Case Number: 19TRCV00719    Hearing Date: April 11, 2023    Dept: B

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT

Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka                                                                                             Tuesday, April 11, 2023
Department B                                                                                                                               Calendar No. 4

PROCEEDINGS

Ariana Lara Soto v. Nissan North America, Inc., et al.

19TRCV00719

1.      Ariana Lara Soto’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses

TENTATIVE RULING

Ariana Lara Soto’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses is granted, in part.

Background

            Plaintiff filed the Complaint on August 15, 2019. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Plaintiff alleges that her 2016 Nissan Altima suffers from transmission, engine, and electrical defects.  Plaintiff sets forth causes of action under the Song-Beverly Act as well as causes of action for Breach of Express Warranty, Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability, and Violation of Business and Professions Code 17200.  The parties entered into a settlement agreement wherein Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff $32,526.73 plus $2,711.62 to the lienholder.  The parties agreed that pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(d), Defendant shall pay Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses that have been reasonably incurred by Plaintiff.

            Objections

            Defendant’s objections 1 to 43 are overruled.

            Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

            Civ. Code, § 1794(d) states: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

            Plaintiff moves for attorneys’ fees as costs pursuant to Civ. Code section 1794(d) as the prevailing party in this action.  Paragraph 2b of the agreement provides that Plaintiff is the prevailing party, and that the Court will determine the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred via a noticed motion.  

            “The trial court has “broad authority” to determine the amount of a reasonable attorneys’ fees.  PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.  “[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.”  Id. [“California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys' fee award.”].  “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”  Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 (internal quotation omitted.) 

            Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the lodestar method based on the reasonable amount of time the attorney spent multiplied by a reasonable rate. Plaintiff requests the following: “Base (unadjusted) lodestar: $46,628.50 Multiplier enhancement (+0.20): $9,325.70 Additional anticipated fees for Fee Motion Reply and oral argument for hearing: $6000.00 Costs and Expenses sought: $2607.98.1 TOTAL SOUGHT: $64,562.18[.]” (Plaintiff’s Ex. 1).

            Plaintiff has attached as Exhibit 37 to the declaration of Mark A. Johnson a full and detailed accounting of the billing and invoices related to this matter. (Decl., Mark A. Johnson, Ex. 37). In addition, for clarity, Mr. Johnson’s declaration set forth a concise summary of the number of hours billed by each attorney and the total amount billed: 141.5 hours. (Id., at ¶ 117). Mr. Johnson also provided a concise summary of the hourly rates of the various attorneys who worked on this matter, which ranged from $350 to $580 per hour. (Id. at ¶¶ 83, 104-112.)

            Defendant opposes the motion arguing that both the time expended, and the hourly rates were not reasonable.  Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to a fee enhancement. Defendant contends that the billing entries contain numerous “block-bills,” and that there were numerous entries for clerical work that were attributed to attorneys.  In addition, Defendant states that the hourly rates are unreasonable and contends that the rates should not exceed $231 for associates and $252 for partners.  Defendant requests that the Court reduce Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs to $39,447.93.

            The Court finds that the hourly rates were reasonable considering the nature of this case, that the case was heavily contested by the opposing side, and that the matter eventually was settled in an amount that was ultimately greater than Plaintiff’s 998 offer.  In addition, the attorneys’ hourly rates were reasonable considering their experience and background.  Defendant’s contention that the rates should be reduced to no more than $252 is unreasonable especially considering the community in which the attorneys practice.  The Court does find that, however, some of the billing entries do contain “block bill” entries and demonstrate work that could have been accomplished by clerical staff.  Rather than impose an across the board 30 percent reduction, the Court determines that a 10 percent reduction in the base amount is appropriate.

            Thus, the base amount is reduced from $46,628.50 to $41,965.65.

            The Court determines that a multiplier of 1.2 is not appropriate in this action. “[A] trial court should not consider these factors to the extent they are already encompassed within the lodestar. The factor of extraordinary skill, in particular, appears susceptible to improper double counting; for the most part, the difficulty of a legal question and the quality of representation are already encompassed in the lodestar. A more difficult legal question typically requires more attorney hours, and a more skillful and experienced attorney will command a higher hourly rate. Indeed, the reasonable hourly rate [used to calculate the lodestar] is the product of a multiplicity of factors ... the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney's reputation, and the undesirability of the case. Thus, a trial court should award a multiplier for exceptional representation only when the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation. Otherwise, the fee award will result in unfair double counting and be unreasonable. Nor should a fee enhancement be imposed for the purpose of punishing the losing party.” Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138–1139 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel has not demonstrated the type of “exceptional representation” that would justify the addition of a multiplier.  The hours expended and substantial hourly rates charged already demonstrate the type of skill and experience that was necessary to achieve the result that was obtained.

            The Court determines that the amount sought for the time expended in working on and appearing on this motion in the amount of $6,000.00 is excessive.  The Court reduces this amount to $3,000.00.

            Thus, the Court fixes reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of $44,965.65.  Costs are recoverable pursuant to a timely filed and served Memorandum of Costs.  The Court notes that there does not appear to have been a timely motion to tax costs filed.  Thus, the full amount of costs set forth in the Memorandum of Costs, in the amount of $2,589.04 is recoverable.  The Court is uncertain as to why the amount set forth in the instant motion ($2,607.98) differs from the amount stated in the Memorandum of Costs. The amount of costs is set and memorialized in the Memorandum of Costs.

            Thus, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs in part.  Attorney’s fees are awarded in the sum of $44,965.65.  Costs are recoverable in the sum of $2,589.04.

            Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.