Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 20STCV25573, Date: 2023-10-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV25573    Hearing Date: October 10, 2023    Dept: 61

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Defendant to give notice.

I.                   SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A party may move for summary judgment “if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment.  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)

The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850.)  The plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.  (Ibid.)  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence.  (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) moves for summary judgment on the third and fourth causes of action for negligence and negligent supervision alleged against it in Plaintiff Joshua Araujo’s (Plaintiff) first amended complaint (FAC).

Government Code § 815 establishes that public entities are not liable for acts or omissions of themselves or their employees “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.” (Gov. Code § 815, subd. (a).) Government Code § 815.2 states, “A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” (Gov. Code § 815.2, subd. (a).)

“To succeed in a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the duty, and (3) the breach proximately or legally caused (4) the plaintiff's damages or injuries.” (Thomas v. Stenberg (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 654, 662.)

This case arises from an alleged assault committed by Defendant Michael Flores (Flores) against Plaintiff after school, in the absence of staff monitors or supervisors. (FAC ¶¶ 15–26.)

“Schools have a ‘special relationship’ with their students; therefore, schools are required to ‘use reasonable measures to protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands of third parties acting negligently or intentionally.” (Achay v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 528, 531.)

LAUSD relies on the case Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4^th 1138, in which the court held that a child care facility owed no duty to prevent a criminal act that killed and injured several children when a driver intentionally drove his car through a fence and onto a playground. (Id. at p. 1142–1143.) The court reasoned:

No evidence indicated defendants' child care facility had ever been the target of violence in the past and no hint existed that either defendants or any other similar business establishment had ever been the target of any criminal acts. Indeed, here, the foreseeability of a perpetrator's committing premeditated murder against the children was impossible to anticipate, and the particular criminal conduct so outrageous and bizarre, that it could not have been anticipated under any circumstances.

(Id. at p. 1150.)

Here, LAUSD presents evidence that Defendant Flores was picking up his child Steven Flores from school when a student, whom they identified as Plaintiff, threw a firecracker into their car, setting Flores’s jacket on fire and burning his son. (Separate Statement No. 7, 8.) Flores exited his vehicle, chased Plaintiff into the campus, and struck him in the back of the head. (Separate Statement No. 5.) Plaintiff’s mother, a former campus aide at the school, testified that she had never observed or heard of a parent assaulting a student on campus, and that while working at the campus, the school gates were supervised after school hours. (Separate Statement No. 14, 17.) The dean of the school, who has acted as dean for the past 14 years, stated that no incidents involving an intruder gaining access to campus without being restrained had occurred within the past ten years. (Separate Statement No. 30.) An attendant was assigned to watch the access gate where the incident occurred, but had left the position for about 30 seconds to check on an incident involving a car burning rubber, during which the assault occurred. (Separate Statement No. 35–36.) There had been no prior complaints related to Defendant Flores. (Separate Statement No. 41.)

Defendant LAUSD has presented evidence showing that no similar incidents had occurred in the previous ten years, and that no LAUSD staff had reason to foresee that Defendant Flores would engage in the criminal conduct alleged. Additionally, Defendant has shown an absence of triable issues as to the breach of any duty, as an attendant was appointed to oversee the point where Flores’s entry occurred. Plaintiff has filed no opposition to the present motion.

The motion is therefore GRANTED.