Judge Gary I. Micon, Case Number: 25CHCV00009, Date: 2025-03-05 Tentative Ruling

Order striking Plaintiff’s complaint or in the alternative striking the first through tenth causes of action or in the alternative striking paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 24, 27, 29, 33, 34, 37, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, and 66, and $7,479.37 in attorney’s fees and costs for each Defendant.

RULING: Motion is granted for the entire complaint and $14,958.75 in attorney fees and $990.00 in costs is granted.

Plaintiff Jessica Mulhearn (Plaintiff), in pro per, filed this wrongful eviction case against defendants ADR/Preferred Business Properties and Ozer-Zelzah Apartments (Defendants) on January 2, 2025. Plaintiff alleges ten causes of action: breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, wrongful eviction, constructive eviction, conversion, and fraud.[1]

Plaintiff was a property manager for Defendants’ property. On March 7, 2022, Plaintiff sued Defendants for various FEHA claims, violation of the family rights act and intentional infliction of emotional distress (case 22STCV08195). Plaintiff alleges that she entered into stipulated agreement with Defendants on August 24, 2022. (Compl., ¶ 7.) The agreement allowed Plaintiff to remain in possession of her apartment unit rent-free for two years through August 31, 2024, after which Plaintiff agreed to vacate and waive any and all defenses to eviction proceedings. (Compl., ¶ 7, Exh. A.) Plaintiff filed notice of the settlement with Judge Richard L. Fruin in Stanley Mosk Dept. 15 on August 1, 2022. Dismissal was entered on September 8, 2022.

On August 29, 2024, Defendants emailed Plaintiff with a rent statement seeking rent for September 2024 to be paid by September 1, 2024. (Compl. ¶ 8, Exh. 1, p. 2.) Defendants did the same for October, November, and December 2024, and Plaintiff remitted payment via check for each statement. (Compl., ¶¶ 8-11, Exh. 1-8.) In October 2024, Defendants moved to enforce the settlement agreement and for a ruling ordering Plaintiff to vacate the premises. Plaintiff opposed seeking enforcement of the “new landlord-tenant” agreement or return of her rent payments. Judge Fruin granted Defendants’ motion, including ordering Defendant to return Plaintiff’s payments less attorney fees, and entered judgment on December 3, 2024.

Plaintiff then filed this case alleging that Defendants waived their rights to enforce the stipulated agreement because the monthly rent statements created a new landlord-tenant relationship which voided the stipulate agreement. (Compl., ¶¶ 11-12.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants refused to waive the stipulated agreement, evicted Plaintiff, used the court for an illegal purpose by failing to honor the landlord-tenant relationship, refused to return Plaintiff’s rent payments, failed to serve Plaintiff a just cause notice to terminate tenancy, and failed to use the unlawful detainer summary proceeding to seek possession of the apartment unit. (Compl., ¶ 20, 42, 48.)

On January 31 and February 3, 2025, Defendants each filed identical special anti-SLAPP motions to strike Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff filed oppositions on February 11 and 13, 2025. Defendants replied on February 24, 2025. Plaintiff filed further replies on February 27, 2025 alleging.

· Exhibit A: Motion to Enforce Settlement – Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Enforce Settlement And For Recovery of Fees and Costs.

· Exhibit B: Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement And For Recovery of Fees and Costs.

· Exhibit C: Declaration of Dana Ozer in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement And For Recovery of Fees and Costs.

· Exhibit D: Declaration of Jessica DiPalma in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement And For Recovery of Fees and Costs.

· Exhibit E: Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Enforce and for Fees and Costs; Plaintiff's Request for Attorneys' Fees and Costs in the Amount of $9,470.00 Against Defendants ADR Properties, Ozer-Zelzah Apartments, Dana Ozer, And Carrie Ventrella, Jointly.

· Exhibit F: Declaration of Jessica Mulhearn in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion.

· Exhibit G: Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and Recovery of Fees and Costs.

· Exhibit H: Court’s Ruling on Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and for Recovery of Fees and Costs.

· Exhibit I: Order Granting Motion to Enforce Settlement and for Recovery of Fees and Costs.

The court grants Defendants’ requests pursuant to Evidence Code sections 451, 452, and 453 and People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 280.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint arises from Defendants’ protected activity of moving to enforce a settlement agreement under section 664.6 in case 22STCV08195. Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s opposing arguments are barred by the res judicata primary rights theory due to Judge Fruin’s final judgment. Finally, Defendants state they are entitled to attorney fees under section 425.16(c)(1).

Plaintiff opposes arguing that Defendants did not meet their burden of demonstrating her causes of action arise from protected activity. Plaintiff’s claims arise from a mix of unprotected activity and merely incidental protected activity. Plaintiff’s claims are likely to survive on the merits. Further, the court should not grant Defendants attorney fees because the settlement agreement’s attorney fee provision was voided by a new landlord-tenant agreement and the litigation privilege and public interest exemption apply to this motion. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants failed to properly serve the nine documents attached to the proof of service filed on February 7, 2025 and that the documents attached to the proof of service were inadmissible.[2]

“A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

The trial court applies a burden shifting analysis when considering a special motion to strike brought under section 425.16 (the “Anti-SLAPP Statute”). (Soukun v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 278.) First, the defense carries the burden of making a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action arises from “any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the [federal or state constitution] with a public issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b); see Soukun, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 278.) Second, and only if the defense meets its threshold burden, the burden will shift to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of the claims at issue. (See Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67; Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.)

First Step: Plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and tenth causes of action arise from Defendants’ protected activity.

“To prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion, the movant must first make ‘a threshold showing the challenged cause of action’ arises from an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192.)

An act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(1)-(4).)

Defendants contend that their acts of moving for judicial enforcement of the settlement agreement under section 664.6 in case 22STCV08195 is protected activity under 425.16(e) subdivisions (2) and (4). Plaintiff opposes stating the causes of action allege a mixture of unprotected and protected activity. The protected activity is merely incidental.

“[T]he requirement that the statement or conduct be connected with an issue of public interest—a limitation that, among other things, means that in many cases the statement or conduct will be a part of a public debate and the public therefore will be exposed to varying viewpoints on the issue.” (Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 898.) “The most commonly articulated definitions of ‘statements made in connection with a public issue’ focus on whether (1) the subject of the statement or activity precipitating the claim was a person or entity in the public eye; (2) the statement or activity precipitating the claim involved conduct that could affect large numbers of people beyond the direct participants; and (3) whether the statement or activity precipitating the claim involved a topic of widespread public interest. [Citations] As to the latter, it is not enough that the statement refer to a subject of widespread public interest; the statement must in some manner itself contribute to the public debate. [Citations]” (Id.)

Filing a lawsuit to enforce an agreement is protected activity. (See Sonoma Foods, Inc. v. Sonoma Cheese Factory, LLC (N.D. Cal. 2007) 634 F.Supp.2d 1009, 1016; Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. v. Krane & Smith, APC 225 Cal.App.4th 660, 684, disapproved on other grounds by Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225; Cordoba Corp. v. City of Industry (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 145, 151.)

Plaintiff’s complaint is grounded in allegations that Defendants pursued litigation against Plaintiff, based on a void settlement agreement, evicted Plaintiff from an apartment after sending Plaintiff four monthly rent statements that Plaintiff paid in full, and then refused to refund Plaintiff’s payments. The agreement allowed Plaintiff to remain in possession of her apartment unit rent-free for two years through August 31, 2024, after which Plaintiff agreed to vacate and waive any and all defenses to eviction proceedings. (Compl., ¶ 7, Exh. A.) When Plaintiff did not vacate, Defendants moved to enforce the settlement agreement. After Judge Fruin granted Defendants’ motion, ordered Plaintiff to vacate the premises, and ordered Defendants to return Plaintiff’s rent payments, less Defendants’ attorney fees, Plaintiff filed this motion to enforce the tenancy that allegedly voided the settlement agreement.

Considering the basis of case 22STCV08195, the timing of Plaintiff filing her complaint, and that Plaintiff alleges conduct based out of Defendants’ enforcement of the settlement agreement and the court’s final judgment enforcing the agreement, Defendants’ statements in litigating the enforcement of the settlement agreement is protected activity.

“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062.) Courts must consider the elements of each cause of action and whether Defendant sufficiently identified the protected activity each cause of action rests on. (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.) Filing an action after protected activity occurred “does not mean the action arose from the activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.) “Moreover, that a cause of action arguably may have been ‘triggered’ by protected activity does not entail it is one arising from such. . . . the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Ibid.; see Wong v. Wong (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 358, 367.) If the allegations referring to protected activity are only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on nonprotected activity, collateral references to protected activity should not subject the cause of action to the anti-SLAPP statute. (Martinez v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 188.)

Defendants contend that each cause of action in Plaintiff’s complaint arises from Defendants’ protected activity of moving for judicial enforcement of the settlement agreement under section 664.6. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations that Defendants sought to enforce a stipulated agreement, used “the court for an illegal purpose,” and acted “in bad faith in the name of justice.” (Compl., ¶¶ 15-16.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff repeats these allegations verbatim or augmented with additional allegations based on the settlement agreement. (Motion [citing Compl., ¶¶ 18 (first); 20 (second); 22, 24 (third); 25, 27 (fourth); 28-29 (fifth); 31, 33 (sixth); 36, 37 (seventh); 39, 41-42 (eighth); 43 (ninth); 53, 59, 66 (tenth).].)

Plaintiff argues that her causes of action do not arise from Defendants’ protected activity because each cause of action is based on Defendants’ breach of a private rental contract formed between the parties in August 2024. Any mention of the void settlement agreement is merely incidental to Plaintiff’s causes of action.

Plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and tenth causes of action primarily arise from Defendants’ enforcement of the August 2022 settlement agreement through the judicial system.

Plaintiff’s first cause of action concerns breach of contract due to Defendants evicting Plaintiff based on the August 24, 2022 settlement agreement even though Defendants sent Plaintiff subsequent rent statements, Plaintiff timely paid the rent, and Defendants refused to return the rental money to Plaintiff. The second cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing alleges that Defendants failing to waive enforcement of the settlement agreement, failing to honor the new rental agreement formed from the new rental statements and Plaintiff’s rent payments, and failing to serve Plaintiff a just cause notice for terminating her tenancy. The third cause of action breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment alleges that Defendants failed to cease enforcing the settlement agreement after creating a landlord-tenant relationship and seeking a writ of possession and Sheriff’s lockout to evict Plaintiff from the premises. The fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleges that Defendants caused Plaintiff to suffer emotional distress by filing a motion to enforce the voided settlement agreement and withholding the $8,000.00 in rent paid by Plaintiff. The fifth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress alleges that Defendants failed to enforce their landlord-tenant relationship with Plaintiff by enforcing the voided settlement agreement and using the court system in bad faith to evict Plaintiff from the premises. The sixth cause of action for negligence alleges that Defendants caused Plaintiff damages by breaching various duties including not interfering with Plaintiff’s use of the apartment and failing to return tender to Plaintiff after the settlement agreement expired. The seventh cause of action for wrongful eviction alleges that Defendants willfully interrupted and terminated Plaintiff’s tenancy based on the voided settlement agreement and moved to enforce the settlement agreement even though Plaintiff paid $8,000.00 in rent. The eighth cause of action for constructive eviction alleges that Defendants caused Plaintiff to suffer harm by refusing to waive the stipulated settlement agreement based on the new landlord-tenant relationship. The tenth cause of action for fraud alleges that Defendants engaged in fraud by entering into the settlement agreement and creating a new landlord-tenant relationship in August 2024 with the intent to collect rent Defendants could not collect under the stipulated agreement.

As pleaded, the ninth cause of action for conversion does not arise from protected activity. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants substantially interfered with Plaintiff’s right to possess an interest, wrongfully exercised control over Plaintiff’s personal property ($8,000.00 in rent), and refused to return the $8,000.00 to Plaintiff. Plaintiff also incorporates allegations arising from the first through eighth causes of action. However, the cause of action does not state how the settlement agreement or Defendants’ enforcement the settlement agreement factors into this cause of action, this cause of action does not arise from protected activity. (See Nirschl v. Schiller (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 386, 353-54 [pleading “incorporated” allegations is not sufficient to show an element of a cause of action is based on protected activity].) Further, “taking possession of personal property is not a protected activity, because it is conduct, not a written or oral statement.” (Graham-Sult v. Clainos (9th Cir. 2014) 756 F.3d 724, 737.)

Accordingly, Defendants sufficiently allege that the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and tenth causes of action arise from protected activity.

Second Step: Plaintiff does not meet her burden of demonstrating a probability of success on the merits of any of her causes of action.

The second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis is a “summary-judgment-like procedure” limited to whether “the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. [The court] accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. Claims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384-85 [citations omitted].)

Plaintiff fails to meet her burden of showing even a minimal probability of success on the merits of her causes of action. Plaintiff quotes various anti-SLAPP cases without providing any analysis of her causes of action.

Plaintiff also argues that the litigation privilege and the public interest exemption protect her complaint from Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion.

The litigation privilege arises when litigation is “contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration as a means of obtaining access to the courts for the purpose of resolving the dispute.” (Haneline Pacific Properties, LLC v. May (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 311, 319.) The privilege does not apply to statement made as a “tactical ploy to negotiate a bargain.” (Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 36.) “A plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing on the merits of a cause of action for anti-SLAPP purposes where the cause of action is barred by the litigation privilege codified in Civil Code section 47.” (Flickinger v. Finwall (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 822, 840.)

The litigation privilege applies to any communication “(1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Medallion Film LL v. LLC v. Loeb & Loeb LLP (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1272, 1290.) The privilege applies to statements made during a trial or other proceedings and may also apply to “steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards. . . . The privilege is absolute and applies regardless of malice.” (Ibid. [quoting Flickinger, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 840].)

Plaintiff does not present a sufficient substantive litigation privilege argument. Plaintiff only contends that the new landlord-tenant relationship voided the settlement agreement and that the acts of creating Plaintiff’s new tenancy acts are not protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. (Opposition, pp. 6:24-26, 7:1-2.) As the court will discuss later in this tentative, Plaintiff is barred from using this argument to negate the enforceability of the settlement agreement because Judge Fruin has already entered judgment enforcing the agreement.

The public interest exception, codified at section 425.16, subdivision (b), does not apply to actions brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public if: (1) plaintiff does not seek any relief greater than or different from the relief sought for the general public or a class of which the plaintiff is a member, excluding a claim for attorney’s fees, costs, or penalties; (2) the action, if successful, would enforce an important right affecting the public interest, and would confer a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, on the general public or a large class of persons; and (3) private enforcement is necessary and places a disproportionate financial burden on the plaintiff in relation to the plaintiff’s stake in the matter. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.17, subd. (b).)

Similar to the litigation privilege argument, Plaintiff has not met her burden of showing that all three conditions stated above exist.

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to meet her burden of proving her first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and tenth causes of action have a probability of succeeding on the merits.

Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ request for attorney fees through an illegality defense. Plaintiff contends that illegality of contract precludes the court from enforcing the settlement agreement’s attorney fees provision. Plaintiff argues that the settlement agreement’s attorney fee provision was voided by Defendants’ new offer, acceptance, and valid consideration which created a new landlord-tenant agreement which was bargained. These acts are not protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. Although Plaintiff cites to legal authority to support her illegality argument, Plaintiff does not sufficiently explain how the settlement agreement’s attorney fee provision was voided by a “new contract” when another court already ruled that Plaintiff did not apply for a new landlord-tenant relationship. (RJN, Exh. D, p. 10, ¶ 9; Exh. E, p. 11.)

Res Judicata bars Plaintiff from bringing her ninth cause of action for conversion.

Defendants’ replies raise a res judicata argument contending that Plaintiff is barred from raising her opposition arguments based in her rights under the settlement agreement. Specifically, Plaintiff has already asserted the same primary rights argument and evidence regarding the creation of a new tenancy in case 22STCV08195. (Citing RJN – Exhs. A, EF, F, H-J [noticing Plaintiff’s opposing arguments and the court’s final judgment].) Plaintiff raised these same arguments in case 22STCV08195, and that court has already entered a final judgment.

Under the res judicata primary rights theory, “a judgment for the defendant is a bar to a subsequent action by the plaintiff based on the same injury to the same right” even if Plaintiff presents differ legal theories. (Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 798.) The primary right is Plaintiff’s right to be free from suffering a particular injury. (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 681-82.) Res judicata applies if “(1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present proceeding is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present proceeding or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding.” (Federation of Hillside & Canyon Ass’ns. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1180, 120.) “Res judicata applies to a court-approved settlement agreement[.]” (Villacres v. ABM Indus., Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 577.) Courts may examine the agreement’s terms to ensure the parties did not waive a res judicata defense. (Ibid.)

On November 22, 2024, Judge Richard L. Fruin granted Defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement, ordered Plaintiff to vacate the apartment within three days of the order, and ordered Defendants to return Plaintiff’s rent payments, less Defendant’s attorney’s fees pursuant to the settlement agreement, within three days of Plaintiff vacating the apartment. (RJN - Exh. I, p. 2.) Judge Fruin entered a final judgment on December 3, 2024. (RJN - Exh. J., p. 1.) Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in January 2025 seeking return of the full $8,000.00 in alleged rent paid.

Plaintiff is barred from seeking the $8,000.00 in rent payments under her conversion claim because Judge Fruin has already ruled on Plaintiff’s right to rent payments according to the settlement agreement, which Judge Fruin also found valid and enforceable.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action for conversion also fails on the merits.

If a defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion succeeds, the court must award attorneys’ fees and costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).)

Defendants seek $15,948.75 in attorney fees and costs—$4,365.00 for Attorney Steven J. Revitz; $10,593.75 for Attorney Jay Woollacott; $870.00 under section 425.16(c)(1); and $120.00 in filing fees. Attorney Woollacott states that each defendant would receive $7,479.37 in attorney fees and $495 in court costs. (Declaration of Jay Woollacott, ¶ 3.)

Attorney Revitz’s hourly rate is $450. (Declaration of Steven J. Revitz Dec., ¶ 3.) The $4,365.00 includes 9.7 hours Attorney Revitz spent on this case: (1) 1.4 hours corresponding with co-counsel and determining the basis of this motion; (2) .7 hours corresponding with co-counsel; (3) 2.2 hours reviewing the complaint and the files in case 22STCV08195; (4) 2.1 hours researching this motion; (5) 1.2 hours corresponding with co-counsel J. Woollacott regarding final judgment in case 22STCV08195; (6) 1 hour reviewing co-counsel J. Woollacott’s motion drafts, declaration, and request for judicial notice, and suggesting changes; and (7) 1.1 hours preparing his supporting declaration. (Revitz Dec., ¶¶ 2-3, 16.)

Attorney Woollacott’s hourly rate is $375. (Declaration of Jay Woollacott, ¶ 3(c).) The request includes the following: (1) 23.25 hours reviewing the underlying facts and pleadings (2.75 hours), researching this motion and preparing the moving papers (7 hours), conferring with co-counsel Revitz and client (6.50 hours), reviewing, finalizing, and filing the motion (7 hours)—$8,718.75; (2) 5 hours estimated to review and reply to the opposition—$1,875.00; (3) $435.00 in filing fees for each defendant—$870; and (4) $60.00 for each defendant’s motion—$120.00. (Woollacott Dec., ¶ 3(b)-(e), Exh. 2.)

After reviewing the supporting declarations, the counsel’s hourly rates reasonable and the time spent on the moving papers reasonable.

The court grants the parties’ request for attorney’s fees of $14,958.75 ($7,479.37 per defendant) and costs in $990.00 ($495.00 per defendant).

Defendants ADR/Preferred Business Properties and Ozer-Zelzah Apartments’ special to strike the complaint is granted. Attorney fees of $14,958.75 and costs of $990.00 are granted.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay Defendants’ counsel within twenty (20) days of the date of this order.

[1] The court notes that Plaintiff lists an “injunctive relief” claim in the complaint caption and prayer for relief. However, Plaintiff does not allege the claim in body of the complaint.

[2] The court has reviewed the filings but does not understand Plaintiff’s arguments. Plaintiff may discuss her arguments further at the motion hearing.