Judge: Gary Y. Tanaka, Case: 22TRCV00747, Date: 2023-01-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22TRCV00747    Hearing Date: January 12, 2023    Dept: B

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT

Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka                                                                                 Wednesday, January 12, 2023
Department B                                                                                                                               Calendar No. 5

PROCEEDINGS

Shuni Wang v. FCA US LLC, et al.

22TRCV00747

1.      FCA US LLC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Action

TENTATIVE RULING

FCA US LLC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Action is denied.

Background

            Plaintiff filed the Complaint on August 25, 2022. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Plaintiff alleges that her 2018 Jeep Compass suffers from electrical defects. Plaintiff sets forth causes of action under the Song-Beverly Act.

            Request for Judicial Notice

            Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is granted.

            Motion to Compel Arbitration

            “California law reflects a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a relatively quick and inexpensive method for resolving disputes.  [Citation.]  To further that policy, [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1281.2 requires a trial court to enforce a written arbitration agreement unless one of three limited exceptions applies.  [Citation.]  Those statutory exceptions arise where (1) a party waives the right to arbitration; (2) grounds exist for revoking the arbitration agreement; and (3) pending litigation with a third party creates the possibility of conflicting rulings on common factual or legal issues.  (§ 1281.2, subds. (a)–(c).)”  Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 967.

            “The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, and a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense.  In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.”  Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284.

            “The party opposing arbitration has the burden of demonstrating that an arbitration clause cannot be interpreted to require arbitration of the dispute.  Nonetheless, this policy does not override ordinary principles of contract interpretation.  [T]he contractual terms themselves must be carefully examined before the parties to the contract can be ordered to arbitration:  Although [t]he law favors contracts for arbitration of disputes between parties, there is no policy compelling persons to accept arbitration of controversies which they have not agreed to arbitrate.”  Rice v. Downs (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1223 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

            In Rowe v. Exline (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1286, the Court of Appeal found that “a nonsignatory sued as an agent of a signatory may enforce an arbitration agreement.”  Id. at 1286.  In addition, “a nonsignatory who is the agent of a signatory can even be compelled to arbitrate claims against his will.”  Id. at 1285, citing Harris v. Superior Court (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 475, 477–78.  Further, “in many cases, nonparties to arbitration agreements are allowed to enforce those agreements where there is sufficient identity of parties.”  Valley Casework, Inc. v. Comfort Construction, Inc. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1021.  This includes nonparties as agents of a party as well as “a third party beneficiary of an arbitration agreement.”  Ibid. 

            “Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, [...] a nonsignatory defendant may invoke an arbitration clause to compel a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate its claims when the causes of action against the nonsignatory are intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations. By relying on contract terms in a claim against a nonsignatory defendant, even if not exclusively, a plaintiff may be equitably estopped from repudiating the arbitration clause contained in that agreement. Where the equitable estoppel doctrine applies, the nonsignatory has a right to enforce the arbitration agreement.” Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, 495–96 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

            Defendant moves for an order compelling arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims and for an order for stay pending completion of arbitration.  The motion is made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1281 et seq. and the FAA, on the grounds Plaintiff is bound by a written agreement to arbitrate the subject matter of the Complaint. Defendant argues that a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties that requires arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims.  

            Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2 states, in relevant part: “On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists[. . .]” “Generally, an arbitration agreement must be memorialized in writing. A party's acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be express, as where a party signs the agreement. A signed agreement is not necessary, however, and a party's acceptance may be implied in fact or be effectuated by delegated consent. An arbitration clause within a contract may be binding on a party even if the party never actually read the clause.” Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 (internal citations omitted).

            Defendant attached the Retail Installment Sale Contract (“RISC”) which appears to indicate the existence of an agreement for sale between Plaintiff and an entity named Scott Robinson Chrysler Dodge Jeep.  (Declaration of Eric Tsai, ¶ 3, Exh. B.)  The Court notes that the entity named on the RISC is not the named co-Defendant Glenn E. Thomas Dodge Chrysler Jeep.

            First, the Court notes that the portion of the RISC which attempts to set forth the alleged arbitration agreement is incomplete and not competent for purposes of the Court’s review.  The moving party is directed to the Declaration of Eric Tsai, Exh. B, pages 19 and 20 of the declaration.  The arbitration clause is cut off on page 19 and then on page 20 it is cropped off on the left side.  This, on its own, is a ground to deny this motion as the moving party has failed to produce a legible and complete copy of the arbitration clause such that the Court can fully and completely analyze the entirety of the arbitration clause.

            Second, moving party has failed to establish that it is a party to the arbitration clause or that equitable estoppel principles allow it to enforce the arbitration provision. As noted above, competent authorities exist to indicate that a non-signatory may enforce an arbitration provision. However, no evidence was submitted by moving party to indicate that it is an agent of Scott Robinson Chrysler Dodge Jeep, third party beneficiary of this entity, or that other circumstances exist, such as an identity of parties, to show that it can enforce the arbitration clause.

            Defendant attempts to rely on the equitable estoppel principle delineated in Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486.  However, here, Defendant has failed to provide any facts or evidence to show that the cause of action against it is intimately founded and intertwined with the underlying contract obligation.  Further, as mentioned earlier, there is no showing that the co-Defendant is even a party to the RISC.  In Felisilda, it was actually the co-defendant dealership which moved to compel arbitration and also sought to include FCA in the arbitration.  Such facts are lacking here, and there is no showing that co-Defendant Glenn E. Thomas Dodge Chrysler Jeep has even responded to the Complaint. Thus, there are certainly no facts to show that this co-Defendant can enforce a clause which is in the name of a completely different entity - Scott Robinson Chrysler Dodge Jeep.

            As moving party has failed to meet its initial burden to show the existence of a valid arbitration clause between the parties, the burden does not shift to Plaintiff to show that the arbitration clause should not be enforced. Rice, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at 1223.

            Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Action is denied.

            Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.