Judge Gregory Keosian, Case Number: 20STCV40540, Date: 2023-08-24 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 20STCV40540, Date: 2023-08-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV40540 Hearing Date: November 7, 2023 Dept: 61

Defendant Muncie Power Products’ Demurrer and Motion to Strike Portions of the First Amended Complaint are OVERRULED and DENIED.

I. DEMURRER

A demurrer should be sustained only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Pro., §§ 430.30, et seq.) In particular, as is relevant here, a court should sustain a demurrer if a complaint does not allege facts that are legally sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See id. § 430.10, subd. (e).) As the Supreme Court held in Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311: “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Id. at p. 318; see also Hahn. v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 [“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. [Citation.]”)

“In determining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer … if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Such demurrers “are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Insurance Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.)

A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) The demurrer also may be sustained without leave to amend where the nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead render it probable plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Krawitz v. Rusch (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 957, 967.)

Defendant Muncie Power Products, Inc. (Defendant) was added to this case by amendment as Doe No. 3, 52, and 102 on February 24, 2023, and March 30, 2023. Defendant claims that there are no allegations as to what specific product it manufactured or designed that caused Decedent Kelli D. Haskell’s (Decedent) harm. (Demurrer at pp. 8–9.) Defendant argues that the FAC is uncertain, as it has been added as three numbered Doe defendants, and the product at issue is not specified. (Demurrer at pp. 9–10.) Defendant finally argues that the punitive damages allegations are conclusory. (Demurrer at pp. 10–11.)

“The elements of a strict products liability cause of action are a defect in the manufacture or design of the product or a failure to warn, causation, and injury.” (Nelson v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 689, 695.) Moreover, “[t]o succeed in a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the duty, and (3) the breach proximately or legally caused (4) the plaintiff's damages or injuries.” (Thomas v. Stenberg (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 654, 662.)

The FAC states claims against Defendant, and is not uncertain. Defendant is named as a different numbered Doe defendant because each group of Doe defendants is placed under a different cause of action, and adding Defendant as Does No. 3, 52, and 102, is to indicate that Plaintiff is suing Defendant for negligence, product’s liability, and exemplary damages. Nor is the subject of Plaintiff’s FAC in doubt; it refers to defects in the design or manufacture of the PTO drive shaft and PTO control system. (FAC at p. 12.) Defendant’s arguments as to how it manufactured the PTO itself, and not the drive shaft, are not proper arguments for a demurrer to resolve, and indicate the Defendant’s understanding of the FAC.

Defendant finally demurrers to the prayer for punitive damages. Punitive damages are allowed in non-contract cases when a defendant is guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code § 3294.) The terms are defined as:

“Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

“Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.

“Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c).)

Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894.) Proof of negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. (Dawes v. Sup.Ct. (Mardian) (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88–89.) Punitive damages may be recovered in an action for negligence or other nonintentional torts if the plaintiff pleads and proves that the defendant acted with the state of mind described as “conscious disregard” of the potential dangers to others. (Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.) When malice is based on a defendant’s conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights, the conduct must be both despicable and willful. (College Hospital v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 794, 713 (“College Hospital”).)

The FAC’s allegations are also sufficient to support a prayer for punitive damages. The FAC contains a section specifically devoted to supporting the case for exemplary damages, and lays out facts by which Plaintiffs contend Defendants, including Muncie, were aware of the danger of the exposed PTO system in the truck at issue. This section includes facts such as prior publicly recorded deaths resulting from PTOs, safety recommendations from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, and the existence of safer shielded PTO designs and power control systems available in other models and mandated in other countries. (FAC at pp. 24–29.) Such allegations are adequate to support the contention that Defendant, by failing to guard against a known lethal danger in their product, acted despicably and in conscious disregard of Decedent’s rights.

The demurrer is OVERRULED.

Defendant’s motion to strike largely repeats the arguments of the demurrer against the prayer for punitive damages. (Motion at pp. 5–7.) It includes an additional argument, that the FAC does not allege corporate ratification or direction of the wrongful conduct that is at issue here, as required under Civil Code § 3294, subd. (b). (Motion at pp. 7–9.) Yet the FAC includes such allegations. (FAC at p. 29.) Defendant also repeats its argument that it did not in fact manufacture the component at issue, which is a matter not subject to judicial notice or appropriately considered on a motion to strike. (Motion at pp. 9–10.)

The motion to strike is DENIED.