Judge: Glenn R. Salter, Case: 22-1242017, Date: 2022-12-01 Tentative Ruling

Venue

 

The court raises the venue issue on its motion.

 

It is inclined to transfer the case to Sacramento County Superior Court because no plaintiff resides in Orange County, and all events—such as the purchase of the vehicle and the repairs to the vehicle—all occurred in Sacramento, not Orange County.

 

The court notes that the defendant initially filed a motion for change of venue when the dealer—which is located in Sacramento County—was still a party.  When the dealer was later dismissed, the motion for change of venue was (for reasons which are unclear) withdrawn.

 

The argument for change of venue was—in part—that defendant Sacramento Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram was the place where the repairs were made and is the principal address of the dealer.  Moreover, the contract was entered into in Sacramento County and neither plaintiff resides in Orange County

 

Those facts appear to be undisputed.

 

The “unofficial” Bench Guide for Lemon Law cases states that venue for a Lemon Law case is proscribed by Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (b).  It shall be located in the county where the plaintiff resides or resided at the time of the sale, or the county where the contract was entered into or enforced.  All of those criteria here point to venue in Sacramento County.

 

The unofficial Bench Guide also indicates that the court may change venue on its own motion.

 

Enforcing the venue provision is not an idle act.  The court takes judicial notice that hundreds if not thousands of these cases are filed annually throughout the State.  Many have been filed in Orange County even though the plaintiff resides elsewhere, the vehicle was purchased elsewhere, and the vehicle was serviced elsewhere.  Many reasons are given for this phenomenon.  Some are rationale—FCA, a Michigan corporation, has a place of business in Orange County—while some are simply gamesmanship—cases move quicker here than in other counties and some motions (such as a motion to compel arbitration) often have a better outcome for the plaintiff in this County.

 

But meanwhile, residents of Orange County are required to sit longer in the trial queue while these out-of-county cases take up valuable courtroom space and trial time that the Orange County residents should have.

 

Unless the parties can point to a published opinion that says otherwise, the court intends to transfer the case to Sacramento County on its own motion.

 

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

 

Assuming the case is not transferred:  The motion of the plaintiffs for judgment on the pleadings as to the Fifteenth Affirmative Defense is DENIED.

 

The defendant sufficiently pled its defense that the claims were subject to arbitration.  Although defendants may have engaged in actions that could be deemed inconsistent with that claim—such as seeking a jury trial in its Case Management Conference Statement—those facts are not sufficient to support an order granting judgment on the pleadings.

 

The court finds no waiver.

 

The Request for Judicial Notice submitted with the reply is DENIED.

 

Motion to Compel Arbitration

 

Assuming the case is not transferred:  The defendant’s motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the arbitration agreement is GRANTED.

 

The moving party is the manufacturer.  The arbitration agreement is between the buyer and the dealer.  There is a state case—which we all know is Felisilda—that somehow came to the conclusion that the manufacturer can force the plaintiff into arbitration based on a provision within the arbitration agreement that mentions third parties that have not signed the agreement.

 

In this court’s opinion, Felisilda was wrongly decided.

 

The federal cases that mention that state case routinely question its applicability.  As this court has stated in its prior rulings on this question, if it were writing on a clean slate, it would find the federal cases far more persuasive.

 

If nothing else, that third-party arbitration provision would seem limited to the situation where the buyer or the dealer want to bring the manufacturer into a pending arbitration so that the parties do not end up with conflicting results.  It does not—and this court cannot comprehend how Felisilda came to a different conclusion—give the third party, such as the manufacturer, the unilateral right to force the plaintiff into an arbitration that neither party to the arbitration agreement signed up for.

 

Unfortunately, this court believes it is bound by the holding in Felisilda, even though there are several distinctions that can be drawn between that case and this one.

 

The court is aware that at least one other local jurist is denying the motion to compel arbitration.  Someone needs to take this issue up to the local Court of Appeal and have some definitive resolution.  Whether these cases go to arbitration or not should be based on which civil department the case is randomly assigned to.

 

Notice

 

The plaintiff shall give notice.