Judge Gary Y. Tanaka, Case 22TRCV00840 2023-04-27 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Gary Y. Tanaka, Case: 22TRCV00840, Date: 2023-04-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22TRCV00840 Hearing Date: April 27, 2023 Dept: B

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT

Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Thursday, April 27, 2023
Department B Calendar No. 13

PROCEEDINGS

Stephanie Medina v. Nissan North America, Inc., et al.

22TRCV00840

1. Nissan North America, Inc. and Gardena Nissan, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Action

2. Stephanie Medina’s Motion to Compel Nissan North America, Inc.’s Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One

3. Stephanie Medina’s Motion to Compel Nissan North America, Inc.’s Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One

4. Stephanie Medina’s Motion to Compel Nissan North America, Inc.’s Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One

5. Stephanie Medina’s Motion to Deem the Truth of Matters in Requests for Admissions, Set One, Admitted

TENTATIVE RULING

Nissan North America, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Action is denied.

Gardena Nissan, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Action is moot. Gardena Nissan, Inc. was dismissed on April 11, 2023.

Stephanie Medina’s Motions to Compel Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One, Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, and Requests for Monetary Sanctions are deemed moot, in part, and granted, in part.

Stephanie Medina’s Motion to Deem Truth of Matters in Requests for Admissions, Set One, Admitted and Request for Monetary Sanctions is denied, in part, and granted, in part.

Background

Plaintiff filed the Complaint on September 22, 2022. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Plaintiff alleges that her 2017 Nissan Altima suffers from engine, electrical, and other defects. Plaintiff sets forth the following causes of action: 1. Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability under the Song-Beverly Warranty Act. 2. Breach of Express Warranty under the Song-Beverly Warranty Act. 3. Breach of Express Warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. 4. Breach of Implied Warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Defendant Gardena Nissan, Inc. was dismissed on April 11, 2023.

Motion to Compel Arbitration

“California law reflects a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a relatively quick and inexpensive method for resolving disputes. [Citation.] To further that policy, [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1281.2 requires a trial court to enforce a written arbitration agreement unless one of three limited exceptions applies. [Citation.] Those statutory exceptions arise where (1) a party waives the right to arbitration; (2) grounds exist for revoking the arbitration agreement; and (3) pending litigation with a third party creates the possibility of conflicting rulings on common factual or legal issues. (§ 1281.2, subds. (a)–(c).)” Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 967.

“The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, and a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.” Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284.

“The party opposing arbitration has the burden of demonstrating that an arbitration clause cannot be interpreted to require arbitration of the dispute. Nonetheless, this policy does not override ordinary principles of contract interpretation. [T]he contractual terms themselves must be carefully examined before the parties to the contract can be ordered to arbitration: Although [t]he law favors contracts for arbitration of disputes between parties, there is no policy compelling persons to accept arbitration of controversies which they have not agreed to arbitrate.” Rice v. Downs (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1223 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

In Rowe v. Exline (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1286, the Court of Appeal found that “a nonsignatory sued as an agent of a signatory may enforce an arbitration agreement.” Id. at 1286. In addition, “a nonsignatory who is the agent of a signatory can even be compelled to arbitrate claims against his will.” Id. at 1285, citing Harris v. Superior Court (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 475, 477–78. Further, “in many cases, nonparties to arbitration agreements are allowed to enforce those agreements where there is sufficient identity of parties.” Valley Casework, Inc. v. Comfort Construction, Inc. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1021. This includes nonparties as agents of a party as well as “a third party beneficiary of an arbitration agreement.” Ibid.

“Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, [...] a nonsignatory defendant may invoke an arbitration clause to compel a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate its claims when the causes of action against the nonsignatory are intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations. By relying on contract terms in a claim against a nonsignatory defendant, even if not exclusively, a plaintiff may be equitably estopped from repudiating the arbitration clause contained in that agreement. Where the equitable estoppel doctrine applies, the nonsignatory has a right to enforce the arbitration agreement.” Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, 495–96 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Defendant moves for an order compelling arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims and for an order for stay pending completion of arbitration. The motion is made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1281 et seq. and the FAA, on the grounds Plaintiff is bound by a written agreement to arbitrate the subject matter of the Complaint. Defendants argue that a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties that requires arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims.

Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2 states, in relevant part: “On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists[. . .]” “Generally, an arbitration agreement must be memorialized in writing. A party's acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be express, as where a party signs the agreement. A signed agreement is not necessary, however, and a party's acceptance may be implied in fact or be effectuated by delegated consent. An arbitration clause within a contract may be binding on a party even if the party never actually read the clause.” Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 (internal citations omitted).

Defendant attached the California Motor Vehicle Lease Agreement (“lease”) which appears to indicate the existence of a lease between Plaintiff and former Defendant Gardena Nissan, Inc. (Declaration of Jeck Dizon, Ex. B.)

Moving Defendant has failed to establish that they are parties to the arbitration clause or that equitable estoppel principles allow them to enforce the arbitration provision. As noted above, binding authorities exist to indicate that a non-signatory may enforce an arbitration provision. However, no competent evidence was submitted by moving party to indicate that it is an agent of Gardena Nissan, Inc., third party beneficiary of this entity, or that other circumstances exist, such as an identity of parties, to show that moving party can enforce the arbitration clause. The only evidence that was submitted was in the form of the declaration of Jeck Dizon. The only evidence that was attached to the declaration was the above referenced lease and the Complaint. (Decl., Jeck Dizon, Exs. A, B.) This evidence does not establish the required relationship between the actual signatory on the lease, Gardena Nissan, Inc., and moving party Nissan North America, Inc.

Defendant attempts to rely on the equitable estoppel principle delineated in Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486. However, here, Defendant has failed to provide any facts or evidence to show that the causes of action against it is intimately founded and intertwined with the underlying contract obligation. Only conclusory arguments, set forth in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities were provided, with no underlying evidence. Further, in Felisilda, it was actually the co-defendant dealership which moved to compel arbitration and also sought to include FCA in the arbitration within its own motion. Gardena Nissan, Inc. was a Defendant in this action, and was a moving party. However, this Defendant was dismissed prior to the hearing of this motion. There are no facts or evidence to show that moving party herein can enforce an arbitration clause which is in the name of a completely different entity – Gardena Nissan, Inc.

In addition, on April 4, 2023, in Ford Motor Warranty Cases (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 4, 2023, No. B312261) 2023 WL 2768484, the Court of Appeal declined to follow Felisilda, holding that equitable estoppel did not apply to the non-signatory manufacturer because the Plaintiffs’ claims against the manufacturer were not founded in or intertwined with the sales contract, and the manufacturer was not a third party beneficiary to the contract. Id. at 3-8.

As moving party failed to meet its initial burden to show the existence of a valid arbitration clause between the parties, the burden does not shift to Plaintiff to show that the arbitration clause should not be enforced. Rice, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at 1223.

Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Action is denied.

Motions to Compel/Motion to Deem Admitted

CCP § 2030.290 states: “If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, the following rules apply…The party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling response to the interrogatories.” (CCP § 2030.290(b).)

CCP § 2031.300 states: “If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response to it, the following rules shall apply: The party making the demand may move for an order compelling response to the demand.” (CCP § 2031.300(b)).

CCP § 2033.280(b) states: “The requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).” (CCP § 2033.280(b)).

On October 4, 2022 and November 3, 2022, Plaintiff served Form Interrogatories, Set One, Special Interrogatories, Set One, Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, and Requests for Admissions, Set One, upon Defendant Nissan North America, Inc. (Decls., Camran K. Pakbaz.) On January 24, 2023, Defendant served responses to the discovery requests. (Decls., Jeck Dizon.) Apparently, Defendant served responses essentially consisting of only objections. However, the propriety of these responses is not at issue with these motions. If the responses are deficient, they would be the subject of a motion to compel further responses.

The Court does note, however, that no verifications were attached to the copies of the responses that were submitted with the oppositions. If no verifications were served, then, unverified responses would be tantamount to no responses at all. In that scenario, the motions would have been granted. However, Plaintiff did not make any mention of a lack of verification in her Reply.

Plaintiff’s motions to compel responses to Form and Special Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents, Set One, are deemed moot. Plaintiff’s motion to deem Requests for Admissions Admitted is denied.

Sanctions

Plaintiff’s requests for monetary sanctions are granted. As to the Form and Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, responses were only served after the motions were filed. Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1348(a). Further, as to the Motion to Deem Requests for Admissions admitted it is mandatory to impose monetary sanctions on a party and/or attorney whose failure to serve a timely response necessitated the filing of the motion. CCP § 2033.280(c).

Sanctions are awarded in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the total amount of $1,749.00. The Court notes that Plaintiff simply sought a blanket figure of $995 per motion and Plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide a breakdown of the hourly rate and time expended for each motion. Thus, the Court will determine a reasonable rate and reasonable time allotted for the four motions. The Court determines that a reasonable rate is $250 per hour. The Court determines that a reasonable time allotted for all motions is 6 hours. The Court awards $62.25 in filing fees for each motion. Sanctions are payable within 30 days of this date.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.