Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 20STCV20983, Date: 2023-07-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV20983    Hearing Date: July 21, 2023    Dept: 61

Plaintiffs Ramiro Perez Miranda and Gloria Perez’s Motion for Reconsideration of October 7, 2021 Order Compelling Arbitration is DENIED.

I.       MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Code Civ. Proc. § 1008 is the exclusive means for seeking reconsideration of an order or renewing a motion.  (Kerns v. CSE Ins. Group (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 368, 384.)  The application to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order must be made within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order to the same judge or court that made the order.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(a).) A motion for reconsideration may only be brought if the party moving for reconsideration can offer “new or different facts, circumstances, or law” which it could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the time of the prior motion.  (Id.) There is a strict requirement of diligence - i.e., the moving party must present a satisfactory explanation for failing to provide the evidence or different facts earlier.  (Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690.) “The burden under section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial.” (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212–13.)

“If a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008, subd. (c).) Whether to grant a motion for reconsideration is a matter of discretion for the trial court. (See Simonyan v. Nationwide Insurance Company of America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 889, 895.)

Plaintiffs Ramiro Perez Miranda and Gloria Perez (Plaintiffs) move for reconsideration of this court’s order of October 7, 2021, granting Defendant FCA US, LLC’s (Defendant) motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs rely on recent authority, Ochoa v. Ford Motor Company — Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2023) 89 Cal.App.5^th 1324 (Ochoa) — which disagrees with the holding of Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5^th 486, upon which this court relied in its prior order in holding Plaintiff to be equitably estopped from opposing arbitration with Defendant. (Motion at pp. 6–11.) Plaintiffs argue that this motion may be considered under Code of Civil Procedure § 1008, subd. (c), which allows a court of its own motion to reconsider a prior order when it determines there has been a change in law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008, subd. (c).) (Motion at pp. 5–6.)

Defendant in opposition argues that arbitration remains proper under the Felisilda holding, as the Ochoa decision rested upon pre-UCC and pre-Song-Beverly authorities that held warranties were separate from a sales agreement, while more recent authorities recognize warranties as constituting part of the purchase agreement.(Opposition at pp. 5–9.)

No reconsideration of the prior order is necessary or proper at this time. Whether to grant reconsideration of a prior order is a matter of court discretion. (Simonyan, supra, 78 Cal.App.5^th at p. 895.)The order that Plaintiff targets is almost two years old. Felisilda, the holding upon which this court relied in making its prior order, has not been overturned. The holding of the Ochoa court marks a split in appellate court authority, and this court may choose to follow the holding of either case. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456.)

Plaintiffs argue that Ochoa is more closely aligned with the facts of this case than Felisilda, and is therefore controlling.  (Motion at pp. 5–6.) This argument is unpersuasive. It is belied both by the reasoning of the Ochoa decision — which needn’t have expressly disagreed with Felisilda at such length if the facts were different and distinguishable— and this court’s prior order compelling arbitration, which rejected Plaintiff’s efforts to distinguish Felisilda on the same grounds that Plaintiffs now raise. As noted in the prior order, the Felisilda holding did not turn upon the identity of the party that first brought the motion; the claims against the dealer in Felisilda were ultimately dismissed, leaving the claims against the manufacturer. The court expressly framed the issue as “the question of whether a nonsignatory to the agreement has a right to compel arbitration under that agreement.” (Felisilda, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 495.) The court indeed disapproved the holding of the case Jurosky v. BMW of North America, LLC (C.D. Cal. 2020) 441 F.Supp.3d 963, in which the court had denied a motion to compel arbitration brought by the manufacturer, which was the fact-pattern of this case. (Felisilda, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 498.) The Felisilda court held that the Jurosky decision had “gloss[ed] over language in an arbitration clause that expressly include[d] third party nonsignatories.” (Ibid.) Plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish Felisilda is no more persuasive now.

The motion is therefore DENIED.