Case Number: 19STCV16437    Hearing Date: April 25, 2023    Dept: B

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT

Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka                                                                                           Tuesday, April 25, 2023

Department B                                                                                                                             Calendar No. 7

PROCEEDINGS

Armando Joseph Zepeda, et al. v. Stars Behavioral Health Group, Inc., et al.   

19STCV16437

1.      Star View Behavioral Health, Inc., et al.’s Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint     

TENTATIVE RULING

            Star View Behavioral Health, Inc., et al.’s Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint is sustained without leave to amend, in part, and overruled, in part.

            Star View Behavioral Health, Inc. and South Bay High School, Inc.’s Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint is sustained without leave to amend.

            Star View Children and Family Services, Inc.’s Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint is overruled.

Background

Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on May 10, 2019. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint was filed on November 22, 2022. Plaintiffs allege the following facts. On or about July 30, 2018, Plaintiff Armando Zepeda was lawfully on the premises of property owned and/or controlled by Defendants. Plaintiff Armando Zepeda slipped and fell onto the cement ground due to a dangerous condition.  Plaintiffs allege the following causes of action: 1. Premises Liability 2. General Negligence 3. Loss of Consortium.

Meet and Confer

Defendants set forth a meet and confer declaration in sufficient compliance with CCP § 430.41.  (Decl., Sarah R. Lustig, ¶ 9.)

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants’ request for judicial notice is pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(c)(d) and (h).

Demurrer

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. (Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.)  In testing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)  The Court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.  (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.App.4th 634, 638.) Because a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the plaintiff must show that the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action.  (Rakestraw v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.)  Where the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the demurrer.  (C.C.P., § 430.10(e); Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1126.)

Sufficient facts are the essential facts of the case "with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action.”  (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.)  "Whether the plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant to ruling upon the demurrer."  (Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609–610.)  Under Code Civil Procedure § 430.10(f), a demurrer may also be sustained if a complaint is “uncertain.”  Uncertainty exists where a complaint’s factual allegations are so confusing they do not sufficiently apprise a defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet.  (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)

Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 430.10(a) and 430.10(e), on the ground that each cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, and that each cause of action is barred by workers compensation exclusivity.

Defendants Star View Behavioral Health, Inc. and South Bay High School, Inc.

As to Defendants Star View Behavioral Health, Inc. and South Bay High School, Inc., as to all causes of action, the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend.

The face of the allegations of the pleading, as well as upon matters to which the Court can properly take judicial notice, reveal a bar based on the exclusivity provision of the Workers Compensation Act. “Workers' compensation provides the exclusive remedy against an employer for an injury sustained by an employee in the course of employment and compensable under the workers' compensation law. (Lab.Code, §§ 3600, subd. (a), 3602, subd. (a); Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 812–813, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 562, 14 P.3d 234.) This precludes a tort remedy against the employer if the conditions of compensation are present. The workers' compensation exclusivity rule also precludes a tort remedy against another employee of the same employer acting within the scope of employment, except in certain circumstances that are inapplicable here. (Lab.Code, § 3601, subd. (a).) The basis for the exclusivity rule is the “presumed ‘compensation bargain’” in which the employer assumes liability for injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment without regard to fault and compensation is relatively swift, in exchange for limitations on the amount of liability.” Angelotti v. The Walt Disney Co. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1403.

Here, matters upon which the Court may properly take judicial notice, including discovery responses of Plaintiff Armando Zepeda, himself, establish that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the workers compensation exclusivity provision.  Armando Zepeda admitted that School and SVAC were his employer.  (Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) Ex. E at No. 2.6; RJN Ex. H at pp. 153:11-22.)  Armando Zepeda admitted in responses to requests for admission the following facts - at the time of his slip and fall on July 30, 2018, he was at his job site, on duty, and that he was performing work services related to his employment.  (RJN, Ex. F, at 1-4.)  In addition, the claim related to his injuries is being adjudicated as Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board Case No. ADJ11438423.  (RJN, Ex. F at No. 10.)  Plaintiff Keisha Zepeda’s cause of action for Loss of Consortium is derivative of Plaintiff Armando Zepeda’s claims.

Defendants have properly requested judicial notice of matters that are in direct contradiction to the allegations of the SAC.  Namely, Plaintiffs allege claims which can only be viable if Mr. Zepeda was not in the course and scope of his employment.  Matters to which the Court may take judicial notice establish that Mr. Zepeda was in the course and scope of his employment and has adjudicated a workers compensation case based on that direct factual position.  Plaintiffs cannot attempt to take a directly contradictory position now.  Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Zepeda was not in the “correct frame of mind to fully understand and acknowledge what he was signing.”  (Opposition, page 11, lines 13-14.)  However, Mr. Zepeda’s status as employee, and School and SVAC’s status as employers were not and could not be established merely through Mr. Zepeda’s subjective belief regarding who his employer was, but, by numerous other documents that established this fact.  In addition, if Mr. Zepeda was not actually employed by these entities and was not in the course and scope of his employment, then, it was incumbent upon him to correct this position during the course of his workers compensation case, which he apparently never did.  In fact, Mr. Zepeda confirmed at his deposition that the information on his Workers Compensation Claim Form (DWC-1) was accurate.

Therefore, the demurrer of School and SVAC to the first through third cause of action is sustained without leave to amend based on the bar of workers compensation exclusivity.

Defendant Star View Children and Family Services, Inc.

Defendant Star View Children and Family Service’s (“SVCFS”) Demurrer is overruled.

This Defendant does not contend that it was the employer of Plaintiff Armando Zepeda. Defendant demurs on the ground that the causes of action are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

The applicable statutes of limitations for each of the causes of action is two years. CCP § 335.1.  Pursuant to the allegations set forth in the SAC, the causes of action accrued upon the date of injury on July 30, 2018.  The Complaint was filed within two years of this date, on May 10, 2019.  However, SVCFS was not substituted as DOE 3 until June 4, 2021. Upon the face of the allegations of the SAC, the allegations relate back to the filing date of the original Complaint.  “It is settled that a defendant sued by a fictitious name and later brought into the case by an amendment substituting his true name is considered a party to the action from its commencement for purposes of the statute of limitations.”  Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 602.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs knew or reasonably should have known of the identity of SVCFS within two years of July 30, 2018. However, here, Defendant relies on factual and evidentiary matters that are not appropriate for adjudication with a demurrer.  The issue of whether Plaintiffs were genuinely ignorant of the identity of SVCFS and the facts giving rise to liability against SVCFS within two years of July 30, 2018, constitutes a factual issue that cannot be resolved until the introduction of evidence.

Therefore, SVCFS’s demurrer is overruled.

Defendant SVCFS is ordered to file and serve an Answer within 10 days of this date.

Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling.