Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 19STCV05553, Date: 2023-01-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV05553    Hearing Date: January 9, 2023    Dept: 61

Defendant Equis, LLC’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.

I.                      MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

A party may move for a judgment on the pleadings as to an entire complaint or as to a particular cause of action in a complaint. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438 subd. (c)(2)(A).) If a defendant moves for a judgment on the pleadings and argues that a complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant, then the court should grant a defendant’s motion only if the court finds as a matter of law that the complaint fails to alleges facts sufficient to constitute the cause of action. (See id., § 438 subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii); see also Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 677.)

“The standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Bezirdjian v. O’Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321.) When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court not only should assume that all facts alleged in the SAC are true but also should give those alleged facts a liberal construction. (See Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515–516, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 12 P.3d 720.) In particular, the court should liberally construe the alleged facts “‘with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties.’ [Citation.]” (See Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1232, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 900 P.2d 601.)

Defendant Equis, LLC (Defendant) moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff Ruthie Zepeda’s causes of action against it, on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to allege facts establishing that Equis —alleged to be the staffing agency that assigned Plaintiff to work for Defendant LA Care — was Plaintiff’s employer. (Motion at pp. 7–12.)

Defendant’s motion is meritless. First, Plaintiff need not plead the evidentiary facts constituting the basis for claiming the existence of an employment relationship with Defendant. “[T]o withstand a demurrer, a complaint must allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts or conclusions of law.” (Logan v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 116, 126.) The existence of an employment relationship is analogous to the existence of an agency relationship, which may be pleaded outright as an ultimate fact. (See Skopp v. Weaver (1976) 16 Cal.3d 432, 439 [agency may be alleged as “ultimate fact,” and it is “unnecessary” to include “further allegations explaining how this fact of agency originated”].)

Second, the SAC contains sufficient allegations to establish an employment relationship between Plaintiff and Equis under the above standards. Authority holds that an individual employed by a temporary services agency to work for another employee is an employee as to each “for such terms, conditions, and privileges of employment” that the relevant entity controls. (Bradley v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1612, 1625–1626.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that it was Equis that assigned her to LA Care. (SAC ¶ 39.) It is alleged that Equis had the power to remedy the discrimination that Plaintiff experienced at LA Care, and indeed represented to Plaintiff that it would make efforts to do so, when in fact such representations were false, and designed to induce Plaintiff to continue in the same assignment. (SAC ¶¶ 26–27.) The SAC further alleges that Equis had the power to hire and fire employees, and indeed terminated Plaintiff’s employment based on her complaints. (SAC ¶¶ 18, 105.) Plaintiff thus alleges that Equis had power over the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment relevant to her claims.

The motion is DENIED.