Judge: Gary Y. Tanaka, Case: 20TRCV005005, Date: 2022-12-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20TRCV005005    Hearing Date: December 12, 2022    Dept: B

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT

Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka                                                                                  Monday, December 12, 2022

Department B                                                                                                                             Calendar No. 7

PROCEEDINGS

Ian Anderson, et al. v. Dipu Haque, et al. 

20TRCV00505

1.      Ian Anderson, et al.’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs    

TENTATIVE RULING

            Ian Anderson, et al.’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs is denied, in part.

Background

            Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on July 23, 2020. Plaintiffs allege the following facts. Defendants are committing violations of the Los Angeles Municipal Code for home sharing. Transient occupants have exclusive use of Defendants’ property. This has resulted in activities that have caused the risk of fire damage based on the occupants smoking and setting of fires. Also, Defendants’ conduct exposes Plaintiffs, and the public in general, to COVID-19 risks. The transient occupants have engaged in numerous instances of conduct causing a nuisance. Plaintiffs allege the following causes of action: 1. Violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code Section 12.22; 2. Violation of L.A. Municipal Code Section 57.4908.6; 3. Private Nuisance.

            Request for Judicial Notice

            Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice, filed on July 11, 2022, is granted.

            Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice, filed on December 5, 2022, is granted.

            The Court only takes judicial notice of the existence of the documents and does not take judicial notice of the truth of the matters asserted therein. In addition, the Court notes that the December 5, 2022 request constitutes new evidence first submitted with the Reply. Generally, the Court can reject this new evidence or continue the matter to give the opposing party the opportunity to respond. However, in this instance, the Court’s decision was not affected by this new evidence.

            Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

            Plaintiffs Ian Anderson, et al. move for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $46,980.00 and costs in the amount of $7,915.99 against Defendants Dipu Haque and Luxury Mansion Rentals pursuant to CCP § 1021.5 and CCP § 1032.  The motion is made on the ground that Plaintiffs were granted a preliminary injunction against Defendants to prohibit conduct complained of in the Complaint, Defendants changed their conduct after Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit, and Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a settlement agreement that provided net monetary recovery and contractual obligations equivalent to injunctive relief, and therefore Plaintiffs achieved their litigation objectives in this action.

            Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5 states, in relevant part:

            “Upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.”  

            “[I]t has been said that the public always has a significant interest in seeing that legal strictures are properly enforced[.] This does not mean, however, that the private attorney general doctrine was designed to reward plaintiffs who, in pursuit of their own interests, just happened to bring about the enforcement of a statute that benefits the public. Norberg v. California Coastal Com. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 535, 541 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “[T]he public always derives a ‘benefit’ when illegal private or public conduct is rectified. . . . However, the Legislature did not intend to authorize an award of attorney fees in every case involving a statutory violation. Instead, its purpose is to provide some incentive for the plaintiff who acts as a true private attorney general, prosecuting a lawsuit that enforces an important public right and confers a significant benefit, despite the fact that his or her own financial stake in the outcome would not by itself constitute an adequate incentive to litigate.” Id. at 541–542.

            “An award on the ‘private attorney general’ theory is appropriate when the cost of the claimant's legal victory transcends his personal interest, that is, when the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit placed a burden on the plaintiff ‘out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter.” Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 941. “This requirement of section 1021.5 looks at whether the plaintiffs’ expenses in bringing the suit is disproportionate to his or her personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. If the enforcement of the public interest is merely coincidental to the attainment of ... personal goals.” California Common Cause v. Duffy (1987) 200 Cal.App.3d 730, 750 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

            Here, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the disposition of this action resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest by providing significant benefit to the public or to a large class of persons. Instead, the significant benefit, if any, was provided to the Plaintiffs, themselves, by their attempt to rectify the alleged nuisance in their neighborhood. The litigation and the resulting settlement did not affect the general public or a large class of individuals.  In addition, Defendants here were the owner and property manager of a single home. The outcome of the litigation simply enforced Plaintiffs’ ability to ensure that home sharing regulations were followed by these Defendants and did not result in a significant benefit to the public at large.  The effect of the outcome was limited to this specific objective of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs provide mere speculation as to the significance and benefits to the general public. For example, Plaintiffs argue that the litigation resulted in preventing fires which could have affected a large class of individuals and the public. Again, any such benefits are purely speculative and do not provide competent facts of a true public benefit. Finally, the costs of the result did not transcend the personal interests of Plaintiffs. Any expenses incurred by Plaintiffs was not disproportionate to the Plaintiffs’ personal stake in the outcome of this litigation.

            Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, pursuant to CCP § 1021.5, is denied.

            The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ motion also sought an order for an award of costs. Costs are generally recoverable by filing a memorandum of costs, which can then be challenged by a timely motion to tax costs. Therefore, the Court makes no order with respect to that portion of this motion.

            Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling.