Judge: Gary Y. Tanaka, Case: 22TRCV00208, Date: 2022-10-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22TRCV00208 Hearing Date: October 25, 2022 Dept: B
LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT
Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Tuesday, October 25, 2022
Department B Calendar No. 3
PROCEEDINGS
Omninet Pacific Pointe, LP v. Posh Management, et al.
22TRCV00208
Omninet Pacific Pointe, LP’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees as Costs
TENTATIVE RULING
Omninet Pacific Pointe, LP’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees as Costs is granted.
Background
Plaintiff filed its Complaint on March 18, 2022. Plaintiff alleges a single cause of action for unlawful detainer pursuant to a commercial lease agreement. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached the lease by failing to pay the amounts due under the agreement. On June 17, 2022, after a court trial, the Court entered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. On June 23, 2022, judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff. On July 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed a writ of possession. On August 4, 2022, Defendant’s motion for relief from forfeiture was denied.
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
Civ. Code, § 1717(a) states, in relevant part: “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs. . . . Reasonable attorney's fees shall be fixed by the court, and shall be an element of the costs of suit.”
The Court determines the prevailing party on contract claims “upon final resolution of the contract claims and only by a comparison of the extent to which each party ha[s] succeeded and failed to succeed in its contentions.” Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 876 (internal quotations omitted). When a party obtains an unqualified victory by prevailing on or defeating a contract claim, that party is entitled to attorneys’ fees. Scott Co. of Calif. v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1109. Other non-contract claims that are joined in the action are disregarded for purposes of analyzing contract based attorneys’ fees motions. Thus, even if a party may have been successful on a non-contract claim, the party who prevailed on the contract is entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Section 1717. Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 615; Korech v. Hornwood (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1419-22.
Plaintiff moves for attorneys’ fees as costs pursuant to Paragraph 19.4 of the lease agreement entered into by the parties. Paragraph 19.4 states: “Should any party hereto institute any action or proceeding in court to enforce or seek an interpretation of any provision hereof or for damages by reason of an alleged breach of any provision of this Lease, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the losing party or parties such amount as the court may adjudge to be reasonable attorneys' fees for services rendered to the prevailing party in such action or proceeding. The prevailing party shall be deemed to be the party substantially accomplishing the relief and/or remedy sought.” (Plaintiff’s Ex. A). Here, Plaintiff was the prevailing party as to its Unlawful Detainer Complaint because it prevailed in obtaining possession of the subject premises.
“The trial court has “broad authority” to determine the amount of a reasonable attorneys’ fees. PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095. “[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” Id. [“California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys' fee award.”]. “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 (internal quotation omitted.)
Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the lodestar method based on the reasonable amount of time the attorney spent multiplied by a reasonable rate. Plaintiff requests the following: $111,148.89 for attorneys’ fees and $2,902.39 in costs. Plaintiff has attached as Exhibits E and F to the declaration of Patrick McGarrigle a full and detained accounting of the billing and invoices related to this matter. (Decl., Patrick McGarrigle, Exs. E, F.) Counsel states that the firm expended 206 hours in litigating this matter and the hourly rate of the attorneys who worked on this case ranged from $595.00, $495.00, and $195.00, per hour. (Id. at ¶ 7.) The Court finds that the hourly rate and time expended were reasonable considering the nature of this case, that the case was heavily contested by the opposing side, and that the matter eventually was required to proceed to a trial. The attorneys’ hourly rates were reasonable considering their experience and background. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff did not file any written opposition to the motion, and, thus, failed to challenge with any competent evidence the reasonableness of the amount of attorneys’ fees requested by moving party.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees as costs is granted. Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees are fixed at $111,148.89. Costs are recoverable via the memorandum of costs.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.