Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 20STCV16415, Date: 2023-02-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV16415 Hearing Date: February 21, 2023 Dept: 61
Cross-Complainants
Cappello Global, LLC and Camden Financial Services’ Motion for Leave to File a
First Amended Cross-Complaint is GRANTED.
Cross-Defendants
Defendants Phe.no LLC, Phenomenon Holdings LLC, Phenomenon Blocker LLC and
Sleeping Bear Capital LLC Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Cross-Complainant to provide notice.
I.
MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT
Code Civ. Proc.
section 473 subd. (a)(1) states that:
The court may, in furtherance of justice, and
on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or
proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a
mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may,
upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may
likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any
terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other
particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time
limited by this code.
“The trial court
has discretion to permit or deny the amendment of the complaint, but instances
justifying the court's denial of leave to amend are rare.” (Armenta ex rel. City of Burbank v. Mueller
Co. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 636, 642.)
“Although courts
are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the
complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial
[Citations], this policy should be applied only ‘[w]here no prejudice is shown
to the adverse party . . .’ [Citation.] A different result is indicated
‘[w]here inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party’ is
shown. [Citation.]” (Magpali v. Farmers
Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487.)
Pursuant to California Rule of Court
Rule 3.1324, “[a] motion to amend a pleading before trial must: (1)Include a
copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially
numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments; (2) State
what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any,
and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are
located; and (3)State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous
pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the
additional allegations are located.”
Such a motion must include a
supporting declaration stating, “(1) The effect of the amendment; (2) Why the
amendment is necessary and proper; (3) When the facts giving rise to the
amended allegations were discovered; and (4) The reasons why the request for
amendment was not made earlier.” (CRC Rule 3.1324, subd. (b).)
Here, Cross-Complainants
Cappello Global, LLC and Camden Financial Services (Cross-Complainants) seek to
amend their Cross-Complaint to add Roe Defendants — now including
Cross-Defendants Phe.no, LLC; Phenomenon Holdings, LLC, Phenomenon Blocker,
LLC, and Sleeping Bear Capital (collectively Roe Defendants) — as defendants to
their first cause of action for breach of contract, presently only alleged
against cross-defendants Phenomenon Marketing and Entertainment LLC and
Phenomenon Marketing and Entertainment, Inc.
Cross-Complainants argue that
the failure to include Roe Defendants in the first cause of action was a
product of inadvertence and mistake, which they only realized once Roe
Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on December 6, 2022.
(McKibbon Decl. ¶ 8.) Cross-Complainants further argue that Roe Defendants will
suffer little prejudice from permitting this amendment, since
Cross-Complainants discovery responses made reference to provisions of the
contract implying that they were incorporated as parties to the agreement.
(McKibbon Decl. Exh. 5.)
Roe Defendants in opposition
argue that Cross-Complainants deliberately omitted them from the brach of
contract claim, based on the strategic decision not to allege that claim
against entities that were not signatories to the agreement. (Opposition at pp.
1–2.) As early as December 2021, Roe Defendants objected to interrogatories
directed against them on the grounds that the questions pertained to contracts
they had not signed, and were related to a breach of contract claim they were
not parties to. (Opposition at pp. 3–4.) They argue that allowing leave under
the present motion would frustrate the objectives of their motion for summary
judgment, currently directed against the claims for intentional and negligent
misrepresentation. (Opposition at pp. 6–7.) Allowing the amendment would
require further discovery and dispositive motions, likely to delay trial in
this matter beyond the May 2023 date for which it is currently set. (Opposition
at p. 8.) Roe Defendants further argue that the proposed amendment would be
futile, since language in a contract purporting to bind a party does not bind
them if they did not agree to be so bound. (Opposition at pp. 8–10.)
Roe Defendants are correct in
their characterization of this motion’s delay and the prejudice likely to result
from permitting amendment. Despite the declaration of Cross-Complainants’
counsel, the failure to include Roe Defendants within the original cause of
action for breach of contract was not the product of mistake or inadvertence,
but a strategic decision to allege the claim for breach of contract against the
contract’s actual signatory, Phenomenon Marketing and Entertainment. (XC ¶¶
48–58.) If the Cross-Complaint itself gave not enough notice of the nature of
the claim, Roe Defendants’ discovery responses in December 2021 would have made
the matter clear. (Mall Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. 1.) Likewise, the present motion is
likely to prejudice Roe Defendants and the other parties to this action by
requiring additional discovery and motion practice, and likely a continuance of
trial in order to accommodate the same.
However, it is unlikely that
such prejudice can be avoided by denying leave to amend. This is because, as
Cross-Complainants argue, the four-year limitations period for their breach of
contract claim, accruing in March 2019, has not yet expired. (Motion at pp.
9–10.) As such, the most likely effect of denying leave to amend here would be
Cross-Complainants’ filing of a new lawsuit against Roe Defendants. This being
the case, there is little to be gained from denying the proposed amendment.
The motion is therefore
GRANTED.
II.
MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A party may move for summary judgment “if it
is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the
action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc.
§ 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences
reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences
or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving
party will be entitled to summary judgment.
(Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp.
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made
by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall
proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)
The moving party bears an initial burden of
production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable
issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing
party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of
material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850;
accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
Once the defendant
has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable
issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a
defense thereto. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850.)
The plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its
pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead,
shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material
fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Ibid.)
To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the
motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster
v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Cross-Defendants Phe.no LLC, Phenomenon Holdings LLC,
Phenomenon Blocker LLC and Sleeping Bear Capital LLC (Cross-Defendants) seek
summary judgment or adjudication against the causes of action for intentional
and negligent misrepresentation alleged against them in Cross-Complainants’
Cappello Global, LLC and Camden Financial Services Cross-Complaint. Cross-Defendants
argue that the claims are based on representations made during negotiations of
a contract with Phenomenon Marketing and Entertainment, and that
Cross-Complainants’ principal, who conducted the negotiations, admitted that no
one made any misrepresentations during these negotiations. (Motion Exh. 4 at
pp. 43–44.)
Misrepresentation is an element of
both claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation. (National Union
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Cambridge Integrated Services Group, Inc.
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 35, 50; Manderville v. PCG&S Group, Inc.
(2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1498.) Here, Cross-Defendants have satisfied their
initial burden to show the absence of triable issues as to the making of any misrepresentations.
Cross-Complainants have filed a notice of non-opposition to the motion.[1]
The motion is therefore GRANTED.
[1] The
granting of Cross-Complainants’ motion for leave to amend does not affect the
ruling on this summary adjudication motion. An amended pleading will not render a pending motion for summary judgment
moot in the absence of some change to the pleading that is material to the
motion. (See Delon Hampton & Associates, Chartered v. Superior Court (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 250, 253 [holding that new pleading did not render a demurrer
moot when the only change was the addition of one paragraph].)
Cross-Complainants’ motion seeks only to add Cross-Defendants to a cause of
action not at issue in the present motion.