Judge: Gary Y. Tanaka, Case: 19STCV16437, Date: 2022-10-27 Tentative Ruling


Case Number: 19STCV16437    Hearing Date: October 27, 2022    Dept: B

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT

 

 

Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka                                                                                                  Thursday, October 27, 2022

Department B                                                                                                                                              Calendar No. 9

 

 

 

PROCEEDINGS

 

Armando Joseph Zepeda, et al. v. Stars Behavioral Health Group, Inc., et al.   

19STCV16437

  1. Stars Behavioral Health Group, Inc., et al.’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint         

  2. Stars Behavioral Health Group, Inc., et al.’s Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint

     

     

    TENTATIVE RULING

     

                Stars Behavioral Health Group, Inc., et al.’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

     

                Stars Behavioral Health Group, Inc., et al.’s Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint is moot.

     

     

                Background

     

                Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on May 10, 2019.  Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint was filed on January 27, 2022.  Plaintiffs allege the following facts.  On or about July 30, 2018, Plaintiff Armando Zepeda was lawfully on the premises of property owned and/or controlled by Defendants.  Plaintiff Armando Zepeda slipped and fell onto the cement ground due to a dangerous condition.  Plaintiffs allege the following causes of action: 1. Premises Liability 2. General Negligence 3. Loss of Consortium.

     

                Meet and Confer

     

                Defendants set forth a meet and confer declaration in sufficient compliance with CCP § 430.41 and CCP § 435.5. (Decl., Sarah R. Lustig, ¶ 14.)

     

                Request for Judicial Notice

     

                Defendants’ request for judicial notice is pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(c)(d) and (h).

     

    Demurrer

     

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. (Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.)  In testing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)  The Court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.  (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.App.4th 634, 638.) Because a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the plaintiff must show that the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action.  (Rakestraw v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.)  Where the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the demurrer.  (C.C.P., § 430.10(e); Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1126.)

Sufficient facts are the essential facts of the case "with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action.”  (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.)  "Whether the plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant to ruling upon the demurrer."  (Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609–610.)  Under Code Civil Procedure § 430.10(f), a demurrer may also be sustained if a complaint is “uncertain.”  Uncertainty exists where a complaint’s factual allegations are so confusing they do not sufficiently apprise a defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet.  (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)

Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 430.10(a) and 430.10(e) on the ground that Armando Zepeda lacks standing to sue on the first and second causes of action, that each cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, and that each cause of action is barred by workers compensation exclusivity.

Plaintiff Armando Zepeda has failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate standing to assert the first and second causes of action. Upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, a bankruptcy estate is created by operation of law. The appointed trustee administers the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). Thus, the legal and equitable interests in debtor’s property becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. In re Bronner, 135 B.R. 645, 647 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992). “Title to estate property generally remains in the trustee unless the property is abandoned or intentionally re-vested. In re Hyman, 123 B.R. 342, 348 (9th Cir. BAP 1991). A debtor's claim for injuries to the person, even if unliquidated at the time the petition was filed, is property of the bankruptcy estate as of the commencement of the case.” Id.  The bankruptcy estate includes a debtor’s pending causes of action. Sierra Switchboard Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 789 F.2d 705, 708-09 (9th Cir. 1086).

Armando Zepeda’s causes of action became an asset of the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of his bankruptcy petition. Plaintiffs argue that they believe that Armando Zepeda’s damages will ultimately be greater than his debts. However, there is no legal authority presented to show that a bankruptcy petitioner can maintain a separate legal action in his own name based on his own self-serving belief that the ultimate judgment will be greater than his debts. If a party could maintain a lawsuit simply based on this assertion, this would render the line of authorities noted above meaningless because a petitioner could always provide his own self-serving conclusory statements about his belief in the worth of his lawsuit. As noted above, the legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). “If a cause of action is part of the estate of the bankrupt then the trustee alone has standing to bring that claim.” Nat. Am. Ins. Co. v. Ruppert Landscaping Co., 187 F.3d 439, 441 (4th Cir. 1999).

Therefore, the demurrer to Plaintiff Armando Zepeda’s first and second causes of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

As to all causes of action, the face of the allegations of the pleading, as well as upon matters to which the Court can properly take judicial notice, reveal a bar based on the exclusivity provision of the Workers Compensation Act. “Workers' compensation provides the exclusive remedy against an employer for an injury sustained by an employee in the course of employment and compensable under the workers' compensation law. (Lab.Code, §§ 3600, subd. (a), 3602, subd. (a); Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 812–813, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 562, 14 P.3d 234.) This precludes a tort remedy against the employer if the conditions of compensation are present. The workers' compensation exclusivity rule also precludes a tort remedy against another employee of the same employer acting within the scope of employment, except in certain circumstances that are inapplicable here. (Lab.Code, § 3601, subd. (a).) The basis for the exclusivity rule is the “presumed ‘compensation bargain’ ” in which the employer assumes liability for injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment without regard to fault and compensation is relatively swift, in exchange for limitations on the amount of liability.” Angelotti v. The Walt Disney Co. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1403.

Here, matters upon which the Court may take judicial notice, including discovery responses of Plaintiff Armando Zepeda, himself, establish that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the workers compensation exclusivity provision. Armando Zepeda admitted in responses to requests for admission the following facts -- at the time of his slip and fall on July 30, 2018, he was at his job site, on duty, and that he was performing work services related to his employment. (Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”, Ex. F, at 1-4.)  In addition, the claim related to his injuries is being adjudicated as Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board Case No. ADJ11438423. (RJN, Ex. F at No. 10.)  Plaintiff Keisha Zepeda’s cause of action for Loss of Consortium is derivative of Plaintiff Armando Zepeda’s claims.  Therefore, the demurrer to the first through third cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend based on the bar of workers compensation exclusivity.

The Court exercises its discretion to decline to rule upon Defendants’ argument concerning the statute of limitations as it is not required because the demurrer is sustained on other grounds.

Motion to Strike

            The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  CCP § 436(a).  The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.  CCP § 436(b).  The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws.  CCP § 436.  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.  CCP § 437.

            The motion to strike is moot upon the sustaining of the demurrer.

Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling.