Judge: Gary Y. Tanaka, Case: 21TRCV00376, Date: 2023-03-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21TRCV00376    Hearing Date: March 13, 2023    Dept: B

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT

Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka                                                                                        Monday, March 13, 2023   

Department B                                                                                                                            Calendar No. 3

PROCEEDINGS

David Trozak v. Ken Hartley, et al.   

21TRCV00376

1.      Kenneth Hartley and Dorothy Forba’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees    

TENTATIVE RULING

            Kenneth Hartley and Dorothy Forba’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is denied.

Background

            Plaintiff filed the Complaint on May 19, 2021. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. The action stems from the construction and replacement of a fence on the property line located between 721 30th Street, Hermosa Beach, CA 90254 (“Plaintiff’s Property”) and 723 30th Street, Hermosa Beach, CA 90254 (“Defendants’ Property”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants trespassed on his property, created a nuisance, and interfered with Plaintiff's contractual relations on the construction of Plaintiff's house. Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: 1. Trespass; 2. Private Nuisance; 3. Interference with Contractual Relations.

            On February 16, 2022, Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike was denied, in part, and granted, in part.  Defendants moved to strike the entirety of the third cause of action.  Defendants’ motion to strike the entire third cause of action was denied.  Instead, stray allegations in support of and within the third cause of action were stricken.  The third cause of action remained viable and active.

            Objections

            The Court deems Defendants’ objections moot and declines to rule on them as the objected matter only dealt with Plaintiff’s attempt to reduce attorneys’ fees if Defendants were deemed the prevailing parties.

            Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

            Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(c)(1) states: “Except as provided in paragraph (2), in any action subject to subdivision (b), a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs.  If the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to Section 128.5.”

            “The trial court has “broad authority” to determine the amount of a reasonable attorneys’ fees.  PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.  “[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.”  Id. [“California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys' fee award.”].  “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”  Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 (internal quotation omitted.)

            Defendants move, pursuant to CCP § 425.16(c), for attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $36,180.52. Defendant’s motion is based on the grounds that the Court granted Defendants’ special anti-SLAPP motion to strike. However, as noted above,    Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees was granted, only, in part.  The third cause of action remains viable and active, and only stray allegations that were not essential to state facts to support the cause of action were deemed stricken.  

            A Defendant who partially succeeds on an anti-SLAPP motion is generally considered the prevailing party.  Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 340 (stating that defendants who successfully eliminated a trade libel cause of action prevailed despite the fact that a defamation cause of action remained). However, this general principle does not apply when the result of the motion was insignificant, and the Defendant did not achieve any practical benefit from bringing the motion.  Moran v. Endres (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 952, 955.  But, even when a partially successful Defendant is considered a prevailing party, only those fees and costs incurred in connection with the successful portion of the anti-SLAPP motion that is granted in part may be recovered.  Jackson v. Yarbray (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 75, 82.

            Here, Defendants were able to strike several allegations within and in support of the third cause of action.  However, that cause of action remained active because other theories outside of the allegations that were stricken could support the cause of action.  Similar to the moving party in Moran v. Endres (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 952, here, the partial granting of the anti-SLAPP motion, limited solely to stray allegations in several paragraphs of the Complaint, had no practical benefit to moving party.  Contrary to Defendants’ arguments that the cause of action now remains stripped of any supporting facts, the cause of action is still supported by facts indicating that Defendants made acts of physical intimidation and threats of physical violence.  The third cause of action remains active and viable.  Thus, the Court declines to name the moving party as the successful or prevailing party in the anti-SLAPP motion.

            Thus, Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees is denied.

            Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.