon Defendant’s subsequent
ratification of its employees and officers’ actions, not advanced knowledge.
Defendant
replies noting Plaintiffs’ opposition avoids addressing the fraud heightened
pleading standard and the ambiguity regarding the “special relationship” which
would give rise to a duty. This
ambiguity exists because the complaint lacks the requisite specificity required
for fraud.
ANALYSIS
A¿party
may respond to a pleading against it by demurrer based on one or more of eight
enumerated grounds, including¿that¿“the pleading does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action” and is uncertain, meaning
“ambiguous and unintelligible.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e), (f).) The grounds for demurring
must be apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the
court may take judicial notice. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39
Cal.3d 311, 318.)
The
purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising
questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey
(1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the
construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its
allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice
between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 452.) The court “treat[s] the demurrer
as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law[.]”
(Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court
liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has
been stated. (Picton v. Anderson
Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)
Third
Cause of Action: Fraudulent - Concealment
Defendant
demurs to the Third Cause of Action because the complaint fails to allege
sufficient facts and is uncertain.
Defendant argues the complaint lacks specific facts articulating a duty
that Defendant owed to either plaintiff. The complaint also fails to plead the basis
for a fraudulent concealment claim absent a fiduciary or confidential
relationship or resulting damages based on the alleged concealment. The complaint also contradicts itself by stating
Aguilar was alone and unattended in the transit van but that only Defendant
knew about the incident. It is unclear
how Defendant would know the facts of the alleged incident were not known to Aguilar
because the complaint states Aguilar was the only individual present at the
time of the incident. The complaint also
fails to allege with particularity facts showing that Defendant actively
concealed the information from Plaintiff.
The anonymous phone call allegation is insufficient.
Plaintiffs
oppose arguing that the complaint adequately alleges a “special relationship”
between Defendants and Aguilar and that Defendant is also a common carrier with
a duty to Aguilar. Further, the
complaint sufficiently alleges emotional distress, a CACI-approved category of
recovery for non-economic damages.
Defendant
replies that Plaintiffs’ opposition ignores the complaint’s failure to meet
California’s heightened fraud pleading standard. Plaintiffs’ cited authority does not address fraud,
except the Steiner case. The
opposition also fails to address the ambiguity and lack of clarity on who was
present during the alleged incident. The
complaint states that Aguilar allegedly wheeled herself into the transit vans
interior and fell backwards and Defendant’s employee did not witness the
incident, as Defendant’s employee came up on the scene after the alleged
incident occurred. It is unclear what
Plaintiffs allege was “concealed.”
To
establish fraudulent concealment, the complaint must plead “(1) concealment or suppression
of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff;
(3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing
or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would
not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or
suppressed fact; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the
concealment or suppression of the fact.”
(Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 606.) Fraud claims must be pled with specificity;
general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12
Cal.4th 631, 645.) The complaint must
plead facts showing “how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the
representations were tendered.” (Ibid.) The facts must be clear enough to inform the
opposing party what they must answer.
(See Scafidi v. Western Loan & Building Co. (1946) 72
Cal.App.2d 550, 558.)
A
person must speak the whole truth and must “not conceal any facts which
materially qualify those stated. One who
is asked for or volunteers information must be truthful, and the telling
of a half-truth calculated to deceive is fraud.” (Pavicich v. Santucci (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 382, 398 [internal
citations omitted].) “[A] duty to
disclose arises in this context only where there is already a sufficient
relationship or transaction between the parties.” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7
Cal.App.5th 276, 312.) A sufficient
relationship arises when a transaction occurs between the parties such as that
of a buyer and a seller, an employer and a prospective employee or parties
entering into any kind of contract. (LiMandri
v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 337.)
If
no sufficient relationship or transaction exists, a cause of action for
non-disclosure of material facts exists if “(1) the defendant makes
representations but does not disclose facts which materially qualify the facts
disclosed, or which render his disclosure likely to mislead; (2) the facts are
known or accessible only to defendant, and defendant knows they are not known
to or reasonably discoverable by the plaintiff; (3) the defendant actively
conceals discovery from the plaintiff.”
(Linear Tech. Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th
115, 132; Warner Constr. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d
285, 294.) “[C]onclusionary allegations
that the omissions were intentional and for the purpose of defrauding and
deceiving plaintiffs and bringing about the purchase . . . and that plaintiffs
relied on the omissions in making such purchase are insufficient [to show fraud
by concealment].” (Goodman v. Kennedy
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 347.)
The
Court finds that the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to establish
fraudulent concealment and that the cause of action is uncertain due to ambiguity
regarding specific facts. Plaintiffs
allege they were harmed by Defendant concealing information and that Defendant
owed Plaintiffs a duty of care because of the special relationship that existed
between Defendants and Plaintiffs. (Compl.,
¶ 37.) Plaintiffs allege that as a
common carrier, Defendant owed Aguilar the highest degree of care in carrying
out its paratransit services including using vigilance and foresight and
preventing harm to its passengers.
(Compl., ¶¶ 15-16.) While these
allegations are enough to state a special relationship between Aguilar and
Defendant, these facts do not establish a special relationship between Jimenez
and Defendant. And although the
complaint alleges that Defendant knew about Aguilar’s diminished capacity to
recall past events, the complaint is unclear about how Defendants concealed or
tried to conceal material facts about Aguilar’s accident from Aguilar.
Regarding
Jimenez, the complaint does not allege a transaction or relationship between Jimenez
and Defendant. The complaint does allege
that Defendant intentionally failed to disclose to Jimenez that Aguilar was
injured and hoped that Jimenez would not discover the injury occurred while
Aguilar was in Defendants’ custody and care.
(Compl., ¶ 38.) The complaint
alleges Jimenez did not know this information until 20 hours after the incident
when Jimenez received an anonymous phone call, informing her that Aguilar had
been injured and Defendant tried to “cover it up.” (Compl., ¶¶ 39, 41.) Jimenez believes the call came from one of
Defendant’s employees. (Compl., ¶ 41.) Plaintiffs allege that had Jimenez known this
information sooner, Plaintiffs would have behaved differently by seeking
immediate medical care for Aguilar.
(Compl., ¶ 42.) Plaintiffs allege
this resulted in Jimenez suffering emotional distress, but the complaint does
not state facts describing Jimenez’s alleged injuries. (Compl., ¶ 43.)
Accordingly,
the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the Third Cause of Action.
Motion to Strike
“Any
party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a
notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.) A court may strike from the complaint any
irrelevant, false, or improper matter.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)
The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not
drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an
order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
436, subd. (b).) A complaint must plead
ultimate facts to support punitive damages.
(Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255; Antelope
Valley Groundwater Cases 59 Cal.App.5th
241, 265 [“[T]he term ‘ultimate fact’ generally refers to a core fact,
such as an essential element of a claim.”].)
Punitive Damages
Defendant moves to strike punitive damages from the
complaint: “For punitive damages on Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action.” (Comp., Prayer, ¶ 10.)
Because the Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to
the Third Cause of Action, Defendant’s motion to strike punitive damages is
moot.
Leave to Amend
Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a
reasonable possibility of successful amendment.
(Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the
court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015)
244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) The complaint
must plead facts in summary fashion and in ordinary and concise language. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1).)
Plaintiff’s
opposition states facts not alleged in the complaint which implies that Plaintiffs
could amend their complaint to add more facts.
Accordingly, leave to amend is granted.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s demurrer to the Third Cause of Action is
sustained, with leave to amend. The
motion to strike is moot.
Defendant to give notice.