Judge: Gary Y. Tanaka, Case: 20TRCV00495, Date: 2022-09-21 Tentative Ruling


Case Number: 20TRCV00495    Hearing Date: September 21, 2022    Dept: B

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT

 

 

Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka                                                                                            Wednesday, September 21, 2022

Department B                                                                                                                                                Calendar No. 8

 


PROCEEDINGS

 

Princess Obienu v. Cucamonga Holdings, Inc., et al.

20TRCV00495

  1. Cucamonga Holdings, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or, in the Alternative Summary Adjudication     

         

    TENTATIVE RULING

            

                Cucamonga Holdings, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication is denied.

     

                Background

     

                Plaintiff Princess Obienu filed her Complaint on July 16, 2020.  The  First Amended Complaint was filed on April 11, 2022 by a new Plaintiff: Tamunomietta Jaja. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Plaintiff lived at the apartment located at 818 Austin Avenue, Unit 8, Inglewood, California. However, the conditions in which she lived were uninhabitable due to water intrusion, mold infestation, and excessive noise. In the original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged the following causes of action: 1. Failure to Provide Habitable Dwelling; 2. Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; 3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; 4. Private Nuisance; 5. Unfair Competition (Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200); 6. Negligence; 7. Retaliatory Eviction. The First Amended Complaint set forth a sole cause of action for General Negligence. As noted, the Plaintiff was changed to Tamunomietta Jaja.

     

                Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

     

                The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1119.)

     

                “On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  CCP § 437c(p)(2).  “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” CCP § 437c(p)(2).  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”  Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 463, 467.

     

                “A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1).

     

                “When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”  (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; CCP § 437c(c).)

     

                Defendant moves for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of the ninth and forty fifth affirmative defenses. The motion is made on the ground that there is no triable issue of material fact and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The ninth affirmative defense states as follows: “This answering defendant is informed, believes, and thereupon alleges that plaintiff is estopped by law or by her conduct from maintaining the instant action, including, but not limited to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and/or by the ‘one judgment rule.’” (Answer, page lines 14-18). The forty fifth affirmative defense states as follows: “This answering defendant is informed, believes and thereupon defendant alleges that plaintiff is estopped by law or by her mother's conduct from maintaining the instant action, including, but not limited to the doctrine of res judicata as plaintiffs habitability claims have been previously adjudicated in an unlawful detainer action which resulted in a judgment in favor of CUCAMONGA HOLDINGS, INC. against the plaintiff's mother, PRINCESS OBEINU (sic), on January 22, 2020 in Department R of the Inglewood Courthouse (LASC Case No. 19IWUD02401).”  (Answer, page 10, line 27-28; page 11, lines 1-5.)

     

                Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims regarding the habitability of property are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

     

                “Res judicata or claim preclusion precludes the relitigation of a cause of action that previously was adjudicated in another proceeding between the same parties or parties in privity with them. Res judicata applies if (1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present proceeding is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present proceeding or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding. Res judicata bars the litigation not only of issues that were actually litigated but also issues that could have been litigated.  Federation of Hillside & Canyon Assns. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1202 (internal citations omitted.)

     

                “The applicable principle that bars relitigation is issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel. Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings. The threshold requirements for issue preclusion are: (1) the issue is identical to that decided in the former proceeding, (2) the issue was actually litigated in the former proceeding, (3) the issue was necessarily decided in the former proceeding, (4) the decision in the former proceeding is final and on the merits, and (5) preclusion is sought against a person who was a party or in privity with a party to the former proceeding.” Castillo v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 477, 481 (internal citations and quotations omitted.)

     

                “Because an unlawful detainer action is a summary procedure involving only claims bearing directly upon the right of immediate possession, a judgment in unlawful detainer has very limited res judicata effect. Legal and equitable claims-such as questions of title and affirmative defenses-are not conclusively established unless they were fully and fairly litigated in an adversary hearing.” Pelletier v. Alameda Yacht Harbor (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 1551, 1557.

     

                Defendant argues that the Unlawful Detainer judgment entered in Los Angeles Superior Court Case no. 19IWUD02401, acts as res judicata and/or collateral estoppel to the Plaintiff’s cause of action. Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 750, 758.

     

                However, Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 75 is distinguishable. In Needelman, the tenant entered into a stipulation for entry of judgment with the landlord in an unlawful detainer action after filing an answer that included certain affirmative defenses. As part of this settlement, the tenant signed a waiver clause which stated the following: “Needelman ‘waives any claims he may have, which [the lessors] assert do not exist, to bring an attempted wrongful eviction against [the lessors] or any action in any way arising out of or concerned with his tenancy....’”  Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 750, 754. Thus, in Needelman, the tenant specifically waived “any claims” and “any action” arising out of or concerned with his tenancy.” Id. (emphasis added).

     

                However, in the instant action, Plaintiff did not specifically waive her right to assert any “claims” or “actions.” The judgment filed on January 22, 2020 makes no mention of waiver of any claims or actions arising out of the tenancy. Thus, the instant action is more similar to both Landeros v. Pankey (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1171 and Pelletier v. Alameda Yacht Harbor (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 1551 wherein the Defendants in those cases did not specifically waive their right to assert claims or actions which had first been mentioned as affirmative defenses to the unlawful detainer action.

     

                “Prior litigation by the same parties on a different cause of action has a collateral estoppel effect only as to those issues litigated and determined in the prior action. The party asserting collateral estoppel has the burden to show from the record of the prior action that the asserted issue was previously litigated and determined. Defendants fail to sustain that burden here. [¶] Although the issue of breach of warranty of habitability was raised in the answer to the prior unlawful detainer complaint, the record fails to show it was litigated and determined. The unlawful detainer was resolved by a stipulated judgment giving the landlord less than the relief prayed. The prior stipulated judgment contains no language of comprehensive settlement of all matters between the parties arising from the lease.” Landeros v. Pankey (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1171 (emphasis in original; internal citations and quotations omitted). Similarly, in the instant action, Defendant failed to establish that claims of habitability were determined in the prior UD action. Defendant makes reference to the UD Court’s minute order. However, the minute order, just like the judgment, makes no mention of habitability claims nor does it mention any waiver of the right to present claims in the future. Defendant also cited to numerous portions of the transcript of the trial proceedings. Again, arguments and statements made by the Judge at trial do not constitute the judgment or decision of the Court. The issue of whether res judicata or collateral estoppel is applicable must be based on the ultimate terms of the judgment, and not as to arguments and statements made during the trial proceedings.

     

                In addition, an unlawful detainer judgment does not collaterally estop a former tenant from bringing a claim for damages for breach of warranty of habitability based on defects over a period of time which was not at issue in the prior UD action.  The adjudication of habitability issues in the prior UD action are limited to the period of non-payment of rent.  Damages claim for other periods of the tenant’s occupancy could not have been litigated in the UD action. Landeros v. Pankey (1995) 39 CA4th 1167, 1174. Defendant’s motion and separate statement of facts failed to submit any evidence or facts to establish that the UD action covered the entirety of the time period set forth in the allegations of the First Amended Complaint.

     

                Finally, the Court notes that another essential element of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel has failed to be established by Defendant: same party or privity of parties. The Defendant in the UD action was Princess Obienu. The Plaintiff in the instant action is Tamunomietta Jaja. This individual is apparently the daughter of Princess Obienu. The Court makes no finding of whether this individual is in privity with Princess Obienu. The Court merely notes that Defendant’s motion and separate statement of facts is silent as to this element, and it appears that Defendant simply believes that it is presumed that she is in privity with Princess Obienu.  However, with a motion for summary judgment and/or summary adjudication, it is Defendant’s burden to provide facts to show the existence of a complete defense.  The motion is premised upon the complete defense of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel, but Defendant did not present any evidence to support this essential element (privity) of the defense.

     

                Thus, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and/or adjudication is denied.

     

                Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.