Judge: Gary Y. Tanaka, Case: 22TRCV00067, Date: 2023-02-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22TRCV00067 Hearing Date: February 7, 2023 Dept: B
LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT
Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Tuesday, February 7, 2023
Department B Calendar No. 3
PROCEEDINGS
Jeff
Williams v. City of Torrance, et al.
22TRCV00067
1.
City of
Torrance’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint
2.
City of
Torrance’s Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint
TENTATIVE RULING
City of Torrance’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint
is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.
City of Torrance’s Motion to Strike Portions of First
Amended Complaint is moot.
Background
Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on January 28, 2022. Plaintiff’s
First Amended Complaint was filed on September 9, 2022. Plaintiff alleges the
following facts. Plaintiff is a firefighter paramedic for Defendant City of
Torrance. In 2011, Plaintiff was diagnosed with a “physical disability, mental
disability, or protected condition.” (FAC, ¶ 8.) In 2016, Plaintiff was removed
from his paramedic assignment by the Fire Chief. In 2020 and again in 2021,
Plaintiff asked to be reinstated to his paramedic assignment. Plaintiff was
never reinstated. Plaintiff was discriminated against due to his age and
disability. Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: 1. Discrimination in Violation of FEHA (California
Government Code § 12940(a); 2. Failure to Accommodate in Violation of FEHA
(California Government Code § 12940(m); 3. Failure to Engage in Interactive
Process in Violation of FEHA (California Government Code § 12940(n).
Meet and Confer
Defendant filed meet and confer
declarations in sufficient compliance with both CCP § 430.41 and CCP §
435.5. (Decls., James M. Oldendorph).
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendant’s request for judicial
notice is granted pursuant to Evidence Code § 452.
Demurrer
A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a
complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. (Schmidt v.
Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) In testing the sufficiency of the complaint,
the court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual
allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly
pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39
Cal.3d 311, 318.) The Court may not
consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.App.4th
634, 638.) Because a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the
plaintiff must show that the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish
every element of each cause of action. (Rakestraw
v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Where the complaint fails to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the demurrer.
(C.C.P., § 430.10(e); Zelig v. County
of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1126.)
Sufficient facts are the essential facts
of the case "with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently
specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his
cause of action.” (Gressley v.
Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.) "Whether the plaintiff will be able to
prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant to ruling upon the demurrer." (Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180
Cal.App.3d 605, 609–610.) Under Code
Civil Procedure § 430.10(f), a demurrer may also be sustained if a complaint is
“uncertain.” Uncertainty exists where a
complaint’s factual allegations are so confusing they do not sufficiently
apprise a defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp.
(1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)
Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s FAC
pursuant to CCP § 430.10(e) on the grounds that the causes of action are barred
by the applicable statute of limitations and that the causes of action fail to
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Defendant also demurs to pursuant to CCP § 430.10(f)
on the grounds that the causes of action are uncertain.
Statute of Limitations
“The Government Claims Act (§
810 et seq.) establishes certain conditions precedent to the filing of a
lawsuit against a public entity. As relevant here, a plaintiff must timely file
a claim for money or damages with the public entity. (§ 911.2) [....] The
failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars
the plaintiff from bringing suit against that entity. [....] Claims for
personal injury must be presented not later than six months after the accrual
of the cause of action, and claims relating to any other cause of action must
be filed within one year of the accrual of the cause of action. [....] The
deadline for bringing a lawsuit against the public entity after a claim
has been acted upon or deemed denied “is a true statute of limitations[.] [....]
With certain exceptions (§ 905), the timely filing of a written government
claim is an element that a plaintiff is required to prove in
order to prevail on his or her cause of action. Thus, a complaint failing to
allege facts demonstrating timely presentation of a claim or that such
presentation was excused is subject to a general demurrer for not stating facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 1104, 1118–1119 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Plaintiff alleges the following:
“Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies by filing a charge of
discrimination with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH). The DFEH issued Plaintiff a right to sue
notice dated on or about October 16, 2021.” (FAC, ¶ 15.)
First, Plaintiff has failed to
allege facts demonstrating when he filed his government claim. Plaintiff only alleges when the DFEH issued
its right to sue notice. Here, however,
Plaintiff has alleged that he was first diagnosed with a disability in 2011,
and then alleges facts that he suffered an adverse employment action in 2016. As to the first cause of action, facts
supporting the year of 2016 as the date of accrual have been alleged by
Plaintiff. If Plaintiff did not file the
government claim within one year of 2016, a bar based on the statute of
limitations would be revealed in the FAC. Again, it is uncertain when Plaintiff filed
the government claim. As to the second
and third causes of action, it is not certain when and whether Plaintiff gave
notice to Defendant regarding the need to accommodate. If the notice had been
given sometime in 2011, then, the government claim should have been filed
within one year of that date. At a
minimum, it appears that Plaintiff has alleged facts demonstrating that
Defendant knew of the alleged failure to accommodate and failure to engage in
an interactive process no later than 2016, and, again, as noted above, while
uncertain, it appears that the government claim was not filed until after one
year from that date.
“Generally, a cause of action
accrues when [it] is complete with all of its elements[.][....] An exception to
this rule is the continuing violation doctrine. The continuing
violation doctrine aggregates a series of wrongs or injuries for purposes
of the statute of limitations, treating the limitations period as accruing for
all of them upon commission or sufferance of the last of them. Consequently,
the continuing violation doctrine allows liability for unlawful ... conduct
occurring outside the statute of limitations if it is sufficiently connected to
unlawful conduct within the limitations period. For the continuing violation
doctrine to apply, a plaintiff must show the defendant engaged in a pattern of
reasonably frequent and similar acts [that] may, in a given case, justify
treating the acts as an indivisible course of conduct actionable in its
entirety, notwithstanding that the conduct occurred partially outside and
partially inside the limitations period. [¶] Unlike equitable tolling, the
continuing tort/continuing violation theory affects a cause of action's
accrual.[....] [A] court must consider whether the employer's actions
(1)...[were] sufficiently similar in kind—recognizing ... that similar kinds of
unlawful employer conduct, such as acts of harassment or failures to
reasonably accommodate disability, may take a number of different forms
[citation]; (2) have occurred with reasonable frequency; (3) and have not
acquired a degree of permanence.” Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 1104, 1124–1125 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Plaintiff argues that the
continuing violation doctrine should be utilized to toll the statute of
limitations. However, here, Plaintiff
has alleged facts demonstrating an adverse employment action based on alleged
discrimination in 2016. The face of the allegations
of the FAC, as currently alleged, demonstrate that this adverse employment action
acquired a degree of permanence on that date. Plaintiff alleges that he again asked to be returned
to his former position in 2020 and 2021 and was denied. This allegation simply appears to be an
allegation noting a statement made by Defendant confirming and reiterating a
decision which Plaintiff alleges was discriminatory occurring in 2016. The decision in 2016, which Plaintiff states
was discriminatory, is the act which actually caused the alleged adverse
employment action.
The Court also notes the
following uncertainties and defects within the individual causes of action.
First Cause of Action for Discrimination in Violation
of FEHA (California Government Code § 12940(a))
[I]n disability discrimination
cases, the threshold issue is whether there is direct evidence that the motive
for the employer's conduct was related to the employee's physical or mental
condition. [A] plaintiff alleging disability discrimination can establish the
requisite employer intent to discriminate by proving (1) the employer knew that
plaintiff had a physical condition that limited a major life activity, or
perceived him to have such a condition, and (2) the plaintiff's actual or
perceived physical condition was a substantial motivating reason for the
defendant's decision to subject the plaintiff to an adverse employment action.”
Glynn v. Superior Court (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 47, 53.
“[A] prima facie case, of age discrimination arises
when the employee shows (1) at the time of the adverse action he or she was 40
years of age or older, (2) an adverse employment action was
taken against the employee, (3) at the time of the adverse action the employee
was satisfactorily performing his or her job and (4) the employee was replaced
in his position by a significantly younger person.” Hersant v. Department of
Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1003.
While uncertain, it appears that Plaintiff is
attempting to allege two theories of discrimination – disability and age. To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to
allege a theory based on age, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to meet the
requisite elements listed above.
Second Cause of Action for Failure to Accommodate in
Violation of FEHA (California Government Code § 12940(m))
“Subdivision (m)(1) of section 12940 makes it unlawful
[f]or an employer ... to fail to make reasonable accommodation for the known
physical or mental disability of an ... employee. Nothing in this subdivision
or in paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a) shall be construed to require an
accommodation that is demonstrated by the employer or other covered entity to
produce undue hardship, as defined in subdivision (u) of Section 12926, to its
operation. [¶] There are three elements to a failure to accommodate action: (1)
the plaintiff has a disability covered by the FEHA; (2) the plaintiff is a
qualified individual (i.e., he or she can perform the essential functions
of the position); and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the
plaintiff's disability.” Hernandez v.
Rancho Santiago Community College District (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1187,
1193–1194.
“An employee cannot demand clairvoyance of his
employer. Where the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary
reasonable accommodations, are not open, obvious, and apparent to the employer,
... the employee bears the burden to specifically identify
the disability and resulting limitations, and to
suggest the reasonable accommodations.” Doe v. Department of Corrections
& Rehabilitation (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 721, 738–739 (internal
citations and quotations omitted; emphasis in original).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts
demonstrating notice and a request for accommodation, and facts to show that he
would have been able to perform the essential functions of the position.
Third Cause of Action for Failure to Engage in
Interactive Process in Violation of FEHA (California Government Code § 12940(n))
“The “interactive process” required
by the FEHA is an informal process with the employee or the employee's
representative, to attempt to identify a reasonable accommodation that will
enable the employee to perform the job effectively.” Wilson v. County of
Orange (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1195. Similar to the defects noted
above, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to demonstrate that Plaintiff ever
gave notice to Defendant of the need for accommodation and requested a
reasonable accommodation.
Therefore, the demurrer to the FAC
is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.
Motion
to Strike
The court may, upon a motion, or at any
time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. CCP § 436(a).
The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or
filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of
the court. CCP § 436(b). The grounds for a motion to strike are that
the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or
filed in conformity with laws. CCP §
436. The grounds for moving to strike
must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. CCP § 437.
The motion to strike is moot upon the
sustaining of the demurrer.
Defendant is ordered to give notice of
this ruling.