Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 19STCV13194, Date: 2024-03-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV13194    Hearing Date: March 1, 2024    Dept: 61

Defendants Ford Motor Company and Bob Wondries Ford’s Motion for Summary Judgment or Adjudication is GRANTED as to the first cause of action against Defendant Bob Wondries Ford and as to the second cause of action against all defendants, and is otherwise DENIED.

Defendants to give notice.

I.                   SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A party may move for summary judgment “if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment.  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)

The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850.)  The plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.  (Ibid.)  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence.  (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Defendants Ford Motor Company and Bob Wondries Ford (Defendants) move for summary judgment and adjudication of Plaintiff Veronica Rodriguez’s (Plaintiff) first and second causes of action for breach of express warranty and Civil Code § 1793.2, subd. (b). Defendants argue that Bob Wondries cannot be liable for an express warranty that it did not promulgate, and which it expressly disclaimed in its sales document. (Motion at p. 9.) Defendants also argue that the second cause of action under Civil Code § 1793.2, subd. (b) fails because there was no single repair within the warranty period that took more than 30 days. (Motion at pp. 11–13.) Defendants finally argue that the first cause of action for breach of express warranty is time-barred. (Motion at pp. 9–11.)

It is undisputed that Bob Wondries was not a party to the warranty, and expressly disclaimed any warranty created by the sales transaction. (PUMF No. 26.) Plaintiff does not oppose this argument in opposing the motion. (Opposition at p. 1, fn. 1.) There is also no dispute that the sole repair taking longer than the 30 days provided by Civil Code § 1793.2, subd. (b), took place outside the warranty period. (PUMF No. 14, 20.) Again, Plaintiff does not oppose the motion as to the second cause of action. (Opposition at p. 1, fn. 1.) The motion is therefore GRANTED as to all causes of action against Bob Wondries, and as to the second cause of action.

This leaves Defendant’s argument as to the statute of limitations and the first cause of action. “An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued.” (Com. Code § 2725, subd. (1).) “A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.” (Com. Code § 2725, subd. (2).) This statute applies to Song-Beverly claims. (See Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 205, 214.)

The vehicle was purchased on April 17, 2010. (PUMF No. 1.) Defendant argues that the four-year limitations period began to run on July 29, 2014, on the fifth time Plaintiff brought the subject vehicle in for repairs. (Motion at p. 10.)[1]

This argument is unpersuasive. The five repair attempts made before the warranty’s expiration on April 17, 2015, were prelude to five further repair attempts made outside the warranty period.(PUMF No. 12, 15, 17, 19, 21.) A claim for breach of warranty under the Song Beverly Act requires “a reasonable number of [repair] attempts” before a plaintiff can take advantage of its replace or repurchase remedies. (Civ. Code § 1793.2, subd. (d)(1).) The claim thus accrues when a defect persists after a “reasonable number of attempts” have been made.  (See Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 205, 218 [holding that claim accrued after fifth repair attempt in a five-month period].) Whether that accrual occurred with the July 29, 2014 repair attempt or after the defect reemerged following that attempt is, as with the application of the delayed discovery rule generally, a question for the trier of fact. (Metabyte, Inc. v. Technicolor S.A. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 265, 281.)

The motion is therefore GRANTED as to the first cause of action against Defendant Bob Wondries Ford and as to the second cause of action against all defendants, and is otherwise DENIED.