Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 20STCV23413, Date: 2023-07-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV23413 Hearing Date: September 7, 2023 Dept: 61
Defendant
Plaintiff Tony Cinciprinni’s Motion to Tax Costs sought by Defendant 1201 North
Crescent Heights LLC is GRANTED in part; the $500 in attorney fees are taxed,
yielding a new cost award of $695.
Defendant to give notice.
I.
MOTION TO
TAX COSTS
“Any notice of motion to strike or to tax costs must be
served and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum. If the cost
memorandum was served by mail, the period is extended as provided in Code of
Civil Procedure section 1013. If the cost memorandum was served electronically,
the period is extended as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section
1010.6(a)(4).” (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1700, subd. (b)(1).)
“Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b) [],
guarantees prevailing parties in civil litigation awards of the costs expended
in the litigation: ‘Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a
prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any
action or proceeding.’” (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist.
(“Williams”) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97,
100.).
“If the items on a verified cost bill appear proper charges,
they are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein
listed were necessarily incurred.” (Rappenecker
v. Sea-Land Service, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 266.) Although
individual cost items are ordinarily challenged by a motion to tax costs, no
cost-item is effectively put in issue by “mere statements” claiming them to be
unreasonable. (Ibid.) However, where
“it cannot be determined from the face of the cost bill whether the items are
proper,” “the mere filing of a motion to tax costs may be a ‘proper objection’
to an item.” (Nelson v. Anderson (1999)
72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131, 132.)
Plaintiff Tony Cinciprinni, who
dismissed his complaint on June 20, 2023, moves to tax costs sought in
Defendant’s memorandum of costs filed on June 21, 2023. The memorandum seeks
$695 in filing fees and $500 in attorney fees, pursuant to a fee agreement in
the lease with a maximum $500 cap. Plaintiff argues that he voluntarily
dismissed his complaint, and thus Defendant is not the prevailing party.
(Motion at pp. 3–4.) Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Defendant cannot claim
100% of filing fees sought here, since other plaintiffs remain in the action.
(Motion at p. 4.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that attorney fees pursuant to
contract are unavailable under Civil Code § 1717, which states, “Where an action has been
voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the case, there
shall be no prevailing party for purposes of this section.” (Civ. Code, § 1717,
subd. (b)(2).)
Plaintiff’s
arguments as to Defendant’s prevailing party status, and the availability of
costs with remaining plaintiffs, are unpersuasive. A prevailing party
for the purposes of an award of costs is “the party with a net monetary
recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where
neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against
those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) A dismissal has been entered in favor of
Defendant, and it is the prevailing party against Plaintiff.
Moreover, Defendant may seek reimbursement of its filing
fees against Plaintiff. In Andersen v. Pacific Bell (1988) 204
Cal.App.3d 277, the court reversed a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s
memorandum of costs where the defendant had prevailed against several
plaintiffs, who were then dismissed, but not against plaintiffs who remained. (Id.
at p. 286.) Where the trial court had reasoned that the remaining plaintiffs
might be entitled to recover their own costs if they later prevailed, the
appellate court stated that the defendant’s “right as prevailing party to
recover its own costs from the dismissed plaintiffs is not dependent on any
hypothetical, future right the remaining plaintiffs might have to recover their
different costs.” (Id. at p. 287; see also Fields v. Napa Mill Co.
(1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 442, 449–50 [holding that defendant who prevailed against
some but not all plaintiffs was entitled to recover costs from those plaintiffs
as though they had brought separate actions].) The same reasoning applies here,
and Defendant may recover its filing fees.
However, Plaintiff is correct as to the availability of
attorney fees. Civil Code § 1717 states that no prevailing party exists under
that section — applicable to contractual attorney fees provisions — “[w]here an
action has been voluntarily dismissed.” (Civ. Code § 1717, subd. (b)(2). Thus
the $500 sought in attorney fees are properly taxed.
The motion to tax costs is therefore GRANTED in part; the
$500 in attorney fees are taxed, yielding a new cost award of $695.