Judge: Gary Y. Tanaka, Case: 19STCV24988, Date: 2022-10-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV24988 Hearing Date: October 10, 2022 Dept: B
LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT
Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Monday, October 10, 2022
Department B Calendar No. 6
PROCEEDINGS
Arnold Flores v. Uber Technologies, Inc., et al.
19STCV24988
Arnold Flores’ Motion for Sanctions
Arnold Flores’ Motion to Compel Responses to Demand for Production of Documents, Set One, Against Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.
Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Further Deposition Testimony by Arnold Flores
Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for Leave to Demand Neuropsychological Examination of Plaintiff
Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Further of Plaintiff to Request for Admissions, Set One, and Form Interrogatory 17.1
Estaquio Aguilar-Hernandez’s Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s Subpoena Duces Tecum for Production of Medical Records
TENTATIVE RULING
Arnold Flores’ Motion for Sanctions is denied.
Arnold Flores’ Motion to Compel Responses to Demand for Production of Documents, Set One, is moot, in part, and denied, in part.
Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Further Deposition Testimony by Arnold Flores is granted.
Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for Leave to Demand Neuropsychological Examination of Plaintiff is denied without prejudice.
Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Further of Plaintiff to Request for Admissions, Set One, and Form Interrogatory 17.1 is granted, in part, and denied, in part.
Estaquio Aguilar-Hernandez’s Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s Subpoena Duces Tecum for Production of Medical Records and Request for Sanctions is denied.
Background
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on July 18, 2019. Plaintiff’s operative Second Amended Complaint was filed on September 2, 2021. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. On February 2, 2019, Plaintiff was riding his motorcycle home from work at LAX Airport when Uber driver, Defendant Aguilar-Hernandez, turned left into Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Aguilar-Hernandez was distracted due to the Uber Driver App. Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: 1. General Negligence; 2. Motor Vehicle Negligence; 3. Negligence Per Se (Cal. Veh. Code §§ 23123(a); 23123.S(a); 2180l(a); and 22107); 4. Negligent Hiring, Retention, Training, and Supervision; 5. Strict Products Liability.
Arnold Flores’ Motion for Sanctions
Plaintiff moves for an order of monetary sanctions in the sum of $7,947.00 against Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier, LLC, and Raisier-CA, LLC, as well as their counsel of record for bringing a motion for protective order without substantial justification and then withdrawing the motion after receiving Plaintiff’s opposition. Plaintiff also moves for an order compelling Defendants to provide verified discovery responses without objections to all discovery against which protection was sought.
Plaintiff’s notice of motion sets forth the following authorities in support of his motion: CCP Sections 2017.020(b), 2023.010 et. seq., 2025.420(g), and CCP 2025.420(h).
Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020(b) states: “The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”
Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010 states: “Misuses of the discovery process include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) Persisting, over objection and without substantial justification, in an attempt to obtain information or materials that are outside the scope of permissible discovery.
(b) Using a discovery method in a manner that does not comply with its specified procedures.
(c) Employing a discovery method in a manner or to an extent that causes unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.
(d) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery.
(e) Making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery.
(f) Making an evasive response to discovery.
(g) Disobeying a court order to provide discovery.
(h) Making or opposing, unsuccessfully and without substantial justification, a motion to compel or to limit discovery.
(i) Failing to confer in person, by telephone, or by letter with an opposing party or attorney in a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve informally any dispute concerning discovery, if the section governing a particular discovery motion requires the filing of a declaration stating facts showing that an attempt at informal resolution has been made.”
Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.020 states: “Notwithstanding the outcome of the particular discovery motion, the court shall impose a monetary sanction ordering that any party or attorney who fails to confer as required pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.”
Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030 states: “To the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title, the court, after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, may impose the following sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process:
(a) The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. The court may also impose this sanction on one unsuccessfully asserting that another has engaged in the misuse of the discovery process, or on any attorney who advised that assertion, or on both. If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.
(b) The court may impose an issue sanction ordering that designated facts shall be taken as established in the action in accordance with the claim of the party adversely affected by the misuse of the discovery process. The court may also impose an issue sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses.
(c) The court may impose an evidence sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from introducing designated matters in evidence.
(d) The court may impose a terminating sanction by one of the following orders:
(1) An order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process.
(2) An order staying further proceedings by that party until an order for discovery is obeyed.
(3) An order dismissing the action, or any part of the action, of that party.
(4) An order rendering a judgment by default against that party.
(e) The court may impose a contempt sanction by an order treating the misuse of the discovery process as a contempt of court.
(f)(1) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), or any other section of this title, absent exceptional circumstances, the court shall not impose sanctions on a party or any attorney of a party for failure to provide electronically stored information that has been lost, damaged, altered, or overwritten as the result of the routine, good faith operation of an electronic information system.
(2) This subdivision shall not be construed to alter any obligation to preserve discoverable information.”
Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420 states, in relevant part:
“(g) If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may order that the deponent provide or permit the discovery against which protection was sought on those terms and conditions that are just.
(h) The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”
Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020(b) fails to provide any authority for the orders that Plaintiff seeks because Defendants did not unsuccessfully make a motion for protective order. Instead, the motion for protective order was taken off calendar prior to any ruling on the merits of the motion. Taking a motion off calendar does not equate to a finding that the motion was unsuccessfully made.
Plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010. There is no showing that the filing of the motion for protective order was a misuse of the discovery process. The motion for protective order was taken off calendar prior to any ruling on the merits of the motion. Plaintiff also fails to show that Defendant has refused to comply with its discovery obligations. Instead, Defendant has shown that it did respond to the request for production of documents by serving verified responses. (Plaintiff’s Ex. B; Defendant’s Exs. 1-2.) Plaintiff argues that the responses are deficient, but the propriety of the responses would be the subject of a motion to compel further responses. Plaintiff also argues that the verifications are defective but fails to establish that the verifications are not proper.
Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.020 provides no authority for the orders that Plaintiff seeks as there was no “outcome” to Defendant’s motion for protective order since it was taken off calendar prior to the hearing.
Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030 does not provide any authority for the orders that Plaintiff seeks. Section 2023.030 specifically states: “To the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title, the court, after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, may impose the following sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process[.]” (emphasis added). Plaintiff has not established any violation of a chapter governing any particular discovery method or other provision of the discovery act.
CCP § 2025.420 fails to provide any authority for the orders that Plaintiff seeks. CCP § 2025.420 only specifically applies to protective orders concerning depositions. Further, in any event, Defendant’s motion for protective order was not denied. The motion was taken off calendar.
Finally, the Court notes that none of the authorities cited by Plaintiff authorizes the Court to order Defendant to compel responses to demand for production of documents. Any such order would be authorized by CCP § 2031.300 or CCP § 2031.310.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is denied. The Court also denies Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff.
Arnold Flores’ Motion to Compel Responses to Demand for Production of Documents, Set One
Plaintiff moves for an order compelling Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. to respond, without objections, to Demand for Production of Documents, Set One, and for monetary sanctions. The motion is made on the grounds that Defendant failed to respond to this discovery item. The motion is made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.300(b), CCP § 2031.300(c), and CCP 2023.010.
CCP § 2031.300 states: “If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response to it, the following rules shall apply: The party making the demand may move for an order compelling response to the demand.” (CCP § 2031.300(b)).
Here, the motion to compel responses is moot because exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s own motion show that Defendant served verified responses to Plaintiff’s Demand for Production of Documents, Set One. (Plaintiff’s Exs. D and E.) Any contention that the responses are insufficient or that the objections are not meritorious would be the subject of a motion to compel further responses after the appropriate meet and confer process.
Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions is also denied. Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff is also denied.
Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Further Deposition Testimony by Arnold Flores
“If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponent's control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (a).)
“This motion shall be made no later than 60 days after the completion of the record of the deposition, and shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480(b).) The motion must be accompanied by a separate statement pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1345(a)(4) and (5).
Where a deposition question seeks discovery of privileged information, the deponent or his or her counsel must interpose a specific objection in order to preserve the privilege or work product protection. CCP § 2025.460(a). Refusing to answer a deposition question on any other ground is improper. See, Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1015. Irrelevance alone is an insufficient ground to justify a deponent’s refusal to answer a deposition question. Id. A refusal to answer is only justified if the questions require the disclosure of privileged matter or if the questions are manifestly irrelevant or calculated to harass. Id.
Meet and Confer
Defendant filed a meet and confer declaration setting forth a reasonable good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion in compliance with CCP § 2025.480(b) and CCP § 2016.040. (Decl., Justina Tate, ¶¶ 8-11).
Motion to Compel Further Deposition Testimony
Plaintiff was instructed by counsel to refuse, and then, refused to answer questions as to the following topics: 1. Questions regarding Plaintiff’s motorcycle acquisition and related liability insurance; 2. Questions regarding Plaintiff’s purported cash deposit at the DMV; 3. A specific question as to when Plaintiff retained legal counsel.
All of these questions are designed to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in this action. In any event, even if the questions had not been relevant, irrelevance alone is not a sufficient ground to refuse to answer a deposition question. See, Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1015. Plaintiff has failed to identify a specific privilege that would justify refusing to answer these questions.
As to questions related to topic 1 and topic 2, Plaintiff objected based on the ground that the questions are legal contentions. Plaintiff’s counsel instructed the deponent not to answer pursuant to Rifkind v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1255 (holding that contention questions at deposition may constitute improper questioning). Here, however, the questions at issue do not ask the deponent to state or explain all facts, witnesses or documents regarding a legal contention or defense.
It is improper to ask a party deponent to state or explain his legal contentions or to designate documents or evidence in support. Rifkind v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1259. The following are examples of legal contentions: “Do you contend X's conduct was negligent (legal conclusion)?” . . . “If you do, state all facts, list all witnesses, and identify and describe all documents that support your contention that X was negligent.” Id. The Rifkind Court held that it was proper for the attorney to instruct the deponent to not answer these types of questions as they are more properly responded to via written interrogatories with the assistance of counsel. However, questions that relate to factual matters that relate to factual assertions and conclusions are proper for the deponent to answer. “Thus, if a deponent says that a certain event happened at a particular time or place, it is quite proper to ask the person, at deposition, how he or she became aware of it, his or her knowledge about it, and for similar information of a factual nature.” Id.
Here, all the questions asked by Defendant relate to factual matters and are not legal contentions. Thus, it was improper for Plaintiff’s counsel to instruct Plaintiff not to answer these questions. None of the questions required Plaintiff to utilize legal expertise that would be more in the province of counsel. Moreover, as to the second topic, Plaintiff counsel also imposed objections based on attorney/client privilege and/or attorney work product. However, Plaintiff failed to justify his objections based on these privileges. None of the questions involve matters that would be protected by the attorney/client privilege and/or attorney work product.
As to topic 3, Defendant simply asked when Plaintiff retained legal counsel. This basic question does not contemplate any specific matter that would be protected by the attorney/client privilege. The date of retention is not protected by the attorney/client privilege because to claim the privilege Plaintiff must first demonstrate the existence of the attorney/client relationship.
In addition, the date of retention does not constitute a confidential communication. Evid. Code, § 952 states: “As used in this article, “confidential communication between client and lawyer” means information transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted, and includes a legal opinion formed and the advice given by the lawyer in the course of that relationship.”
“Nor does the attorney-client privilege protect independent facts related to a communication; that a communication took place, and the time, date and participants in the communication.” State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 625, 640. Here, the question simply asks the date of retention, and does not even delve into any communications that may have occurred during that date.
The motion is granted as Plaintiff failed to justify its objections and failed to establish that the questions were designed to harass.
Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions is also granted. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are sanctioned the total amount of $1,811.65, payable within 30 days of this date, which is calculated utilizing 10 hours to prepare and appear at $175 per hour, plus $61.65 filing fee.
The deponent is ordered to appear to answer the questions at issue with this motion at a reasonable date and time to be determined by mutual agreement of the parties.
Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for Leave to Demand Neuropsychological Examination of Plaintiff
Defendant moves for an order requiring Plaintiff to submit to a neuropsychological examination pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.310, et seq. The neuropsychological examination of Plaintiff is to be performed by Dr. Ari Kalechstein, Ph.D., who is a licensed and board-certified psychologist. Dr. Kalechstein set forth his declaration which demonstrates his competency to conduct the examination. (Decl., Ari Kalechstein, Ph.D, ¶¶ 1-6.)
“If any party desires to obtain discovery by a physical examination other than that described in Article 2 (commencing with Section 2032.210), or by a mental examination, the party shall obtain leave of court.” Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.310(a). “A motion for an examination under subdivision (a) shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, scope, and nature of the examination, as well as the identity and the specialty, if any, of the person or persons who will perform the examination. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.310(b). “The court shall grant a motion for a physical or mental examination under Section 2032.310 only for good cause shown.” Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.320(a).
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d).
Meet and Confer
Defendant set forth a meet and confer declaration sufficiently establishing an attempt to informally resolve each issue presented in this motion. (Decl., Justina L. Tate, ¶¶ 6-14.)
Motion to Compel Examination
Good cause is established where a party has placed his or her mental condition in controversy in the action. See, Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833. “In the case at bar, plaintiff haled defendants into court and accused them of causing her various mental and emotional ailments. Defendants deny her charges. As a result, the existence and extent of her mental injuries is indubitably in dispute. In addition, by asserting a causal link between her mental distress and defendants' conduct, plaintiff implicitly claims it was not caused by a preexisting mental condition, thereby raising the question of alternative sources for the distress. We thus conclude that her mental state is in controversy.” Id. at 839–840.
As to the examination with psychologist, Dr. Kalechstein, Defendant has established good cause to conduct a mental examination. Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered constant head pain, mental and memory impairment, nightmare and night terrors, and great mental anguish and emotional distress resulting in damages. (Decl., Justina Tate, Ex. 3.) Plaintiff’s direct deposition testimony has confirmed these alleged damages.
Therefore, Plaintiff has placed his mental condition in controversy through his allegations and evidence of existing and continuing severe mental injuries. Therefore, Defendant has established good cause to conduct a neuropsychological examination. Defendant is entitled to defend against Plaintiff’s claims by conducting its own neuropsychological examination. In addition, Defendant has shown that conducting the neuropsychological examination is important, and Defendant cannot be simply forced to rely on reviews of medical records, deposition testimony, and/or other discovery methods. In addition, Plaintiff has not established that the undue burden and inconvenience caused by the neuropsychological examination outweigh Defendant’s right to the examination especially considering Plaintiff’s allegations of extensive mental injuries.
Plaintiff opposes the motion but concedes that he is amenable to appear for a neuropsychological examination. Instead, the opposition is based upon the ground that the motion did not adequately comply with CCP § 2032.310(b) by failing to specify the specific tests and procedures to be used. The Court finds that Defendant has not sufficiently set forth the tests and procedures that will be performed. The Court is specifically directed to the following language from the proposed order: “The universe of tests that may be administered to Plaintiff are identified below, to be refined following Plaintiff’s interview.” (Proposed Order, page 3, lines 16-18.) The Court finds that this language is unduly vague and provides the potential for the administration of tests that are not adequately identified in the motion. The Court notes that Defendant then did identify the tests that may be performed in the proposed order on page 8. However, the Court finds that simply listing tests that “may” be performed is not sufficient to properly comply with the requirements of CCP 2032.310(b). “[T]he plain meaning of section 2032.320 is that the trial court must “specify the ... diagnostic tests and procedures” of the mental examination by naming the tests and procedures to be performed.” Carpenter v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 249, 261–62. Thus, simply reciting an extensive laundry list of tests that the psychologist “may” perform is not sufficient.
Therefore, Defendant’s motion is denied without prejudice. Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions is denied. The Court encourages the parties to meet and confer to attempt to avoid another motion.
Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Further Responses from Arnold Flores to Requests for Admissions, Set One, and Form Interrogatory
Where responses to requests for admissions have been served but requesting party believes that they are deficient because the answers are evasive or incomplete, or, because an objection is without merit, that party may move for an order compelling a further response. CCP § 2033.290(a). The motion must be made within 45 days after service of verified responses in question, or any verified supplemental responses. CCP § 2033.290(c). The motion must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration in compliance with CCP § 2016.040. CCP § 2033.290(b).
Where responses to interrogatories have been served but the requesting party believes that they are deficient because the answers are evasive or incomplete, or, because an objection is without merit, that party may move for an order compelling a further response. CCP § 2030.300(a). Notice of the motion must be given within 45 days after service of verified responses in question, or any verified supplemental responses. CCP § 2030.300(c). The motion must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration in compliance with CCP § 2016.040. CCP § 2030.300(b).
Meet and Confer
Defendant filed a meet and confer declaration setting forth a reasonable good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion in compliance with CCP § 2030.300(b), CCP § 2033.290(b)(1), and CCP § 2016.040. (Decl., Justina Tate, ¶¶ 6-11.)
Motion to Compel Further Responses
As to Requests for Admissions 2-9, and the corresponding Form Interrogatory 17.1, the motion is granted. Plaintiff’s responses are evasive, incomplete, and/or the objections that were asserted are without merit. These requests seek basic facts that may relate to Plaintiff’s cognitive functioning shortly after the accident. The requests are straightforward and responses to the requests should be within the personal knowledge of Plaintiff and do not require any speculation.
Thus, the motion is granted as to Requests 2 to 9 and the corresponding Form Interrogatory 17.1.
As to Requests for Admissions 20-41 and corresponding Form Interrogatory, the motion is denied. Requests for Admission Nos. 20-34 ask Plaintiff about academic scores he personally earned on the California Standardized Test from 2004-2007. Requests for Admission No. 35-36 ask Plaintiff about grade point averages he earned while attending Dominguez High School. Requests for Admission Nos. 37-41 ask Plaintiff about his academic and behavioral performance while attending Rockford University and Dominguez High School.
The requests are not designed to lead to the discovery of admissible relevant evidence. To the extent that the requests may be designed to lead to evidence concerning cognitive functioning and/or lost wages, the specific matters involved are so remote with respect to time and relevance to Plaintiff’s current job function and/or current cognitive abilities that the specific requests would, in all likelihood, not be admissible. In addition, Plaintiff has established that his right of privacy to his educational records outweigh any asserted need for the information.
Therefore, the motion is denied as to Requests 20 to 41 and corresponding Form Interrogatory 17.1.
Defendant and Plaintiff’s requests for sanctions are denied.
Plaintiff is ordered to serve further responses to Requests 2 to 9 and corresponding Form Interrogatory 17.1, without objections, within 10 days of this date.
Estaquio Aguilar-Hernandez’s Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s Subpoena Duces Tecum for Production of Medical Records
Code Civ. Proc., § 1985.3(g) states: “Any consumer whose personal records are sought by a subpoena duces tecum and who is a party to the civil action in which this subpoena duces tecum is served may, prior to the date for production, bring a motion under Section 1987.1 to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum.”
Pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1: “If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.”
Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1345(a)(5) states:
“Except as provided in (b), any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request must be accompanied by a separate statement. The motions that require a separate statement include a motion: (5) To compel or to quash the production of documents or tangible things at a deposition.”
Defendant moves for an order quashing Plaintiff’s subpoena duces tecum for the production of medical records of Defendant and also requests sanctions against Plaintiff pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1985.3, 1987.1 and 1987.2. Defendant argues that the subpoena is overly broad because it requests “any and all records” without a time limitation and also that the subpoena violates Defendant’s right to privacy.
“The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, §1.) Protection of informational privacy is the provision’s central concern.” Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552. “[W]hen a discovery request seeks information implicating the constitutional right of privacy, to order discovery simply upon a showing that the Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010 test for relevance has been met is an abuse of discretion.” Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556 (citations omitted).
In Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35-37, the California Supreme Court “established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. . . . . The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 552 (citations omitted). In Hill, the Court “explained that not ‘every assertion of a privacy interest under article I, section 1 must be overcome by a “compelling interest.” . . . . A ‘“compelling interest”’ is still required to justify ‘an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy.’” Id. at 556.
Disclosure depends upon balancing the need for discovery against the need for confidentiality. “Courts must instead place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and the seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interests the opposing party identifies, as Hill requires.” Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557.
The Court denies the motion for an order quashing the deposition subpoena based on Defendant’s failure to file and serve the mandatory separate statement as required by Cal. Rules of Court 3.1345(a)(5). Thus, the Court makes no finding or order based on the substantive arguments made by Defendant regarding the alleged overly broad nature of the subpoena or the alleged violation of privacy interests. The Court encourages the parties to meet and confer to limit the scope of the subpoena.
Estaquio Aguilar-Hernandez’s Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s Subpoena Duces Tecum for Production of Medical Records and Request for Sanctions is denied.
Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. is ordered to give notice of this ruling.