Judge: Gary Y. Tanaka, Case: 21STCV32903, Date: 2022-12-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV32903    Hearing Date: December 7, 2022    Dept: B

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT

Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka                                                                              Wednesday, December 7, 2022

Department B                                                                                                                           Calendar No. 10

PROCEEDINGS

Sridevi Mudundi v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., et al.   

21STCV32903

1.      Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., et al.’s Motion for Summary Judgment      

TENTATIVE RULING

            Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., et al.’s Motion for Summary is granted. 

Background

Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on September 7, 2021.  Plaintiffs allege the following facts. The action pertains to the care and treatment rendered to Plaintiff Sridevi Mudundi during a hysterectomy performed at South Bay Kaiser on February 14, 2019.  Plaintiffs allege Mudundi suffered an injury to the bladder due to a cut that was discovered two days later when Mudundi presented to the emergency room with severe pain. Plaintiffs allege the following causes of action: (1) Negligence and (2) Loss of Consortium (brought by Plaintiff Balakrishna Reddy Naini).

Objections

Defendants’ Objections

Objection to the “Response” to Reply – Sustained.

Motion for Summary Judgment

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  CCP § 437c(p)(2).  “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” CCP § 437c(p)(2).  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”  Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 463, 467.

“A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1).

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”  (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; CCP § 437c(c).)

Defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no triable issue of material fact with respect to Plaintiffs’ causes of action. The motion is based on the ground that the Complaint is barred by the statute of limitations set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.5.

Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5 states, in relevant part:

“In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person's alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.”

“[T]he term ‘injury,’ as used in section 340.5, means both ‘a person's physical condition and its negligent cause. The word “injury” for purposes of section 340.5 is a term of art that refer[s] to the damaging effect of the alleged wrongful act and not to the act itself. The injury is not necessarily the ultimate harm suffered, but instead occurs at the point at which appreciable harm [is] first manifested.” Brewer v. Remington (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 14, 24 (internal citations and quotations omitted; emphasis in original).

Defendants have met their initial burden to establish that the complete defense of the statute of limitations applies to Plaintiffs’ causes of action.  CCP § 437c(p)(2).  Therefore, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to provide specific facts to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to the statute of limitations affirmative defense to Plaintiffs’ causes of action. Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden.

Specific deposition testimony of Plaintiffs show that they had a suspicion of wrongdoing on February 16, 2019, at the time of the admittance of Plaintiff Mudundi to the emergency room. However, Plaintiffs failed to file the action within the one-year statute of limitations pursuant to CCP § 340.5. At that time, according to their own deposition testimony, both Plaintiffs raised suspicions and concerns that the injury to the bladder was caused by negligence during the hysterectomy on February 14, 2019 due to a cut. (Defendants’ Separate Statement of Facts and Supporting Evidence, 5-6.)  Thus, Plaintiffs had a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing as of February 16, 2019.  Plaintiffs did not file this action until September 7, 2021, more than one year after February 16, 2019.  Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.  In addition, all of Plaintiffs’ causes of action are barred because they all arise from medical negligence.  See, Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 336, 347.

Plaintiffs do not meaningfully attempt to dispute that they did not have a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing on February 16, 2019. Based on the clear deposition testimony, this failure to dispute cannot be surprising.  Instead, Plaintiffs attempt to argue that they did not suffer appreciable harm until sometime later when Plaintiff Mudundi began to suffer lack of “sleep, fatigue, irritability, difficulty focusing or remembering, and mood changes” which “affect[ed] her professional and private life.”  (Opposition, page 7, line 6.)  Ultimately, Plaintiff was laid off from her job on or around November 12, 2020.  (Id., line 9-10.)  Apparently, Plaintiffs attempt to argue that appreciable harm occurred on or around this date.  While this is a novel argument, clearly, here, the injury occurred on or around February 14, 2019, during the time of the hysterectomy when Plaintiff Mudundi suffered a cut which caused fluid leakage in and around her urinary bladder.  In fact, these are the allegations of injury that are specifically laid out in the Complaint. (Complaint, ¶¶ 30-37.)  The allegations of the Complaint then provide details as to how Plaintiff suffered significant harm immediately after this date.  (Id.)  The Complaint does also mention that Plaintiff continued to suffer harm when she was laid off, but, clearly, this date is not the date that she began to suffer appreciable harm.  “The injury is not necessarily the ultimate harm suffered, but instead occurs at the point at which appreciable harm [is] first manifested.” Brewer v. Remington (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 14, 24 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  Here, Plaintiffs suffered appreciable harm on or around February 14, 2019, and Plaintiffs had a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing on the part of Defendants no later than February 16, 2019.

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden to provide specific facts to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to their causes of action.  Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted

Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling.