Judge: George F. Bird, Jr., Case: 22CMCV00154, Date: 2023-04-04 Tentative Ruling

“INSTRUCTIONS:
If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court
appearance on the matter, the moving party must:

1. Contact the opposing party and all other
parties who have appeared in the action and confirm that each will submit on the
tentative ruling.

2. No later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day
before the hearing, call the Courtroom (310-761-4302) advising that all parties
will submit on the tentative ruling and waive hearing; and

3. Serve notice of the Court's ruling on all
parties entitled to receive service.

If this procedure is followed, when the case is
called the Court will enter its ruling on the motion in accordance with its
tentative ruling. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then
no telephone call is necessary, and all parties should appear at the hearing.
If there is neither a telephone call nor an appearance, then the matter may
either be taken off calendar or ruled on. 

Case Number: 22CMCV00154    Hearing Date: April 4, 2023    Dept: B

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT

I.       BACKGROUND

            The Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) alleges that Hazel Anderson (“Defendant”) breached a contract with Cheryl Manuel (“Plaintiff”) wherein Defendant allegedly agreed Plaintiff would own residential real property located at 216 E 136^th St., Los Angeles, CA 90061 (the “Property”) during Plaintiff’s lifetime. In 2014, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant encouraged Plaintiff to “find a house that you like.” (TAC, ¶ 3.) Defendant purchased the Property on December 24, 2014, and Plaintiff moved in that same day. (TAC, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff undertook several renovations to the Property during the eight years Plaintiff resided there. (Ibid.) Plaintiff alleges she paid the initial property taxes, property insurance, and has paid the mortgage. (TAC, ¶  8.)

            Defendant allegedly breached the agreement between the parties by giving Plaintiff a notice by email on April 10, 2022, stating Defendant intended to sell the Property. (TAC, ¶ 7.) In May of 2022, Plaintiff states she received a 30-Day Termination of Tenancy notice. (Ibid.)

            Plaintiff alleges claims for: (1) breach of contract, (2) promissory estoppel, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (5) unjust enrichment, and (6) declaratory relief. The Demurrer to Plaintiff’s TAC was overruled on February 2, 2023, and Defendant was given 20 days to file an answer. (Minute Order February 2, 2023.) Defendant filed an answer on February 21, 2023.

II.       DEMURRER TO THE ANSWER

A.    Demurrer filed March 3, 2023.

Plaintiff argues that the Answer fails to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a defense, that the answer is uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible, and that the affirmative defenses are poorly pleaded.

B.     Opposition filed March 21, 2023.

Defendant argues that any facts asserted in Defendant’s Cross-Complaint support the affirmative defenses presented in Defendant’s Answer.

C.     No Reply.

            Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b), a reply to an opposition to a demurrer must be filed and served five (5) court days before the hearing. As of March 30, 2023, two (2) court days before the hearing, no reply has been filed with the court.

III.       LEGAL STANDARDS

            An answer to a complaint shall contain (i) the general or specific denial of the material allegations of the complaint controverted by the defendant and (ii) a statement of any new matter constituting a defense. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 431.30, subd. (b).) The same pleading of “ultimate facts” rather than evidentiary matter or legal conclusions is required as in pleading a complaint. The answer must aver facts as carefully and with as much detail as the facts which constitute the cause of action, and which are alleged in the complaint.  (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashimi (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384.) Merely putting an opposing party on notice is not sufficient. (Bach v. County of Butte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 554, 561; See Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 244, 250.)

            “A party who has filed a complaint or cross-complaint may, within 10 days after service of the answer to his pleading, demur to the answer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (b).) “Generally speaking, the determination whether an answer states a defense is governed by the same principles which are applicable in determining if a complaint states a cause of action.” (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 733 [38 Cal.Rptr. 392, 396].)

            When evaluating a demurrer, the court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; McBride v. Smith (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173.) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.” (Savea v. YRC Inc. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 173, 178; See also Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.App.4th 634, 638.)

            The critical inquiry when a plaintiff demurs to an answer is whether the answer raises a defense to plaintiff’s stated cause of action. (Timberidge Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 873, 879-880.) The answer should make clear what issues the adverse parties must meet such that when taken in connection with the complaint, “no reasonable person could be in any doubt about the issues to be met.” (Hoelzle v. Fresno County (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 478, 483.)

            The sufficiency of an answer depends on the complaint to which it purports to answer. (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen, supra, 226 Cal.App.2d at p. 733.) Therefore, the answer does not stand alone; rather it is read with reference to the facts alleged in the complaint. “[T]he demurrer to the answer admits all issuable facts pleaded therein and eliminates all allegations of the complaint denied by the answer.” (Ibid.)

IV.       DISCUSSION

A.    Sufficiency of the Answer.

            Defendant’s Answer starts by denying the allegations contained in each paragraph of the TAC. Defendant does not provide any facts regarding the denials but merely repeats the same “In answer to paragraph [Number] of the TAC, Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph [Number] of the TAC” 40 times. Defendant then asserts 38 affirmative defenses.

            “[T]he demurrer to the answer admits all issuable facts pleaded therein and eliminates all allegations of the complaint denied by the answer.” (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen, supra, 226 Cal.App.2d at p. 733.) Because Defendant denies every allegation made in the Complaint, none of the allegations can be considered when evaluating the demurrer and only the facts alleged in the Answer can be considered. Here, Defendant does not allege a single fact in the Answer. Defendant’s Answer merely puts Plaintiff on notice of 38 affirmative defenses which fails to satisfy the pleading standard in California. (See Bach v. County of Butte, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 561; See Also Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, supra, 260 Cal.App.2d at p. 250.)

            Defendant supports each affirmative defense by a one-sentence recitation of the affirmative defense. For example, the 10^th affirmative defense asserted is failure to mitigate and Defendant supports this affirmative defense with the statement “Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to mitigate.” (Answer p. 6:17-18.) This fails to provide any ultimate facts which support a failure to mitigate, and it leaves significant doubt about what mitigation efforts Defendant expected which did not occur. (See Hoelzle v. Fresno County, supra,159 Cal.App.2d at p. 483 [an answer should be clear so that “no reasonable person could be in any doubt about the issues to be met.”].)

            Each affirmative defense asserted by Defendant fails to specify the ultimate facts which support the affirmative defense. Though Defendant asserts that the allegations in the Cross-Complaint support the affirmative defenses, Defendant provides no authority that an answer may be supported by allegations in a cross-complaint. It is established that an answer is read in conjunction with the complaint it is responding to, but there is no authority presented by Defendants which allows the court to read an answer in conjunction with a cross-complaint filed by the same party filing the answer. (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen, supra, 226 Cal.App.2d at p. 733.)

            Based on the foregoing, the Demurrer to the Answer is SUSTAINED.

B.     Leave to Amend.

            “Generally, it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 10 Cal.3d 335, 348.) Defendant incorrectly asserted that the Answer could be supported by the allegations in the Cross-Complaint and Defendant may be able to cure the Answer by amending and adding the relevant facts from the Cross-Complaint to the Answer. Because there is a possibility that amendment could cure the defects, leave to amend will be granted.

V.       CONCLUSION

            The Court rules as follows:

            The Demurrer is SUSTAINED as to all 38 affirmative defenses asserted in the Answer. Defendant is granted 10 days leave to amend.

Dated: April 4, 2023                                                   _________________________________

                                                                                                Judge of the Superior Court