Judge: Gary Y. Tanaka, Case: 21TRCV00245, Date: 2023-01-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21TRCV00245 Hearing Date: January 9, 2023 Dept: B
LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT
Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Monday, January 9, 2023
Department B Calendar No. 5
PROCEEDINGS
James
Atkins, et al. v. Karyn Chamberlain, et al.
21TRCV00245
1.
James Atkins, et
al.’s Motion for Summary Adjudication
TENTATIVE RULING
James Atkins, et al.’s Motion for Summary Adjudication
is denied.
Background
Plaintiffs’ Complaint was filed on April 1, 2021.
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint was filed on June 17, 2021. Plaintiffs
allege the following facts. Plaintiffs own and reside at 601 Paseo de los
Reyes, Redondo Beach, California 90277. Defendant Karyn Chamberlain is the
owner of neighboring property. Defendant Gutierrez & Sons Tree Service
& Landscaping, Inc. was hired by Defendant Chamberlain. Defendants caused
harm to Plaintiffs by trespassing and cutting trees and vegetation on Plaintiffs’
property. Plaintiffs allege the following causes of action: 1. Willful
Trespass, Temporary Restraining Order, and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction;
2. Request for Declaratory Relief; 3. Elder Abuse.
On March 11, 2022, Karyn Chamberlain and Michael
Chamberlain filed a Cross-Complaint alleging causes of action for: 1. Nuisance;
2. IIED; 3. Elder Abuse; 4. Declaratory Relief.
Objections
Cross-Complainants’ Objections
Declaration of Arthur V. Murphy – Objection 1 is
overruled.
Motion for Summary Adjudication
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or
summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the
parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations,
trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,
subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the
evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’
and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no
triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7
Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1119.)
“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden
is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no
triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005)
128 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1519.) A
defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or
her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has
shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be
established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” CCP § 437c(p)(2). “Once the defendant . . . has met that
burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue
of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense
thereto.” CCP § 437c(p)(2). “If the
plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” Avivi
v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 463, 467.
“A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her
burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party
has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment
on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that
burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a
triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or
a defense thereto.” Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1).
“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the
court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except
evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi,
159 Cal.App.4th at 467; CCP § 437c(c).)
Cross-Defendant moves for summary adjudication of the
following issues as to the Cross-Complaint.
Issue 1: “The first cause of action of the . . . Cross-Complaint
for Private Nuisance fails because none of the small trees and shrubs growing
along the Atkins' south property line exceed ten feet in height and therefore
do not constitute a spite fence as defined in Civil Code section 841.4.”
(Notice of Motion, page 1, lines 12-15).
Issue 2: “The fourth cause of action of the . . . Cross-Complaint
for Declaratory Relief fails because none of the small trees and shrubs growing
along the Atkins' south property line exceed ten feet in height and therefore
do not constitute a spite fence as defined in Civil Code section 841.4.”
(Notice of Motion, page 1, lines 16-19).
Civ. Code, § 841.4 states:
“Any fence or other structure in the nature of a fence
unnecessarily exceeding 10 feet in height maliciously erected or maintained for
the purpose of annoying the owner or occupant of adjoining property is a
private nuisance. Any owner or occupant of adjoining property injured either in
his comfort or the enjoyment of his estate by such nuisance may enforce the
remedies against its continuance prescribed in Title 3, Part 3, Division 4 of
this code.”
Cross-Defendants have met their initial burden to
submit evidence to show that an essential element of Cross-Complainants’ first
and fourth causes of action cannot be established or that there is a complete
defense to the causes of action. Cross-Defendants allege that the offending
trees and shrubs do not constitute a spite fence pursuant to Civ. Code § 841.
However, Cross-Complainants have met their burden to
submit competent evidence to show the existence of a triable issue of material
fact as to the first and fourth causes of action. (Cross-Complainants’ Separate Statement of Facts
and Supporting Evidence, 1, 3, 4, 6.) Cross-Complainants
submitted evidence indicating that the offending trees and shrubs are located
on a planter which is 49.7 inches above grade where the hedge begins and that,
therefore, the foliage height is between 135.3 inches and 163.9 inches above
the finish grade of the northern property. (Decl., John O. Schuricht, ¶¶ 6-8.) Thus, a triable issue of material fact exists
as to whether the asserted offending structure exceeds ten feet in height. The sole ground for Cross-Defendants’ motion
was that the offending structure was less than ten feet in height and,
therefore, could not constitute a spite fence under Civ. Code § 841.
Therefore, Cross-Defendants’ motion for summary
adjudication is denied.
Cross-Complainants are ordered to give notice of this
ruling.