Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 20STCV32561, Date: 2023-03-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV32561    Hearing Date: March 20, 2023    Dept: 61

Plaintiffs Vanessa Ramirez and Carlos V. Salazar’s Motion to Enforce Settlement is GRANTED, with interest calculated from December 17, 2022.

Plaintiffs Vanessa Ramirez and Carlos V. Salazar’s Motion for Sanctions is DENIED.

I.       MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT

Code Civ. Proc. section 664.6 states that:

If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.

“Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit. [Citation.] It is for the trial court to determine in the first instance whether the parties have entered into an enforceable settlement. [Citation.] In making that determination, ‘the trial court acts as the trier of fact, determining whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement. [Citation.] Trial judges may consider oral testimony or may determine the motion upon declarations alone. [Citation.] When the same judge hears the settlement and the motion to enter judgment on the settlement, he or she may consult his [or her] memory. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1359–1360.)

Plaintiffs Plaintiffs Vanessa Ramirez and Carlos V. Salazar (Plaintiffs) accepted Defendant FCA US, LLC’s offer to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure § 998 on September 15, 2022. (Melero Decl. ¶ 3.) The settlement provides 60 days from the return of the offer for Plaintiff’s acceptance to make the promised $33,000 payment to Plaintiff. (Melero Decl. Exh. A.) Despite multiple continuous efforts to confirm the promised payment, Defendant has failed to deliver the payment in the promised time. (Melero Decl. ¶¶ 5–10.) Plaintiff moves for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure § 128.5, for bad faith and frivolous conduct, on the same grounds. (Motion at pp. 5–7.)

Defendant in opposition argues that no judgment can be entered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6, as the section 998 offer specifically states that it shall not be entered as a judgment as permitted in Goodstein v. Bank of San Pedro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4^th 899, and moreover that the settlement evidences no agreement for the court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement under Code of Civil Proceudre § 664.6. (Opposition at p. 5.) Defendant further argues that it has been working to obtain the settlement check, but that the check was delayed by a paralegal oversight, in which the “Check Request Worksheet” was not sent to be processed as scheduled on October 21, 2022. (Shephardson Decl. ¶ 6.) Defendant expects to receive the check the week of March 13, and to coordinate the vehicle transfer thereafter. (Shephardson Decl. ¶¶ 10–11.)

The fact that the settlement agreement does not anticipate being entered as a judgment as a condition of its own completion does not deprive this court of jurisdiction to enforce the settlement or enter its terms as a judgment under Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6. This court expressly retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement in its order of January 12, 2023, prior to dismissing the case. As Plaintiff notes in reply, the very authority that Defendant relies upon states: “[A]s between the parties thereto and for purposes of enforcement of settlement agreements, a compromise agreement contemplating payment by defendant and dismissal of the action by plaintiff is the legal equivalent of a judgment in plaintiff's favor.” (Goodstein v. Bank of San Pedro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 899, 907.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff is entitled to interest, but only from 60 days after the date Plaintiff submitted required settlement materials, i.e. December 17, 2022. (Opposition at pp. 5–6.) Defendant contends that the ordinary practice among the parties is for the 60-day clock to start once the plaintiff submits the required settlement materials, which Plaintiff only provided on October 18, 2022. (Shepardson Decl. ¶¶ 5, 9.) Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged in an email that the 60-day clock only began once Plaintiff sent the materials on October 18. (Melero Decl. Exh. D.) Given that Plaintiff’s counsel has already acknowledged that the 60-day clock only began to run after submitting Plaintiff’s materials, Defendant is correct that Plaintiff is entitled to interest only from December 17, 2022.

Plaintiff is not entitled to sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure § 128.5. That statute applies to “actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 128.5, subd. (a).) Here, the reason the payment was not expeditiously made was because of a clerical oversight, not out of any intention to cause delay. (Shepardson Decl. ¶ 6.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to enforce settlement is GRANTED, with interest calculated from December 17, 2022. The motion for sanctions is DENIED.