Judge: George F. Bird, Jr., Case: TC029135, Date: 2023-01-31 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: TC029135    Hearing Date: January 31, 2023    Dept: B

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT

I.       BACKGROUND  

            The operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) was filed in this action on March 3, 2022. The SAC brings nine causes of action for (1) quiet title, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, (3) intentional misrepresentation, (4) negligent misrepresentation, (5) intentional interference with expected inheritance, (6) cancelation of a written instrument, (7) common count, (8) negligence, and (9) declaratory relief.

            Plaintiffs are brother and sister; Defendants are husband and wife. (SAC, ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs allege that the parties’ parents, Jose Munoz and Olivia Munoz, purchased real property located at 623 Tichenor Street, Compton, California 90220 (the “Property”) in the late 1980s. (SAC, ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs allege that the Property was subject to several transfers between family members from the date of purchase through 2005. Plaintiffs allege that on or about July 13, 2005, Defendant Martha Munoz Martinez caused her mother, Olivia Munoz, to execute a Grant Deed transferring title to Defendants. (SAC, ¶ 12.)

            Plaintiffs allege that the mother’s signature is notarized but Defendant Martha Munoz Martinez forged her father’s signature onto the Grant Deed. (SAC, ¶¶ 12, 13.) Olivia Munoz passed away on October 11, 2017, and Jose Munoz passed away soon thereafter on November 13, 2017. (SAC, ¶ 16.) The SAC now seeks an order canceling the Grant Deed of July 13, 2005, recorded in Los Angeles County on July 21, 2005, a declaration that the 2005 Grant Deed is fraudulent, monetary damages, interest, and costs. (SAC, pp. 11-12.)

II.       MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

A.    Defendants filed their motion on November 11, 2022.

            Defendants seek summary judgment or summary adjudication alleging a lack of standing by Plaintiffs, failure to bring their causes of action within the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 388, and a general allegation that Plaintiffs fail to establish evidence supporting their causes of action.

B.     Plaintiffs’ Opposition filed January 17, 2023.

            Plaintiffs argue they do have standing to bring this lawsuit because they are the rightful inheritors of the Property and have been harmed by the fraudulent transfer of the Property. Plaintiffs allege that the statute of limitations has already been litigated and decided as of September 6, 2018. Finally, Plaintiffs argue they have sufficiently pled and supported each cause of action alleged.

C.     Defendants’ Reply filed January 25, 2023.

            Defendants’ Reply argues that Plaintiffs lack standing because canceling the 2005 Grant Deed will only revert title to the 1996 Grant Deed which gives the Property to Defendants and Decedents Olivia Munoz and Jose Munoz (“Decedents”) as joint tenants. Defendants argue that all claims are now moot because the 1996 Grant Deed has not been challenged.

III.       LEGAL STANDARDS

            The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  

            “On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).)  “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Id.)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”  (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)  

            “When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”  (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) 

            Under the California Code of Civil Procedure section 473c subsection (f)(1), the court may grant a motion for summary adjudication only as to “one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty. . . .”  

IV.       REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

            Defendants request this Court take judicial notice of seven (7) documents: (1) July 19, 1989, a Grant Deed recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County as Document #89- 1148063; (2) July 19, 1989, an Individual Quitclaim Deed recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County as Document #89-1148062; (3) July 10, 1991, a Grant Deed recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County as Document #91-1051216; (4) October 18, 1991, a Quitclaim Deed recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County as Document #91- 1646576; (5) January 12, 1993, a Grant Deed recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County as Document #93-69915; (6) September 5, 1996, a Grant Deed recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County as Document #96-1461154; and (7) July 12, 2005, a Grant Deed recorded on the same date as Instrument No. 051721151 in the County Recorder’s Office for the County of Los Angeles.

            In Cal-American Income Property Fund II v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 109, 112 [256 Cal.Rptr. 21], the Court of Appeal determined it is proper to take judicial notice of grant deeds filed with the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c). The Court will take judicial notice that these seven documents have been filed in the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office, but the Court declines to take judicial notice of the content of each writing. The contents are reasonably subject to dispute and Plaintiffs have alleged that document number seven’s contents are fraudulent. The Court may still use these documents as evidence in evaluating the motion for summary judgment without taking judicial notice of the contents.

            Plaintiffs request this Court take judicial notice of The Court’s ruling filed on November 30, 2018. The court may take judicial notice of records of any court in this state under Evidence code section 452, subdivision (d). The Court grants Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice for Court’s ruling filed on November 30, 2018.

V.          DISCUSSION

A.    Transfers of the Property

            The history of the Property transfers is as follows: On July 19, 1989, an individual grant deed was recorded transferring the Property from Donna Boyce, a single woman, to Olivia Munoz, a married woman, as her sole and separate property. (Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (“D-RJN”), Exhibit A.) On the same day Jose Munoz, husband of Olivia Munoz, quitclaimed his interest in the Property to Olivia Munoz, a married woman, as her sole and separate property. (D-RJN, Exhibit B.) This gave Olivia Munoz 100% interest in the Property as her sole and separate property.

            On July 10, 1991, a grant deed was recorded which was executed by Olivia Munoz and granted the Property to Olivia Munoz, a married woman, as her sole and separate property, Andrea Munoz, a single woman, and Jesus Munoz, a single man, all as joint tenants. (D-RJN, Exhibit C.) On October 18, 1991, Jose Munoz, spouse of Olivia Munoz, quitclaimed his interest in the Property to Olivia Munoz, a married woman, as her sole and separate property. (D-RJN, Exhibit D.) At this point, Olivia Munoz, Andrea Munoz, and Jesus Munoz were all joint tenants of the Property.

            On January 12, 1993, a grant deed was recorded which was executed by Andrea Munoz, a single woman, and Jesus Munoz, a single man, transferring their interest to Olivia Munoz, a married woman, as her sole and separate property. (D-RJN, Exhibit E.) On September 5, 1996, a grant deed was recorded which was executed by Jesus Munoz, a married man who acquired title as Jesus Munoz, a single man, and Monica R. Munoz transferring their interest to Olivia Munoz, a married woman, as her sole and separate property. (D-RJN, Exhibit F.) On that same day, another grant deed was recorded which was executed by Andrea Munoz Gonzalez, a married woman who acquired title as Andrea Munoz, a single woman, and Javier Macias Gonzalez, her spouse, transferring their interest to Olivia Munoz, a married woman, as her sole and separate property. (Ibid.) The result of these grant deeds places 100% interest in the Property with Olivia Munoz, a married woman, as her sole and separate property.

            Also on September 5, 1996, a grant deed was recorded which was executed by Olivia Munoz transferring title to the Property to Jose Munoz and Olivia Munoz, husband and wife, and Jose Jesus Martinez and Martha Martinez, husband and wife as joint tenants (the “1996 Grant Deed”). (Ibid.)

            Finally, on July 21, 2005, a grant deed was recorded which quitclaimed the interest of Jose Munoz and Olivia Munoz, husband and wife as joint tenants, to Jose Jesus Martinez and Martha Martinez, husband and wife as joint tenants (the “2005 Grant Deed”). (D-RJN, Exhibit G.) This final transfer would give Jose Jesus Martinez and Martha Martinez 100% interest in the Property, and it is the grant deed that Plaintiffs argue is fraudulent.

B.     Standing

            Defendants allege that Plaintiffs lack standing because the damages sought were suffered by Jose Munoz, the father, not Plaintiffs. Defendants allege that all causes of action should be dismissed for this lack of standing.

            “Code of Civil Procedure section 367 provides: ‘Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute.’ (Accord, 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Pleading, § 862, p. 320.) ‘The issue of whether a party has standing focuses on the plaintiff, not the issues he or she seeks to have determined.’ (Torres v. City of Yorba Linda (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1040, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 400.) ‘A person who invokes the judicial process lacks standing if he, or those whom he properly represents, “does not have a real interest in the ultimate adjudication because [he] has neither suffered nor is about to suffer any injury of sufficient magnitude reasonably to assure that all of the relevant facts and issues will be adequately presented.” [Citation.]’ (Schmier v. Supreme Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 703, 707, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 580.” (Blumhorst v. Jewish Family Services of Los Angeles (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 993, 1001 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 474, 479].)

            Plaintiffs here are siblings and two of the nine children of Jose Munoz and Olivia Munoz, the original purchasers of the Property. (SAC, ¶¶ 2, 7; Opposition p. 3:12-13.) Plaintiffs allege they have an interest in the adjudication because they expected to inherit the Property and Defendants actions, by forging Jose Munoz’s signature onto the 2005 Grant Deed, directly interfered with the expected inheritance of Plaintiffs. (SAC, ¶ 43.) In reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have no right to inherit because, if the 2005 Grant Deed is canceled, under the 1996 Grant Deed, upon the death of any joint tenant the Property would transfer to the other joint tenants and not Plaintiffs.

            “The principal characteristic of joint tenancy is the right of survivorship.” (Estate of Propst (1990) 50 Cal.3d 448, 455 [268 Cal.Rptr. 114, 117, 788 P.2d 628, 631].) Once one joint tenant dies, ownership immediately transfers to the surviving joint tenants. Under the 1996 Grant Deed, once Olivia Munoz and Jose Munoz passed, their interest would transfer to the surviving joint tenants, Jose Jesus Martinez and Martha Martinez.

            Even if the court granted the remedy Plaintiffs seek, by canceling the 2005 Grant Deed and declaring the deed a fraud, Plaintiffs are still not entitled to the Property under the 1996 Grant Deed. Plaintiffs do not have standing because they are not parties in interest and do not have an interest in the ultimate adjudication.

            Plaintiffs point out that the 1996 grant deed has the handwritten word “all” right before joint tenants. (Decl. of Jesus Diaz Munoz, ¶ 2.) The Court finds that even without the word “all” inserted, the deed states that all four people take title ‘as joint tenants’ meaning that each is granted with the right of survivorship should another joint tenant pass.

            Plaintiffs also argue that the 1996 grant deed was executed “for qualification for refinancing purposes only and title was not intended to actually transfer to Martha Munoz [Martinez] or her husband.” (Decl. of Jesus Diaz Munoz, ¶ 2.) The Court is not persuaded by this argument. It is unclear why Plaintiffs believe the 1996 Grant Deed being executed for the purpose of a refinance impacts the actual transfer of title. Plaintiffs do not allege that Olivia Munoz was misled to believe that this grant deed would not actually transfer title. After reviewing the history of the grant deeds on this Property and the several title transfers Olivia Munoz was involved in, it seems that Olivia Munoz was experienced in transferring title. Even if Olivia Munoz did only intend this transfer for the purpose of a refinance, such a transfer is still a valid transfer of title.

            The Statement of Undisputed Facts filed by Plaintiffs states that the 1996 Grant Deed itself is not disputed. (Statement of Undisputed Facts, Questions 6 and 7.) Even if the 2005 Grant Deed was canceled, the Property was held by Olivia Munoz and Jose Munoz, as husband and wife, and Jose Jesus Martinez and Martha Martinez, as husband and wife as joint tenants. When Olivia Munoz died, her ownership would have immediately passed to the three surviving joint tenants under the 1996 Grant Deed. When Jose Munoz died, his ownership would have immediately passed to the two surviving joint tenants, Jose Jesus Martinez and Martha Martinez under the 1996 Grant Deed. Plaintiffs do not have an interest in this litigation and as such, all causes of action in the complaint are moot.

VI.    CONCLUSION

             This Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants. All causes of action are moot because Plaintiffs lack standing.

Dated: January 31, 2023                                             __________________________________

                                                                                                Judge of the Superior Court