Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 20STCV21644, Date: 2022-10-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV21644    Hearing Date: October 17, 2022    Dept: 61

Plaintiff Ashely Garcia’s Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs, and Expenses is GRANTED as to attorney fees in the amount of $26,144.50, and as to costs and expenses in the amount of $5,686.21

 

I.                   OBJECTIONS

 

Plaintiff Ashley Garcia objects to portions of the declaration of Stephen Grimsrud submitted in support of Defendants’ opposition to the present motion. These objections are OVERRULED.

 

II.                MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

 

Parties to litigation must generally bear their own attorney’s fees, unless they otherwise agree. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.) However, the Song-Beverly Act provides for the award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs as follows:

 

If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.

 

(Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).)

 

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.”  (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.)  In exercising its discretion, the court should consider a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in handling the matter, the attention given, the success or failure, and the resulting judgment.  (See id.) 

 

In determining the proper amount of fees to award, courts use the lodestar method.  The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the total number of reasonable hours expended by the reasonable hourly rate.  “Fundamental to its determination . . . [is] a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . in the presentation of the case.”  (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48 (Serrano III).)  A reasonable hourly rate must reflect the skill and experience of the attorney.  (Id. at p. 49.)  “Prevailing parties are compensated for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues.  A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.”  (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635 (Serrano IV).)  The Court in Serrano IV also stated that fees associated with preparing the motion to recover attorneys’ fees are recoverable.  (See id. at p. 624.)

 

Plaintiff Ashley Garcia here seeks a total award of attorney fees, costs, and expenses in the amount of $47,452.96, after negotiating a settlement buyback of the vehicle for $172,207.00. (Motion at pp. 2, 5–6.) The award can be broken down as follows: an attorney fee lodestar of $27,844.50; a 1.5 multiplier on that lodestar, for an additional $13,922.25; and $5,686.21 in costs and expenses. (Motion at p. 2.) The lodestar amount represents $30,134.50 for 95.4 hours of work, minus $2,290.00 in sanctions paid to Plaintiff. (Motion at p. 13; Kirnos Decl. Exh. A.)

 

Defendants Champion Dodge, LLC and FCA US, LLC (Defendants) argue that the fees sought are excessive, as Plaintiff’s case was overstaffed by ten attorneys and two law clerks. (Opposition at pp. 2–3.) Defendants argue that the hourly rates charged, ranging from $175 to $450 per hour, were excessive. (Opposition at pp. 5–6.) And Defendants identify various particular charges that they claim were unreasonable and excessive. (Opposition at pp. 4–5.)

 

Defendants are correct that unreasonable multiplicity of attorneys performing duplicative work may furnish a basis to substantially reduce a cost award. In Morris v. Hyundai Motors America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, the trial court substantially reduced a requested attorney fees award involving 11 attorneys and two firms in a lemon law action. (Id. at p. 32.) “Out of a total of 283.3 hours of billed work, the court did not award any fees for 83.5 hours of work billed by six associates.” (Ibid.) The appellate court affirmed: “Plainly, it is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, non-complex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.” (Id. at p. 39.) The appellate court determined that the trial court’s remedy of cutting out several attorneys’ billings was permissible because it “was designed to yield a revised lodestar figure that reflected a total amount of fees that were reasonably incurred.” (Id. at p. 40.) A similar result was reached in the case Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 253, which cited Morris with approval to reduce an award involving 595 claimed hours of work and a total request of $344,639.00 in fees following trial.

 

But the reasoning of those cases does not necessarily apply here. A large number of attorneys is not on its own reason to reduce a fee award, and both cases cited above upheld lodestar reductions based on the “duplicative” and “inefficient” billings that resulted from the number of attorneys employed. (Mikhaeilpoor, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 255; Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 40.)

 

Here the number of attorneys employed does not indicate a systemic inefficiency of litigation in this matter; it rather appears from the billing records produced that different attorneys were employed to address different aspects of the case. (Kirnos Decl. Exh. A.) One attorney prepared the complaint, another drafted discovery, and another calculated and communicated settlement offers. (Ibid.)

 

However, Defendants persuasively identify certain charges contained in Plaintiff’s invoices that are excessive.  These include 2.3 hours and $920.00 to prepare for and attend a routine case management conference; and 6.0 hours and $1,950.00 to prepare for the routine depositions of dealership personnel, largely concerned with the authentication of repair orders that no party disputes. (Opposition at p. 4.) The case management fees are properly reduced by one hour ($400.00), and the deposition preparations reduced by four hours ($1,300.00) to reflect reasonable time spent on the respective tasks.

 

The hourly rates charged are reasonable. Plaintiff presents the declaration of Roger Kirnos, who testifies concerning the background and experience of each attorney and staff who worked on the case. (Kirnos Decl. ¶¶ 28–41.) The rates charged, between $175 to $450 per hour, are reasonable for cases of this type, and are further supported by Plaintiff’s presentation of other rulings supporting similar fee awards with similar rates in similar cases. (Kirnos Decl. ¶¶ 44–102.)

 

No lodestar multiplier, upward or downward, is appropriate in this matter. “Once the court has fixed the lodestar, it may increase or decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative ‘multiplier’ to take into account a variety of other factors, including the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented.” (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank., N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833.) Although Plaintiff’s attorneys have obtained favorable results for their client on an expectation only of contingency, the subject matter of this case was not so complex as to warrant any expansion of the lodestar.

 

The motion is therefore GRANTED as to attorney fees in the amount of $26,144.50, and as to costs and expenses in the amount of $5,686.21.