Judge: George F. Bird, Jr., Case: 22CMCV00079, Date: 2022-10-20 Tentative Ruling

“INSTRUCTIONS:
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If this procedure is followed, when the case is
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tentative ruling. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then
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Case Number: 22CMCV00079    Hearing Date: October 20, 2022    Dept: B

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I.                   BACKGROUND

            In the Complaint (“Compl.”) Alfredo Leyva (“Plaintiff”) alleges that on December 6, 2019, he purchased a 2019 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 (“the Vehicle”) which was manufactured and/or distributed by General Motors, LLC. (“Defendant”). (Compl. ¶ 6.) Upon purchase, Plaintiff received a warranty that stated, in relevant part, that in the event a defect developed with The Vehicle during the warranty period, Plaintiff could deliver The Vehicle for repair services to Defendant's representative and The Vehicle would be repaired. (Compl. ¶10.) After receiving the Vehicle from Defendant, Plaintiff alleges that The Vehicle developed several defects including a defective ignition system, a defective engine, a defective transmission system, a defective display system, and a defective body system. (Compl. ¶ 12.)

Plaintiff states that he presented Defendant with the Vehicle, but Defendant was unable and/or failed to service or repair the Vehicle within a reasonable number of attempts. (Compl. ¶¶ 14, 15.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant failed to promptly replace the Vehicle or make restitution to Plaintiff as required by Civil Code, § 1793.2, subd. (d) and Civil Code, § 1794, subd. (a). (Compl. ¶ 21.)

Plaintiff alleges specific causes of action or (1) violation of Civil Code, § 1793.2, subd.  (d), (2) violation of Civil Code, § 1793.2, subd. (b), (3) violation of Civil Code, § 1793.2, subd.  (a)(3), (4) breach of express warranty under Civil Code, § 1791.2, subd. (a) and Civil Code, § 1794, and (5) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under Civil Code, § 1791.1 and Civil Code, § 1794.

II.    MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES

A.    Motion filed 09/20/22

      Plaintiff requests an order compelling Defendant to provide further responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 7, 10, 16, 19, 20, and 34 (collectively, the “Requests”). Plaintiff categorizes the Requests into two groups: (1) 7, 10 and 34 which relate to Defendant’s warranty and vehicle repurchase policies, procedures, and practices, and (2) 16, 19, and 20 which relate to Defendant’s internal investigation and Defendant’s analysis of the alleged defects in The Vehicle. (Motion to Compel Further Responses “Mot. to Comp.,” p. 1:18-22.)  

      Plaintiff alleges the objections given by Defendant to the Requests are “boilerplate” and “utterly non-responsive statements.” (Mot. to Comp., p. 1:23-25.)

B.     Opposition filed 10/07/2022

         Defendant argues that this Motion to Compel Further Responses should be denied because Plaintiff did not satisfy the meet and confer requirement. (Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses “Opp.,” p. 3:22-28.) The core of the dispute between the parties is if Plaintiff may or may not discover information about other vehicles of the same year, make, and model concerning the “Transmission Defect” as defined in the Request for Production of Documents, Set One. Defendant states they complied with and produced the documents requested in the Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 7, 10, 19, and 34. (Opp., p. 5:16-26.)

      As to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 16 and 20, Defendant argues that the internal investigations relating to other vehicles “Transmission Defects” are irrelevant to the breach of warranty claims here. (Opp., p. 6:1-8.) Defendant also argues that the term “Transmission Defect” as used by Plaintiff is overbroad. Finally, Defendant argues that the sought-after documents contain confidential trade secret information, and they fall under the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine. (Opp., p. 7-8.)

C.     Reply filed 10/13/2022

            Plaintiff offers the several letters already submitted to the Court between Plaintiff and Defendant as evidence of satisfying the meaningful meet and confer requirement. The letters did result in Defendant offering to supplement some responses and this demonstrates a bare minimum compliance with the meet and confer requirement. Next, Plaintiff argues that though Defendant agreed to produce documents in response to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 7, 10, 19 and 34, Defendant has not produced any of the documents. (Reply Mot. to Comp. “Reply,” p. 2:25-28.)

      Finally, Plaintiff argues that their construction of the definition for “Transmission Defect” is not overbroad, is relevant or will lead to relevant evidence, and is derived from the Defendant’s reports. (Reply, p. 7:1-4.)

III.  DISCUSSION

         A party who receives a demand for production must respond separately to each individual item requested with either a statement indicating compliance, a statement that the party lacks the ability to comply, or an objection. Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subd. (a). If the response is an objection, it must “identify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made” and “set forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection. If an objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked shall be stated.” Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240, subd. (b). An objection based on privilege must also “provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log.” Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240, subd. (c).

         After receiving the response, the party who demanded production may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the party deems that, among other grounds, an objection in the response is without merit or too general. Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a). The motion compelling further responses shall “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand,” include a meet and confer declaration, and include a separate statement outlining the responses in dispute. Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b).

A.    Meet and Confer                 

         Plaintiff declared in their motion that they satisfied the meet and confer requirement before filing. (Mot. to Comp. p. 5:23-28; 6:1-26.) The Code of Civ. Proc., § 2016.040 requires the parties to make “a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion” to satisfy the meet and confer requirement.

         Here, Plaintiff submitted eight letters between the parties as evidence that the meet and confer requirement was met. The original meet and confer letter contained disputes over Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 7, 8, 10, 12-26, 40-41, 51-58, 27, 34-39, and 42-50. Throughout the course of the letters, Plaintiff and Defendant have had meaningful conversations which reduced the dispute to only Nos. 7, 10, 16, 19, 20, and 34. The Court finds that the meet and confer requirement was met before filing.

B.     Nos. 7, 10, 19 and 34

      Request for Production No. 7 asks Defendant for “The Warranty Policy and Procedure Manual;” No. 10 asks Defendant for the “Workshop Manual;” No. 19 asks Defendant for “all documents … concerning customer complaints, claims, reported failures, and warranty claims related to the TRANSMISSION DEFECT, …;” No. 34 asks Defendant for “all documents” used “to evaluate consumers' requests for repurchases pursuant to the Song Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.” (Alfredo Leyva Separate Statement “A.L. SS,” p. 3:14-19; 7:14-15; 16:6-11; 21:24-25.)

      Defendant responds that they have already produced sufficient documents to satisfy these requests and point the Court to the Declaration of Carney Wood, Exhibit 12, as support. (Opp. p. 5:16-19, 23-26.) After analyzing Exhibit 12, the Court finds that Defendant says they produced the requested documents on September 12, 2022. Exhibit 12 does not show that Defendant actually produced any documents. Plaintiff maintains they never received the requested documents. Because Defendant has agreed to produce the documents, and the Court cannot find evidence that the documents were ever produced, the Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Documents is GRANTED for requests Nos. 7, 10, 19 and 34.

C.     Nos. 16 and 20

      Request for Production No. 16 (“No. 16”) asks Defendant for “all DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning any internal analysis or investigation by YOU or on YOUR behalf regarding the TRANSMISSION DEFECT in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.” (A.L. SS, p. 9:24-26; 10:1-4.) Request for Production No. 20 (“No. 20”) asks Defendant for “all DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning failure rates of vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE as a result of the TRANSMISSION DEFECT(S).” (A.L. SS, p. 19:3-5.)

      Defendant’s objections to both No. 16 and No. 20 are nearly identical. They are so similar that in Defendant’s Separate Statement in Support of Opposition, Defendant responds to No. 20 by simply “incorporate[ing] its reasons why no further response should be ordered … as set forth in response to Request No. 16.” Because the grounds for support of each objection are the same, the Court will address the objections together.

      Defendant objects that the requests are vague and ambiguous, overbroad and seek irrelevant documents, production is burdensome and oppressive, the documents sought would disclose confidential information, and the information is protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. (A.L. SS, p. 10:16-21.)

      As to attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, “if an objection is based on a claim of privilege or a claim that the information sought is protected work product, the response shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log.” Code Civ. Proc., §2031.240, subd. (c)(1). Here, Defendant’s objection provides no privilege log and does not give any factual information as to why documents regarding internal analysis, investigations, or failure rates of the Transmission Defect would fall under the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine.

      As to confidentiality, this is not a proper objection. A party who believes that a discovery request seeks confidential information must seek a protective order from the court. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Sup. Ct., (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 12, 23. Plaintiff and Defendant have already agreed to a protective order for the discovery of confidential documents. Defendant does not present any arguments as to why the documents sought under No. 16 or No. 20 would be of a special confidential nature or would fall outside of the protective order already in place.

      As to the requests being burdensome and oppressive, Defendant relies on Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court, (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216 in which Calcor’s custodian of records was served with a subpoena to produce what the court determined to be “everything in its possession which has anything to do with gun mounts (including the gun mount assemblies themselves).” The demand included “categories of materials to be produced [are] described in an attachment to the subpoena which runs some 12 pages, including almost 3 pages of “definitions” and another 3 pages of “instructions.” (Id. at 220.) Such authority is distinguishable here as Plaintiff’s requests in No. 16 and No. 20 relate only to the Transmission Defect and not the entire vehicle. The definitions and instructions section are also distinguishable from Calcor Space Facility because Plaintiff’s definitions and instructions take only one and a half pages and includes only six defined terms. (A.L. SS, p. 1:5-28; 2:1-12.)

      Additionally, the burden on Defendant here is impossible for the Court to determine because Defendant does not point to any “document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information” which would be burdensome to produce as is required by Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subd. (a). Objections of undue burden to requests for electronically stored information (“ESI”), which No. 16 and No. 20 specifically indicate, require Defendant to specify the “types or categories of sources of electronically stored information that are not reasonably accessible.” Code of Civ. Pro., § 2031.210, subd. (d). Defendant does not specify any types or categories of ESI.

      The central dispute between the parties focuses on the defined term ‘Transmission Defect.’ As defined in the Request for Documents, Set One, Transmission Defect means “such defects which result in symptoms including, but not limited to, the vehicle does not start, needs to be jump started, the check engine light (CEL) illuminates, hesitates while driving, transmission slipping, transmission clunks when shifting gears, transmission clunks when accelerating; and any other concern identified in the repair history for the subject 2019 Chevrolet Silverado 1500; Vehicle Identification Number 3GCPWEED6K6131518.” (A.L. SS, p. 2:5-27.)  

      The Code of Civ. Pro., § 2017.010 requires that the information sought during discovery must be “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action … or appear[s] reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Here, the definition of the ‘Transmission Defect’ is directly linked to the issues Plaintiff suffered with The Vehicle. Plaintiff brought The Vehicle into the repair facility five times for The Vehicle not starting, the check engine light being on, The Vehicle needing to be jumpstarted, The Vehicle hesitating to accelerate, the transmission slipping, and The Vehicle banging and clunking into gear upon acceleration. (Mot. to Comp., p. 2:12-28; 3:1-9.) The requests made by Plaintiff are not overly broad or vague and are reasonably calculated to elicit evidence of the relevant defects, if any, and Defendant’s ability to repair them.

      Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc., (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967 demonstrates the courts willingness to grant discovery requests of this kind. In Doppes, Doppes sued Bently Motors for a violation of the Song–Beverly Consumer Warranty Act for a 2001 Bentley Arnage that had an obnoxious odor in the interior. (Id. at 971.) The discovery request asked for all consumer complaints and vehicle tests concerning a rust inhibitor or wax oil smell. (Id. at 973-974.) The trial court ordered Bentley Motors to produce the requested documents. (Id. at 974.) The failure to produce the documents, in conjunction with additional abuses of the discovery process, led the Doppes Court to find the trial court erred for not imposing terminating sanction for Bentley’s unjustified failure to produce its internal documents. (Id. at 971.)

      Here, Plaintiff is similarly alleging a violation of the Song–Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. The discovery requests are similar to those made in Doppes including internal investigations, tests, and customer complaints related to the specified defect encountered. In Doppes, the defect was a smell and here Plaintiff has encountered an alleged engine defect.

      Because Defendant has not alleged a valid objection to the discovery request by Plaintiff, the Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Documents is GRANTED for requests Nos. 16 and 20.

       CONCLUSION

            Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Compel Further Responses is GRANTED. Plaintiff has not made a request for sanctions so this Court will not consider the issue.

                                                                                    DATED: October 20, 2022

                                                                                    _______________________________

                                                                                            [Judge of the Superior Court