Judge Glenda Sanders, Case 30-2019-01111524 2023-01-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Glenda Sanders, Case: 30-2019-01111524, Date: 2023-01-05 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Fernando Pereyra seeks to compel further responses from Defendant Peak Technical Services, LP to his Special Interrogatories, Set Two, Nos. 22, 29, 47, 52, 68 and 92, and Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two, Nos. 36, 44, 70, 71, 75, and 89. Plaintiff also seeks $8,510 in monetary sanctions against Defendant for each Motion, for a total of $17,020 in monetary sanctions.

The primary dispute between the parties is the scope of the discovery to which Plaintiff is entitled. Plaintiff argues he is entitled to information about all of Defendant’s employees in California, regardless of where they were placed throughout California, while Defendant argues Plaintiff is only entitled to information regarding its employees placed at SST.

On the present record the Court agrees with Defendant.

Although very broad, the right to discovery is not absolute. The information sought must be (1) not privileged, (2) relevant to the subject matter of the action, and (3) either itself admissible or “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) Additionally, a court has the power to control discovery and limit discovery abuses when the importance of the information sought is outweighed by burden, expense, embarrassment or harassment of obtaining the information. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4^th 216, 225; Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 832, 841; Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431; Weil, et al. (The Rutter Group June 2022) Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial, §§8:72-8:74.1.) The Court also has the authority to establish the sequence and timing of discovery for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and interests of justice upon good cause. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2019.020.)

It is undisputed that Defendant is a staffing agency that places or has placed more than 3,300 current and former temporary employees to work at more than 300 companies across California. ROA 182, Salvucci Decl., ¶5. Defendant has stated, under oath, that each of these 300-plus companies is a legally separate and distinct entity that has its own employment policies, practices and records without influence or control by Defendant. ROA 182, Sternberg Decl., Ex. B; ROA 183, Salvucci Decl., ¶¶1-3. Defendant also contends, under oath, that the temporary employees have “little to no day-to-day contact” with Defendant while on assignment. ROA 182, Salvucci Decl., ¶3.

Consistent with its general practice, Defendant contends, under oath, that it had no control or involvement in SST’s payroll, time management or workload policies or practices. ROA 182, Sternberg Decl., Ex. B. Indeed, the “Confirmation Agreement” between PEAK and SST expressly states that the employee will work "under your company's direction and supervisio and it further states "you acknowledge and confirm that our employee is and will be working under safe and healthy conditions at your facility solely under your company's direction and supervision and following your appropriate policies and procedures." ROA 182, Sternberg Decl., Ex. C, and ¶3, emphasis added.

Further, apart from boilerplate allegations about joint employers and agency, the operative ROA 15, First Amended Complaint (FAC) expressly alleges that SST (identified in the FAC as Palomar Technologies, but both sides appear to agree that the correct entity is SST) was responsible for the “establishment of, or ratification of, the illegal wage and hour practices or policies alleged herein." ROA 15, FAC, ¶4.

Here, Plaintiff was placed at SST and the allegations in his FAC are specific to SST. Since Plaintiff was only placed at SST, and not any of the other 300-plus downstream companies, and he has placed only SST’s policies and practices at issue, Plaintiff has not adequately demonstrated that discovery beyond SST is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or relevant to the issues in this case.

As Defendant correctly argues, Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5^th 531 allowed statewide discovery precisely because the defendant’s policies were alleged to be uniform statewide and the employees worked for the same company. In contrast, in this case, the FAC’s allegations demonstrate that it is SST’s policies that are in issue and there is simply no evidence, not even speculative evidence, that those same policies exist at any other company at which Defendant placed employees. Under these circumstances it is not clear that Plaintiff is an appropriate aggrieved employee to represent all the other employees placed at other companies.

Based on the above, the Court DENIES, without prejudice, the Motions to Compel to the extent that they seek information regarding employees who were placed at companies other than SST, but GRANTS the Motions to the extent that the discovery seeks information about employees placed at SST. Defendant is ordered to provide verified supplemental responses within 15 days.

As Defendant notes, the Court has previously expressed that staged discovery would be appropriate to determine if there is some support for Plaintiff's arguments. To that end, the Court orders the parties to meet and confer within 30 days on a staged discovery plan aimed at properly investigating whether Defendant in any manner set or dictated practices or policies for SST or any other downstream company such that there should be further discovery of its practices and policies directed at or implement at any other downstream company.

The Court DENIES the request for monetary sanctions as Defendant’s position is substantially justified and the imposition of sanctions would be unjust.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.