Judge Gary Y. Tanaka, Case 21TRCV00212 2023-01-30 Tentative Ruling

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT

Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Monday, January 30, 2023

Department B Calendar No. 5

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on March 22, 2021. Due to legal troubles, in 2007, Plaintiff was required to leave the country. During this time, Plaintiff and Defendant Margarita Chicas had an agreement that Defendant would manage the real property owned by Plaintiff located at 10234 S. 10th Ave. Inglewood, CA 90303. However, instead, Defendant obtained title to Plaintiff’s real property through fraud and forgery of the deed. Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: 1. Quiet Title; 2. Slander of Title; 3. Cancellation of Instrument; 4. Fraud; 5. Breach of Oral Contract.

On October 29, 2021, Defendant filed a Cross-Complaint alleging the following causes of action: 1. Quiet Title; 2. Breach of Implied in Fact Contract; 3. Adverse Possession; 4. Partition of Real Property. Cross-Complainant alleges that she and Cross-Defendant had an agreement whereby the property was transferred to Cross-Complainant. Cross-Complainant also alleges that Cross-Defendant abandoned the property. Cross-Defendant’s demurrer was sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Cross-Complainant filed a First Amended Cross-Complaint on June 27, 2022 alleging the same four causes of action. On September 20, 2022, the parties stipulated to allow Cross-Complainant to file a Second Amended Cross-Complaint which was deemed filed and served that date.

“At any time after notice of pendency of action has been recorded, any party, or any nonparty with an interest in the real property affected thereby, may apply to the court in which the action is pending to expunge the notice. . . Evidence or declarations may be filed with the motion to expunge the notice. The court may permit evidence to be received in the form of oral testimony, and may make any orders it deems just to provide for discovery by any party affected by a motion to expunge the notice. The claimant shall have the burden of proof under Sections 405.31 and 405.32.” Code Civ. Proc., § 405.30.

“In proceedings under this chapter, the court shall order the notice expunged if the court finds that the pleading on which the notice is based does not contain a real property claim. The court shall not order an undertaking to be given as a condition of expunging the notice where the court finds the pleading does not contain a real property claim.” Code Civ. Proc., § 405.31. “In proceedings under this chapter, the court shall order that the notice be expunged if the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim.” Code Civ. Proc., § 405.32.

Code Civ. Proc., § 405.4 states: “‘Real property claim’ means the cause or causes of action in a pleading which would, if meritorious, affect (a) title to, or the right to possession of, specific real property or (b) the use of an easement identified in the pleading, other than an easement obtained pursuant to statute by any regulated public utility.” An action for money on a contract is not a real property claim even if it has some relation to real property. Ziello v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 321, 332.

“The court shall direct that the party prevailing on any motion under this chapter be awarded the reasonable attorney's fees and costs of making or opposing the motion unless the court finds that the other party acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of attorney's fees and costs unjust.” Code Civ. Proc., § 405.38.

Defendant moves to expunge the Notice of Pendency of Action (Lis Pendens) recorded by Plaintiff on June 2, 2021. Defendant did not describe the instrument number of the notice that was recorded. The Court notes that Defendant did not set forth a request for attorneys’ fees in the notice of motion although a glancing mention of attorneys’ fees was set forth in the memorandum of points and authorities. Defendant moves on the ground that “(1) the action as pleaded does not contain a real property claim; (2) Hernandez fails to establish a probable validity of prevailing under his real property claim; and (3) Monetary relief provides an adequate remedy.” (Motion, page 3, lines 11-14.)

First, Plaintiff has established the existence of a real property claim. Plaintiff has alleged causes of action to Quiet Title and for Cancellation of Instruments. The causes of action, if meritorious, would definitely affect title to or the right to possession of specific real property. CCP § 405.4. In fact, the filing of a notice of pendency of action is mandatory upon filing a Complaint which includes a cause of action to Quiet Title. “Immediately upon commencement of the action, the plaintiff shall file a notice of the pendency of the action in the office of the county recorder of each county in which any real property described in the complaint is located.” Code Civ. Proc., § 761.010(b).

Second, Plaintiff has established the probable validity of prevailing in this action. Plaintiff submitted evidence that Defendant admitted at her deposition that Plaintiff never intended that Defendant be placed on title. In addition, Plaintiff submitted evidence that he did not sign the deed in question, and was not in Los Angeles, but, instead, in El Salvador when the deed was notarized. (Decl., Grant Peto, Exs. D, E; Decl., Juan Luis Hernandez, ¶¶ 5-12.)

Finally, real property is unique, and, therefore, monetary relief is not an adequate remedy under these facts.

As the prevailing party on this motion, Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to CCP § 405.38 is granted.

“The trial court has “broad authority” to determine the amount of a reasonable attorneys’ fees. PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095. “[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” Id. [“California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys' fee award.”]. “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 (internal quotation omitted.) An attorney who works on a contingent fee basis may be entitled to a fee enhancement or multiplier depending on the work involved and nature of the case. See Id. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the lodestar method based on the reasonable amount of time the attorney spent multiplied by a reasonable rate.

Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees based on total time expended of 4 hours of work at $500/per hour. The Court finds that the hourly rate is reasonable based upon the attorney’s experience and the nature of the work involved. The Court finds that the time expended is also reasonable.

Therefore, the Court awards reasonable attorneys’ fees in the sum of $2,000.00. Defendant is ordered to pay this sum to Plaintiff within 30 days of this date.