Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 20STCV13415, Date: 2023-05-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV13415    Hearing Date: May 15, 2023    Dept: 61

Defendants Alameda Healthcare & Wellness Center LLC, Boardwalk West Financial Services, LLC, Sol Healthcare LLC, Rechnitz Core GP, and Ensemble Healthcare, LLC’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.

I.                MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

A party may move for a judgment on the pleadings as to an entire complaint or as to a particular cause of action in a complaint. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438 subd. (c)(2)(A).) If a defendant moves for a judgment on the pleadings and argues that a complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant, then the court should grant a defendant’s motion only if the court finds as a matter of law that the complaint fails to alleges facts sufficient to constitute the cause of action. (See id., § 438 subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii); see also Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 677.)

“The standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Bezirdjian v. O’Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321.) When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court not only should assume that all facts alleged in the SAC are true but also should give those alleged facts a liberal construction. (See Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515–516, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 12 P.3d 720.) In particular, the court should liberally construe the alleged facts “‘with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties.’ [Citation.]” (See Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1232, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 900 P.2d 601.)

Defendants Alameda Healthcare & Wellness Center LLC, Boardwalk West Financial Services, LLC, Sol Healthcare LLC, Rechnitz Core GP, and Ensemble Healthcare, LLC (Defendants) move for judgment on the pleadings against Plaintiffs Willard Demerson (Decedent) and Burnidine Demerson’s first and second causes of action for elder abuse and violation of resident’s rights.

To state a claim for elder abuse, “[t]he plaintiff must allege (and ultimately prove by clear and convincing evidence) facts establishing that the defendant: (1) had responsibility for meeting the basic needs of the elder or dependent adult, such as nutrition, hydration, hygiene or medical care; (2) knew of conditions that made the elder or dependent adult unable to provide for his or her own basic needs; and (3) denied or withheld goods or services necessary to meet the elder or dependent adult's basic needs, either with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to befall the elder or dependent adult (if the plaintiff alleges oppression, fraud or malice) or with conscious disregard of the high probability of such injury (if the plaintiff alleges recklessness). (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 406–07, citations omitted.)

“[T]he facts constituting the neglect and establishing the causal link between the neglect and the injury must be pleaded with particularity, in accordance with the pleading rules governing statutory claims.” (Id. at p. 407, internal quotation marks omitted.)

The Complaint here adequately pleads reckless neglect within the meaning of the elder abuse statute. It alleges that Decedent required assistance to go to the bathroom, and instead of having a staff member assist him in using the bathroom, they forced him to wear diapers. (Complaint ¶ 28.) Although Decedent relied on Defendants’ staff to change the diapers, they routinely ignored his call light, purposely placed it out of his reach, and left him to sit in his own urine and feces. (Complaint ¶ 28.) Defendants failed to provide Decedent with adequate assistance in hygiene, bathing, changing, and repositioning, resulting in him developing a life-threatening Stage IV pressure ulcer on his back. (Complaint ¶¶ 28–29.) The Complaint further alleges that Defendants engaged in a “business plan to underfund, understaff, undertrain, and under supervise” their staff, in violation of applicable regulations. (Complaint ¶¶ 9, 18, 50.) Reckless understaffing that results in jury to an elder can form a basis for reckless neglect under the elder abuse statutes. (See Fenimore v. Regents of University of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege that an officer of Defendants directed or ratified the conduct, as required under Welfare & Institutions Code § 15657, subd. (c), and Civil Code § 3294, subd. (b). (Motion at pp. 10–11.) The Complaint, however, alleges such corporate ratification. (Complaint ¶¶ 52–53.) Although Defendants argue that elder abuse claims must be pleaded with specificity, the facts concerning corporate ratification lie more in the knowledge of Defendants, and less specificity of pleading is required as to elements of a defendant’s mental state, as these facts are not readily in a plaintiff’s possession and “lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party.” (Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4^th 821, 838.) Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as to the first cause of action for elder abuse.

Defendants further argue that the second cause of action for violation of the Patient’s Bill of Rights, because Defendants have already provided the statutorily mandated $500 for violation of the act. (Motion at pp. 11–12, citing Health & Safety Code § 1430, subd. (b)(1)(A).) However, the $500 tender is not attested to in the pleadings or any judicially noticeable matters. Defendant also argues that the specific regulatory violations listed in 22 CCR § 72527, and pleaded here, are not supported by specific facts. (Motion at p. 12.) However, this cause of action incorporates the specific factual allegations concerning Decedent’s treatment which support Plaintiff’s other causes of action. (Complaint ¶¶ 65–70.)

The motion is therefore DENIED.