Judge: Gary Y. Tanaka, Case: 20TRCV00918, Date: 2022-09-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20TRCV00918 Hearing Date: September 15, 2022 Dept: B
LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT
Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Thursday, September 15, 2022
Department B Calendar No. 10
PROCEEDINGS
Juan Ramirez, et al. v. Get Lucky Capital, LLC, et al.
20TRCV00918
Get Lucky Capital, LLC’s Demurrer to Cross-Complaint
TENTATIVE RULING
Get Lucky Capital, LLC’s Demurrer to Cross-Complaint is overruled.
Background
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on December 10, 2020. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint was filed on February 3, 2022. Plaintiffs allege the following facts. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants forcibly entered, and Plaintiffs were forcibly evicted from their lawful possession of the property located at 13106 S. Vermont Ave., Unit #7, Gardena, Ca. 90247. Plaintiffs allege the following causes of action: 1. Forcible Entry; 2. Forcible Eviction.
Defendant Weststar Property Management filed a Cross-Complaint on February 7, 2022. Cross-Complainant alleges the following causes of action: 1. Express Indemnification; 2. Equitable/Implied Indemnification; 3. Contribution; 4. Apportionment; 5. Declaratory Relief.
Meet and Confer
Cross-Defendant submitted a meet and confer declaration in sufficient compliance with CCP § 430.41. (Decl., H.G. Long, ¶¶ 1-3.)
Demurrer
A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. (Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) In testing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The Court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.App.4th 634, 638.) Because a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the plaintiff must show that the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Where the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the demurrer. (C.C.P., § 430.10(e); Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1126.)
Sufficient facts are the essential facts of the case "with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.) "Whether the plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant to ruling upon the demurrer." (Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609–610.) Under Code Civil Procedure § 430.10(f), a demurrer may also be sustained if a complaint is “uncertain.” Uncertainty exists where a complaint’s factual allegations are so confusing they do not sufficiently apprise a defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)
Cross-Defendant demurs to the first through fourth causes of action of the Cross-Complaint. Cross-Defendant contends that insufficient facts were pled as to the first cause of action for express indemnity, and, as to the second through fourth causes of action, no such causes of action can be stated because there is no right to any form of indemnity until the indemnitee has suffered a loss via payment.
First Cause of Action for Express Indemnification
Cross-Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action is overruled. Cross-Complainant states facts sufficient to state a cause of action.
“Express indemnity refers to an obligation that arises by virtue of express contractual language establishing a duty in one party to save another harmless upon the occurrence of specified circumstances and is enforced in accordance with the terms of the contracting parties’ agreement.” C.W. Howe Partners Inc. v. Mooradian (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 688, 699. Here, Cross-Complainant has attached the applicable Real Property Management Agreement as Exhibit B to the Cross-Complaint. Paragraph 14.2 of the agreement contains an express indemnification provision running in favor of Cross-Complainant. Cross-Defendant’s demurrer essentially consists of arguing that Cross-Defendant was not liable with respect to the causes of action alleged by Plaintiff. Factual resolution and evidentiary adjudication are not matters for consideration with a demurrer. Whether Cross-Complainant will eventually be able to prove the cause of action will be determined by the trier of fact.
The demurrer to the first cause of action is overruled.
Second Cause of Action for Equitable/Implied Indemnification
Third Cause of Action for Contribution
Fourth Cause of Action for Apportionment
Cross-Defendant’s demurrer is overruled. Cross-Complainant states facts sufficient to state the causes of action.
Cross-Defendant argues that pleading these causes of action is improper because no cause of action for equitable forms of indemnity can be pled until a judgment is rendered against the indemnitee. Cross-Defendant cites to the following passage: “[A] cause of action for equitable indemnity does not exist until the underlying loss is paid.” Boyajian v. Ordoubadi (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1027. However, Cross-Defendant omitted key language following this statement. “The rule, however, is one by which the statute of limitations is tested.” Id. at 470 (emphasis in original). Also, during this same paragraph Boyajian cited to a case that utilized the word “accrual” in connection with the word “exists.” The Court determines that the unfortunately phrased word “exists” does not stand for the proposition that no equitable indemnity causes of action cannot be alleged at the pleading stage, but, instead, simply that the cause of action does not accrue until payment is made. If Cross-Defendant’s interpretation is utilized, there would be no pleadings in this State that would be able to include a cause of action for equitable indemnity.
Cross-Defendant’s reference to Christian v. County of Los Angeles (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 466 is also unavailing and distinguishable on the facts. The issue in that case was as follows: “Where codefendant tortfeasors settle with the plaintiff, but thereby suffer no loss through payment, can their cross-actions against another concurrent tortfeasor for equitable indemnity be maintained by the plaintiff as assignee of their claims?” Christian v. County of Los Angeles (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 466, 470. The factual scenario outlined above does not exist in the instant action. Again, assuming arguendo the truth of Cross-Defendant’s argument, no claims for equitable indemnity could be pled at the pleading stage, and all such claims would be forced to be pled as declaratory relief causes of action. This reasoning appears faulty as the statutory scheme for declaratory relief provides certain distinctions and limitations such as the requirement of an existing controversy over a written instrument or real property that may not apply to all situations in which equitable indemnity may be warranted. CCP § 1060. This again supports the contention that the reasoning in Christian is limited to the facts of that case.
Cross-Defendant’s demurrer to the second through fourth causes of action are overruled.
Cross-Defendant’s demurrer to the Cross-Complaint is overruled. Cross-Defendant is ordered to file and serve an Answer within 10 days of this date.