Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 20STCV19075, Date: 2023-03-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV19075 Hearing Date: March 30, 2023 Dept: 61
Plaintiff Jane Doe’s Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoenas is
DENIED. No sanctions are awarded.
I.
MOTION TO
QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA
“If a subpoena requires the attendance of a
witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored
information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue
therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably
made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion
after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order
quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it
upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective
orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate
to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable
violations of the right of privacy of the person.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1,
subd. (a).) A party may bring a motion under this section. (Code Civ. Proc. §
1987.1, subd. (b)(1).)
Plaintiff Jane
Doe (Plaintiff) moves to quash several subpoenas issued by Defendant
TPUSA-FHCS, Inc. (Defendant), to six of Plaintiff’s prior employers. Plaintiff
claims that the notices to consumer were impermissibly served upon her by
electronic mail, that they include private information about herself (including
a portion of her social security number), and they encompass a broad intrusion
into her private personnel information. (Motion at pp. 6–11.)
Defendant in
opposition contends that the documents sought are relevant to the subject
matter of this action, as they encompass records relevant to Plaintiff’s
credibility, qualifications, mitigation of damages, and earning potential,
based on her claim for lost income for wrongful termination. (Opposition at pp.
12–14.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff has waived her privacy concerns to
the subject records by her filing of this action, and further contends that
Plaintiff’s motion is untimely, as it was filed and served on the appointed
date of production, and was not preceded by the service of any timely
objections under Code of Civil Procedure § 1985.3. (Opposition at pp. 10–11.)
There was no
defect of service of the subpoenas at issue here that warrants quashing the
subpoenas. Plaintiff’s objection is that she was served with notices to
consumer via email, when she has not consented to electronic service. (Plaintiff
Decl. ¶¶ 3–4.) But there is no dispute that email service here gave Plaintiff
timely, actual notice of the subpoenas, since Plaintiff reserved a date for the
present motion to quash the day after the subpoenas were served. Plaintiff has
thus received notice and an opportunity to be heard on her objections to the
subpoena consistent with due process. (See People v. Silva (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 505, 523.) Under Code of Civil Procedure § 1985.3, it
was unnecessary to obtain Plaintiff’s consent when such service has been
accomplished. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1985.3, subd. (c).)[1]
Plaintiff’s motion
is not untimely, however. Code of Civil Procedure § 1985.3 states that
party-consumers whose records are sought by subpoena must provide notice of any
motion to quash “at least five days prior to production,” but simultaneously
states that the failure to provide notice “shall not invalidate the
motion to quash,” but shall only
operate as a defense for the subpoenaed party against liability for improper
production. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1985.3, subd. (g).) Here, Plaintiff served the
present motion after the appointed date of production (March 3), but Defendant
concedes that only partial production of the documents requested has been made,
and that the motion is thus not moot. (Opposition at p. 1.)
But even if
Plaintiff’s motion isn’t moot, it is still unpersuasive, as Defendant’s need
for the documents outweighs Plaintiff’s privacy interests. The requested
documents consisted of the following categories:
1. Resumes, job applications, or other
employment histories
2. Performance evaluations and disciplinary
actions
3. Documents showing Plaintiff’s hours worked
4. Documents showing Plaintiff’s compensation
5. Documents showing Plaintiff’s benefits
6. Documents showing Plaintiff’s job titles,
promotions, and demotions
7. Documents related to Plaintiff’s termination
8. Documents related to Plaintiff’s eligibility
for rehire
9. Plaintiff’s requests for time off or
disability accommodations
10. Complaints made by or against Doe during her
employment
These documents are
discoverable. Although employees generally have a privacy right in their
personnel records (See El Dorado Savings
& Loan v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 342, 345, overruled on
other grounds in Williams v. Superior
Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531.), in employment cases, “defendants are
generally entitled to discover plaintiff’s previous employer’s payroll records
and personnel files (including performance evaluations).” (Chin et al., Cal.
Practice Guide: Employment Litigation (The Rutter Group 2017) ¶ 19:684.)
Indeed, “[e]vidence of the plaintiff's work history and earnings is a standard
subject of discovery.” (Anderson v.
Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 296 fn. 9.) The
reasons are as described in Defendant’s opposition: Such documents are relevant
to Plaintiff’s earning potential, mitigation of damages, and credibility.
(Opposition at pp. 12–14.)
The motion to quash is therefore DENIED.
Defendant in opposition seeks sanctions under Code of Civil
Procedure § 1987.2, which allows the court “in its discretion” to “award the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion,
including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or
opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more
of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” However, Plaintiff’s
motion was founded on substantial objections based on service. No sanctions are
awarded.
Defendant to provide notice.
[1]
Plaintiff has not consented to electronic service under Code of Civil Procedure
§ 1010.6, subd. (c). But Defendant has operated in the reasonable belief that
electronic service was appropriate. Although Plaintiff claims to have objected
to electronic service at an August 9, 2022 hearing on Plaintiff’s deposition,
the record does not reflect such an objection, and Plaintiff’s subsequent court
papers list as her email address the same address served with the notices of
consumer here, which bears the name “janedoe19075,” indicating its creation
specifically for this litigation, which bears the case number 20STCV19075.. However,
in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure § 1010.6, subd. (c), the court
directs Defendant to adopt methods of service consistent with Plaintiff’s lack
of consent to email service.