Judge: Gary Y. Tanaka, Case: 19STCV29152, Date: 2023-03-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV29152 Hearing Date: March 6, 2023 Dept: B
LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT –
SOUTHWEST DISTRICT
Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Monday, March 3, 2023
Department B Calendar No. 5
PROCEEDINGS
Marilu
Barretto, et al. v. Torrance Villa Pacifica Apartments, Inc. et al.
19STCV29152
1. Torrance Villa Pacifica Apartments, Inc.’s Motion for
Summary Adjudication
TENTATIVE RULING
Torrance Villa Pacifica Apartments, Inc.’s Motion for
Summary Adjudication is denied.
Background
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint
on August 19, 2019. Plaintiffs allege
the following facts. Plaintiffs were the
lessee of real property. Defendant was
the lessor. Defendant failed to properly
treat toxic mold inside of the apartment unit leased from Defendant. Defendant
failed to take appropriate remedial measures allowing the condition to persist.
Plaintiffs
allege the following cause of action: 1. Negligence; 2. Premises Liability; 3.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; 4. Breach of Civil Code Section
1942.4.
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted, in
part. The Court takes judicial notice of
the existence of these reports pursuant to Evid. Code 452(h). The Court does not take judicial notice of the
truth of the matters asserted therein.
Objections
Plaintiffs’ Objections
Objection 1 is sustained, in part, and overruled, in
part. Objections to the following are sustained: “I was first notified by
Marilu Barretto about a discoloration in the ceiling of one of the bedrooms in
the Subject Unit on May 2, 2018.” “Plaintiffs made no other complaints about
the ceiling until five months later, when on October 13, 2018, Ms. Barretto reported
that the discoloration in the ceiling had returned.” “Plaintiffs did not report
any additional issues with the ceiling until approximately three months later
on January 23, 2019, when Ms. Barretto reported a ceiling leak.” The rest of
the statements objected to are overruled.
Objections 2, 4, and 5 are overruled.
Objection 3 is sustained.
Defendant’s Objections
Defendant’s objections are moot as the Court did not
consider the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs because Defendant did not meet its
initial burden on the motion for summary adjudication.
Motion for Summary Adjudication
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or
summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the
parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations,
trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,
subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the
evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’
and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no
triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7
Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1119.)
“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden
is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no
triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005)
128 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1519.) A
defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or
her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has
shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be
established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” CCP § 437c(p)(2). “Once the defendant . . . has met that
burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue
of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense
thereto.” CCP § 437c(p)(2). “If the
plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” Avivi
v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 463, 467.
“A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her
burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party
has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment
on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that
burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a
triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or
a defense thereto.” Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1).
“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the
court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except
evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi,
159 Cal.App.4th at 467; CCP § 437c(c).)
Defendants move for summary adjudication as to the
following issue: 1: “Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for Breach of Civil
Code Section 1942.4 is without merit because the undisputed material facts do
not support a finding that any actionable condition existed in Plaintiffs’
apartment under that statute.” (Notice of Motion, page ii, lines 1-6).
Civ. Code, § 1942.4(a) states:
“A landlord of a dwelling may not demand rent, collect
rent, issue a notice of a rent increase, or issue a three-day notice to pay
rent or quit pursuant to subdivision (2) of Section 1161 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, if all of the following conditions exist prior to the landlord's
demand or notice:
(1) The dwelling substantially lacks any of the
affirmative standard characteristics listed in Section 1941.1 or violates
Section 17920.10 of the Health and Safety Code, or is deemed and declared
substandard as set forth in Section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code
because conditions listed in that section exist to an extent that endangers the
life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants
of the dwelling.
(2) A public officer or employee who is responsible
for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has
notified the landlord or the landlord's agent in writing of his or her
obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions.
(3) The conditions have existed and have not been
abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice specified in paragraph
(2) and the delay is without good cause. For purposes of this subdivision,
service shall be complete at the time of deposit in the United States mail.
(4) The conditions were not caused by an act or
omission of the tenant or lessee in violation of Section 1929 or 1941.2.”
Defendant argues that the water and mold issues were
promptly addressed and fixed by Defendants within nine days of the health
inspector’s report. Thus, no claim under section 1942.4 exists for that
condition according to Defendant. Defendant concedes that other conditions
identified by the health inspector remained outstanding for more than 35 days. Defendant
identifies the issues as the following: “(1) a 6” crack and peeling paint in
the living room ceiling, (2) a gap in the kitchen sink caulking, (3) a small
hole in a bedroom ceiling, (4) suspected mold growth on the bathroom
windowsill, and (5) Peeling/cracked paint on living room ceiling above window.”
(Motion, page 2, lines 4-7). Defendant argues that these issues do not meet the
severity threshold requirements of section 1942.4(a)(1). Significantly, without providing any authority in
support, Defendant argues that the issue of whether the five conditions satisfy
the 35-day requirement of section 1942.4.(a)(3) is an issue of law to be
determined by the Court.
Defendant failed to meet its initial burden of “showing
that [the fourth] cause of action has no merit [by showing] that one or more
elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a
complete defense to the cause of action.”
CCP § 437c(p)(2). Therefore, the
burden does not shift to Plaintiffs to show that “a triable issue of one or
more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” CCP
§ 437c(p)(2).
First, Defendant’s main argument is that the mold and
water conditions were resolved within 9 days of the health inspector’s report, and
thus this could not constitute a violation of Section 1942.4. Then, Defendant
identifies five other separate categories of potential violations. Defendant
argues that these violations do not meet the standard necessary to constitute
an actionable violation under Section 1942.4. However, Defendant failed to submit any competent
evidence to show that these violations do not meet the necessary threshold
under Section 1942.4. The evidence submitted in support of Defendant’s separate
statement of fact number 20 does not establish this necessary showing. Instead, it appears that Defendant mainly
relies on the Court determining, as a matter of law, that the alleged
violations cannot meet the necessary threshold. As noted above, no authority is
cited for this proposition. Further, the finding itself appears to directly
involve the analysis of factual issues as to the severity of the alleged
violations. Logically, it is hard to reconcile this requirement - which
involves evidentiary and factual determinations - with Defendant’s contention
that this is an “issue of law” for the Court to determine. The Court is not
stating that these five conditions do meet the necessary threshold. Instead,
the Court is merely stating that it was Defendant’s burden to provide competent
admissible evidence to support Defendant’s contention that it did not meet the
threshold. Defendant failed to do so.
Thus, because Defendant did not meet its initial
burden upon a motion for summary adjudication, the motion for summary
adjudication is denied.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.