Judge: Glenn R. Salter, Case: 22-1276587, Date: 2022-11-03 Tentative Ruling

The motion of defendants FCA US, LLC, and Crown Motors, LLC for change of venue to Shasta County is GRANTED.  The plaintiff shall pay all transfer fees and costs forthwith.  To ensure that the matter is transferred timely, the court sets a Status Conference re Transfer for December 22, 2022, at 8:30 am.

Procedural Background

This is a garden-variety Lemon Law case that has been filed by the buyer in Orange County even though the contract, servicing of the vehicle, and the residence of the buyer (now and at the time the subject vehicle was purchased) are all apparently located in Shasta County.

The plaintiff pled venue as follows:  He alleged he is a “resident of California,” without identifying his county of residence.  He alleged he purchased a vehicle manufactured by FCA US, without identifying where he purchased it, and he alleged that FCA has its principal place of business in Michigan.  He also alleged Crown Motors is a car dealership in Shasta County, without stating precisely whether this is where the vehicle was purchased and serviced.

The manufacturer and the dealer (which is indisputably located in Redding, California) filed a joint motion to change venue to Shasta County.  The motion was primarily based on the ground that Orange County is not a proper venue.  It also asserted as a secondary argument that the case should be transferred to Shasta County for the convenience of witnesses.

The plaintiff opposed the motion on the ground that FCA does business in Orange County.  He attached to the opposition a copy of the LLC-12 filed by FCA on June 18, 2021.  As required by the form, FCA listed a “business address” in California:  Here, Newport Beach, which is in Orange County.  All other addresses are at its principal place of business in Auburn Hills, Michigan.  Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice of the LLC-12 form is GRANTED.

The plaintiff did not file opposition the dealer’s motion except inferentially on the ground that venue was proper here for the FCA defendant.

Analysis

There are no specific venue guidelines contained within the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.  (See Civ. Code, § 1790, et seq.).  The lack of a venue provision in the code would suggest that general venue provisions based on the defendant’s residence is a proper venue.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 395, subd. (a).)  That is clearly the position plaintiff takes.

However, the unofficial Lemon Law “Bench Guide” (prepared by Judge Ronald Frank of the Los Angeles Superior Court, but not expressly sanctioned by CJER) suggests that the trial court may, even on its own motion, transfer a case to where the buyer resides, or where the vehicle was purchased pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (b).  (See Bench Guide: section 2.5, Venue, p. 8.)  The argument is that while Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (a) states the general venue rules, subdivision (b) of section 395 is a specific venue provision that controls over the general venue provision.

Indeed, subdivision (b) of section 395 expressly provides that in an action arising from the provision of goods intended primarily for personal, family, or household use, “the superior court in the county where the buyer [] in fact signed the contract, where the buyer [] resided at the time the contract was entered into, or where the buyer [] resides at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.”  (Underlining added.)

Granting such a transfer is consistent with what appears to be the public policy of the State of California; i.e., the protection of the consumer.

In addition to that specific venue provision, there is Civil Code section 2984.4.  This section is in the chapter entitled “Automobile Sales Finance Act.”  Although this section is narrower than section 395, subdivision (b) [it deals with deceptive practices in the financing of vehicles], it requires that certain provisions be included within the sales contract that speak to a buyer’s general complaints about the sale of a vehicle.  (See, e.g., Civ. Code, § 2982, subd. (h) [“If you have a complaint concerning this sale, you should try to resolve it with the seller.”]

Subdivision (a) of section 2984.4, also states that, “An action on a contract or purchase order under this chapter shall be tried in the superior court in the county where the contract or purchase order was in fact signed by the buyer, where the buyer resided at the time the contract or purchase order was entered into, where the buyer resides at the commencement of the action, or where the motor vehicle purchased pursuant to the contract or purchase order is permanently garaged.”

The court concludes that under the venue rules governing consumer protection statutes such as the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, the principal place of business of the manufacturer of a vehicle is not a proper court for trial of the matter.  The action must be filed either in the county where the contract was signed, the buyer resided (or now resides), or the vehicle was purchased.  This reading of the venue provisions is consistent with the public policy of the State of California.

Further, such a ruling serves the salutary purpose of keeping Orange County courts open to the residents of Orange County.  We are seeing a large number of Lemon Law cases that stem from vehicle purchased and serviced in other counties.  This court alone has seen cases from Sacramento, Madera, Kern, and various other counties.  With each one filed, the residents of Orange County must queue one place further back in line, and wait longer, to have their cases heard.

Accordingly, because the plaintiff has not shown that Orange County is a proper court, the defendants’ motion for change of venue must be granted and the case transferred to Shasta County.

The defendants shall give notice.