Judge: Gary Y. Tanaka, Case: 21TRCV00040, Date: 2023-05-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21TRCV00040 Hearing Date: May 24, 2023 Dept: B
LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT –
SOUTHWEST DISTRICT
Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Wednesday, May 24, 2023
Department B Calendar No. 4
PROCEEDINGS
Howard
Simon v. LuAnn Fabien, et al.
21TRCV00040
1. American Contractors Indemnity Company’s Motion for
Order of Discharge and Award of Costs and Attorneys’ Fees and Order for
Deposit; and for Dismissal of American Contractors Indemnity Company from
Cross-Complaint
2. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company’s Motion for
an Order (1) To Deposit Bond Funds with Court; (2) For Exoneration and
Dismissal of Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company; and (3) For an Award of
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
TENTATIVE RULING
American Contractors Indemnity
Company’s Motion for Order of Discharge and Award of Costs and Attorneys’ Fees
and Order for Deposit; and for Dismissal of American Contractors Indemnity
Company from Cross-Complaint is granted.
Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company’s Motion for
an Order (1) To Deposit Bond Funds with Court; (2) For Exoneration and
Dismissal of Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company; and (3) For an Award of
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs is granted.
Background
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on January 19, 2021. The operative First Amended Complaint was
filed on May 5, 2021. Plaintiff alleges
the following facts. Plaintiff hired
Defendant LuAnn Fabien dba LuAnn Development (“LuAnn”) to perform construction
of the property located at 2432 Palm Drive, Hermosa Beach, CA 90254 (“Subject
Property”). LuAnn was hired to act as
general contractor. The contract stated
that the project would be completed on November 1, 2017. LuAnn was required to
provide weekly billings and all adjustments required approval from Plaintiff. LuAnn
failed to perform the contract, made false representations to Plaintiff, and completed
the construction of the Subject Property in a defective manner. American Contractors Indemnity Company
(“ACIC”) was the surety company which issued the bond for the project.
Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: (1) Negligence; (2) Negligent
Misrepresentation; (3) Breach of Express Warranties; (4) Breach of the Implied
Warranty of Habitability; (5) Breach of Contract; (6) Nuisance; (7) Indemnity; (8)
Violation of Business & Professions Code §§ 7107, et seq.; and (9) Claim
Against Bond. Several Cross-Complaints
have also been filed.
Motions for Deposit and Discharge
Code Civ. Proc., § 386(b) states:
“Any person, firm, corporation, association or other
entity against whom double or multiple claims are made, or may be made, by two
or more persons which are such that they may give rise to double or multiple
liability, may bring an action against the claimants to compel them to
interplead and litigate their several claims.
When the person, firm, corporation, association or
other entity against whom such claims are made, or may be made, is a defendant
in an action brought upon one or more of such claims, it may either file a
verified cross-complaint in interpleader, admitting that it has no interest in
the money or property claimed, or in only a portion thereof, and alleging that
all or such portion is demanded by parties to such action, and apply to the
court upon notice to such parties for an order to deliver such money or
property or such portion thereof to such person as the court shall direct; or
may bring a separate action against the claimants to compel them to interplead
and litigate their several claims. The action of interpleader may be maintained
although the claims have not a common origin, are not identical but are adverse
to and independent of one another, or the claims are unliquidated and no
liability on the part of the party bringing the action or filing the
cross-complaint has arisen. The applicant or interpleading party may deny
liability in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants. The applicant or
interpleading party may join as a defendant in such action any other party
against whom claims are made by one or more of the claimants or such other
party may interplead by cross-complaint; provided, however, that such claims
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.”
Code Civ. Proc., § 386.5 states:
“Where the only relief sought against one of the
defendants is the payment of a stated amount of money alleged to be wrongfully
withheld, such defendant may, upon affidavit that he is a mere stakeholder with
no interest in the amount or any portion thereof and that conflicting demands
have been made upon him for the amount by parties to the action, upon notice to
such parties, apply to the court for an order discharging him from liability
and dismissing him from the action on his depositing with the clerk of the
court the amount in dispute and the court may, in its discretion, make such
order.”
Code Civ. Proc., § 386.6(a) states:
“A party to an action who follows the procedure set
forth in Section 386 or 386.5 may insert in his motion, petition, complaint, or
cross complaint a request for allowance of his costs and reasonable attorney
fees incurred in such action. In ordering the discharge of such party, the
court may, in its discretion, award such party his costs and reasonable
attorney fees from the amount in dispute which has been deposited with the
court. At the time of final judgment in the action the court may make such
further provision for assumption of such costs and attorney fees by one or more
of the adverse claimants as may appear proper.”
On December 13, 2021, ACIC filed its Cross-Complaint
for Interpleader pursuant to CCP § 386.
Cross-Complainant alleged: “On or about February 5, 2013, ACIC as surety
and LUANN FABIAN dba LUANN DEVELOPMENT, as principal, made, executed, and
delivered a certain Contractor’s License Bond, Bond No. 100215153 pursuant to
Sections 7071.5 through 7071.11 of the California Business and Professions Code
in the sum of $15,000.00, but $7,500.00 is reserved for claims made by
homeowners. ACIC is informed and believes that it was in effect at the time of
the occurrence of the event described herein. By the provisions of this bond,
and pursuant to Sections 7071.5 and 7071.6 of the Business and Professions
Code, liability to the Cross-Defendants, and each of them, is limited to the
penal sum set forth in said section.” (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 4-5.) “Cross-Defendants
made written demands and a lawsuit was filed against ACIC for payment of losses
and/or damages claimed to have been suffered in the aggregate amount in excess
of the $15,000.00 penal sum.” (Motion,
page 1, lines 11-13.) Thus, ACIC seeks
an order to deposit the $15,000.00 bond penal sum with the Court, less the
statutorily allowed attorney fees and costs in the amount of $5,000.00 pursuant
Code of Civil Procedure section 386.6.
On April 27, 2022, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance
Company filed its Cross-Complaint for Interpleader. Cross-Complainant alleged:
“On or about January 10, 2018, Philadelphia issued a Contractor’s Disciplinary
Bond No. PB11511002592 (“Bond”) to “LUANN DEVELOPMENT” as principal and the
People of the State of California as obligee pursuant to the provisions of
Business & Professions Code § 7071.6, et seq. The Bond has a penal limit of
$30,000. On January 19, 2021, Simon filed the subject action naming
Philadelphia as a Defendant and asserting a cause of action for Claim Against
Bond against Philadelphia. Simon asserts a claim against Philadelphia’s Bond
based on the allegations that Philadelphia’s Bond principal, Luann Development,
breached the construction contract between the parties. Simon’s claim is in
excess of the penal sum of the Bond.” (Cross-Complaint,
¶¶ 7-8.) Similar to ACIC, Philadelphia
requests an order to deposit the Bond funds with the Court and for attorneys’
fees and costs.
Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Simon filed written
oppositions to the motions. Simon argued
that the right to interpleader and to deposit funds are only available when
there are multiple claims to the bond funds. Simon states he is the sole claimant to the
funds, and, therefore, there are no multiple claims. In addition, Simon argued that moving parties
have attempted to attack Simon’s Complaint through a demurrer and the filing of
an Answer asserting affirmative defenses. Therefore, Simon states that
interpleader is no longer available to moving parties. See, Karton v. Ari Design &
Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734. Thus, Simon maintains that the motions must be
denied.
Both moving parties filed replies contending that an
individual or entity other than Simon is also making a claim to the bond funds
– an individual named Robert Nickell. Apparently,
this assertion stems from the fact that both moving parties were named as
cross-defendants in an action titled Fabian v. Nickell, Case No.
20TRCV00742. Beyond this, however, both
moving parties filed amendments to their Cross-Complaints in Interpleader
substituting Robert Nickell as “JOE 1” and “ZOE 1,” respectively. In addition,
both moving parties attacked Plaintiff’s argument regarding interpleader not
being available to them and distinguished Karton.
The motions were continued to allow Plaintiff the
opportunity to address new evidence submitted with the Replies. The evidence
essentially consisted of showing Nickell’s status as additional claimant.
Plaintiff filed a supplemental opposition again
requesting that the Court deny the motions. As the grounds for denial,
Plaintiff speculates that Nickell may be asserting a claim to a different bond.
In addition, Plaintiff repeats the authority listed above with respect to
moving parties’ potential for being imposed attorneys’ fees based on their
attempt to challenge Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition are not
meritorious. Therefore, the Court grants
both motions.
Here, the only Bonds that are the subject of the
relevant Cross-Complaints in Interpleader are the Bonds identified above. Nickell
was recently named as a party to the Cross-Complaints. Thus, the allegations of
the Cross-Complaints with respect to the right to interpleader are only
addressed to the Bonds at issue in this motion, and not to any other Bond or
Bonds. Moving parties have met their
burden to identify potential claimants to the Bond funds. Whether Nickell’s claim is or is not meritorious is not at issue
with these motions. “There is nothing in Code of Civil Procedure section
386, however, that imposes an obligation on an interpleading party to monitor
the action and dismiss parties who assert no claim to a stake.” Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992)
4 Cal.App.4th 857, 874–875. Plaintiff’s
sheer speculation that Nickell is asserting a claim on a different bond does
not defeat this motion.
Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734 is distinguishable. In Karton,
the Court held that, following bench trial, the surety company which secured
the bond for the unlicensed contractor was also responsible for attorneys’ fees
along with the contractor. The following passage is instructive: “[T]o avoid
the costs and risks of litigation, Wesco could have negotiated settlement of
its own liability or used interpleader procedures to deposit the amount of its
bond in court. Instead, Wesco elected to gamble that it and Ari could avoid
liability altogether on the merits. Having lost that gamble, [Wesco] is not in
a position to complain about liability for court costs ....” Karton v. Ari
Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 753 (internal
citations and quotations omitted). Here,
however, moving parties did not similarly “gamble.” They did not litigate the action on the merits
to completion with a trial. Instead,
they have properly filed Cross-Complaints in Interpleader and promptly moved to
deposit funds. It is true that both
parties filed Answers to the Complaint, but this action cannot be deemed the
type of activity that Wesco engaged in. The
Answers were required to be filed and ensured that Plaintiff would not take
their defaults. In addition, a review of
ACIC’s Demurrer to Complaint shows that it was completely meritorious resulting
in a dismissal of numerous inappropriate causes of action alleged against the
surety leaving the only appropriate cause of action for “Claim Against Bond.”
For the foregoing reasons, moving parties’ respective
motions are granted. The terms of the moving parties’ respective proposed
orders are incorporated into this Court’s minute order.
Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this
ruling.