Judge: Gary I. Micon, Case: 24CHCV03748, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24CHCV03748 Hearing Date: February 19, 2025 Dept: F43
Dept. F43
Date: 02-19-25
Case # 24CHCV03748, Arnold, et al. v. Los
Angeles Unified School District, et al.
Trial Date: None set.
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
CASES
MOVING PARTIES: Plaintiffs Iris Arnold,
Setiawatin Beckman, Angela Karapetyan, Sarah Olczak, Laurie Peachey, and
Protection for the Educational Rights of Kids
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Los Angeles
Unified School District
RELIEF REQUESTED
Order consolidating this case (24CHCV03748)
with case number (22CHCV00276).
RULING: Motion
is denied, without prejudice.
SUMMARY OF ACTION
Plaintiffs Iris Arnold, Setiawatin Beckman,
Angela Karapetyan, Sarah Olczak, and Laurie Peachey (Plaintiffs) were teachers
and other employees at Granada Hills Charter High School (Granada), an
independent public charter school operating under a
charter granted by the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD).
In August 2021, a few months after the
roll-out of the first COVID-19 vaccines, LAUSD imposed a vaccination mandate on
all employees who worked in person at LAUSD campuses, including its charter
schools. Charter schools were required
to certify by October 15, 2021, that they had complied with the mandate. Failure to do so, LAUSD warned, would be a
material breach of a school’s charter and could result in a variety of
sanctions: revocation of the charter; removing people and personal property
from the premises; termination of the charter’s right to occupy LAUSD-owned
property; or other steps to mitigate the impact of the charter’s breach. Any charter school sanctioned for not
complying would also be liable for any costs LAUSD incurred as a result. Reasonable accommodations that complied with
this directive were allowed by LAUSD at LAUSD-owned sites. Charter school operations carried on at
privately-owned locations could grant reasonable accommodations that allowed
for in-person work.
To comply with LAUSD’s mandate, Granada mandated
that all its employees receive the COVID-19 vaccine. Granada provided an interactive process by
which employees who wanted an exemption from the mandate could provide
information to the administration for consideration. The five Plaintiffs submitted forms outlining
religious or disabilities exemptions. During
the interactive process, Granada determined that Plaintiffs’ essential job
functions required them work in person on Granada’s LAUSD-owned campus. Granada also determined that any attempts to
accommodate Plaintiffs’ requests would lead to undue hardship for Granada
including increased costs from hiring more employees if Plaintiffs worked
remotely or were placed on leave and potentially losing its charter. Because of the terms of the vaccine mandate
and the risk of undue hardship, Granada could not allow Plaintiffs to be on
campus without being vaccinated and terminated Plaintiffs’ employment.
Plaintiffs sued Granada and Granada Principal
Brian Bauer (case number 22CHCV00276) on April 22, 2022 alleging causes of
action under the Fair Employment and Housing Act including (1) Religious Creed
Discrimination, (2) Disability Discrimination, and (3) Failure to Engage in an
Interactive Process. On December 17,
2024, the Court granted Granada and Bauer’s motion for summary judgment on all
causes of action. On December 23, 2024,
Plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the Court’s ruling.
On October 14, 2024, Plaintiffs sued LAUSD
(case number 24CHCV03748) alleging causes of action under the Fair Employment
and Housing Act including (1) Religious Creed Discrimination, (2) Disability
Discrimination, for (3) violation of article I section 1 of the California
Constitution, and for (4) Declaratory Relief.
Plaintiffs allege that LAUSD used its contracting power to pressure
Granada into taking steps which resulted in Granada terminating Plaintiffs’
employment.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Plaintiffs move to consolidate this case 24CHCV03748
with case 22CHCV00276, Iris Arnold, et al. v. Brian Bauer, et al., for
all purposes. Both cases are based on
the same facts and legal issues: Granada’s refusal to accommodate Plaintiffs’
objections to COVID-19 vaccination, claims for damages under California’s Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and deciding whether Granada or LAUSD was
responsible for failing to accommodate Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs and
medical conditions. Both cases also turn
on the same evidence: Deposition of Francisco Serrato, various email threads, Plaintiffs’
religious exemption request forms, and accommodations rejection letters. Consolidation would prevent any risk of
conflicting rulings on identical issues because Granada blames LAUSD for its
failure to grant in-person accommodations.
Consolidation will not delay trial in Granada’s case, will promote
efficiency, and will reduce the burdens on the Court, the parties, and
third-party witnesses who would otherwise be forced to testify to the same
issues in multiple proceedings. Finally,
consolidation will prevent prejudice to the parties by ensuring that one jury
decides who was responsible for the failure to accommodate Plaintiffs.
LAUSD opposes consolidation. Plaintiffs’ motion is moot because case
number 22CHCV00276 has effectively been dismissed following the Court’s
December 17, 2024 ruling granting summary judgment in defendants’ favor. LAUSD also contends that the two cases
involve distinct parties, claims, legal issues, and evidence. Case number 22CHCV00276 focuses on whether
Granada’s decision to terminate Plaintiffs was lawful and whether accommodating
Plaintiffs would have constituted undue hardship. Case number 24CHCV03748 focuses on direct
liability and external influence with LAUSD acting as a potential joint or
indirect employer of Plaintiffs. By
joining theses cases, the Court risks causing undue complexity, confusion, and
prejudice to the parties, outweighing any potential time or cost savings. Consolidation would cause significant delays,
due to the different procedural postures of the two cases, with case number
22CHCV00276 nearing trial while case number 24CHCV03748 is still in its
infancy.
ANALYSIS
“When actions involving a common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or
all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may
tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1048, subd. (a).) “Coordination of civil actions sharing a
common question of fact or law is appropriate if one judge hearing all of the
actions . . . will promote the ends of justice taking into account whether the
common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the
litigation; the convenience of the parties, witnesses, and counsel; the
relative development of the actions and the work product of counsel; the
efficient utilization; the calendar of the courts; the disadvantages of
duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and, the likelihood
of settlement of the actions without further litigation should coordination be
denied.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 404.1.)
“The purpose of consolidation is merely to promote trial
convenience and economy by avoiding duplication of procedure, particularly in
the proof of issues common to both actions.” (Estate of Baker (1982)
131 Cal.App.3d 471, 485 [citation omitted].) Consolidation does not require identical
causes of action in each case, absolute identity of the parties, or identical
allegations. (Ibid.) Where
common issues are present in two cases, consolidation is appropriate. (Todd-Stenberg
v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 976, 978-79.)
In deciding a motion to consolidate, the court considers
several factors: (1) timeliness of the motion and whether consolidation would
delay trial or discovery already proceeded in one case; (2) complexity of the
issues and risk of confusing the jury; and (3) whether consolidation would
adversely affect the rights of any party.
(Rutter Group, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial, §
12:362.) Consolidation is improper if it
forces counsel for one party to argue contradictory positions. (State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 428, 432.)
Procedural
Requirements
A motion to consolidate is “deemed a single
motion, . . . but memorandums, declarations, and other supporting papers must
be filed only in the lowest numbered case.”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.350(a)(2)(A).) The motion “[m]ust be served on all attorneys
of record and all nonrepresented partes in all of the cases sought to be
consolidated.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.350(a)(2)(B).)¿¿
Moreover, Los Angeles County Court Rules,
Rule 3.3(g)(1) provides that “[c]ases may not be consolidated unless they are
in the same department.” Both cases were
filed in Chatsworth Department F43.
Before issuing a decision on the merits of Plaintiffs’ motion,
the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ notice of motion does not comply with the requirements
in California Rule of Court 3.350(a)(1)(A)-(C).
Regarding case 22CHCV00276, the notice of motion does not list the named
parties, the names of the parties who have appeared, or the caption. The notice does contain the names of the
attorneys of record in case 22CHCV00276.
Plaintiffs are advised to review Rule of
Court 3.350(a)(1)(A)-(C) to ensure all requirements for the notice of motion
have been met prior to filing and serving a motion to consolidate.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion
to consolidate cases is denied, without prejudice.
Plaintiffs to provide notice.