Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 21STCV00833, Date: 2022-10-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV00833    Hearing Date: October 12, 2022    Dept: 61

Defendant The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles’s Motion to Compel Deposition of Plaintiff Rosa Mendoza is GRANTED. Defendant to provide notice.

I.       MOTIONS TO COMPEL DEPOSITION AND INSPECTION

A party may make a motion compelling a witness’s deposition “after service of a deposition notice” if that witness “fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450, subd. (a).) The motion must include a meet-and-confer declaration and show good cause for the discovery sought. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450, subd. (b)(1), (2).)

Defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (Defendant) moves to compel a third session of Plaintiff Rosa Mendoza’s deposition, pursuant to a third deposition notice served on July 18, 2022. Prior deposition sessions took place on March 21 and June 9, 2022. (Martinez Decl. ¶¶ 6, 9.) Although the two sessions lasted for more than 11 hours of on-the-record time, Defendant claims that Plaintiff’s need for a translator and technical issues resulting from the remote nature of the deposition yielded only seven hours of total testimony. (Martinez Decl. ¶¶ 8, 14.) Defendant argues that the depositions were further slowed by Plaintiff’s evasive and contradictory testimony, and by her counsel’s practice of making meritless speaking objections. (Martinez Decl. ¶¶ 6, 13, Exhs. B, D.) As to further testimony, Defendant contends that no questioning has yet taken place concerning Plaintiff’s medical records or her emotional distress damages, and that a full account of her complaints of misconduct and wage-and-hour claims has not yet been taken. (Martinez Decl. ¶ 14.)

Plaintiff in opposition contends that Defendant has created any present shortcomings in the deposition record, and that it has refused compromise offers for further deposition offered by Plaintiff. (Opposition at p. 4.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant wasted two hours of deposition time questioning Plaintiff concerning the whereabouts of deleted text messages, which were of limited probative value. (Afgani Decl. ¶ 4.) And at the second deposition, Plaintiff offered to proceed beyond the allotted time and finish the deposition, an offer that Defendant refused. (Afgani Decl. ¶ 5.) And after the last session concluded, Plaintiff has offered a third session of deposition, limited to one or two hours, which Defendant has rejected. (Afgani Decl. ¶ 6.)

Depositions are generally limited to seven hours, and leave of court supported by good cause is generally required to extend depositions beyond this limit. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.290, subd. (a).) This limitation, however, does not apply “[t]o any case brought by an employee or applicant for employment against an employer for acts or omissions arising out of or relating to the employment relationship.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.290, subd. (b)(4).) Because the present case is one brought by an employee Plaintiff against her employer for acts arising out of the employment relationship, this limitation does not apply to the present motion.

It is not disputed that the actual time taken by the two previous deposition sessions has significantly exceeded the amount of testimony actually gathered. From the declarations of the parties’ counsel and the portions of the deposition transcript submitted here, this appears to be chiefly a product of difficulties with technology and translation, rather than intentional evasiveness or obstructionism by any party.

Plaintiff’s testimony has not yet been taken on certain relevant subjects. Plaintiff does not contest that her medical records and emotional distress have remained largely uncovered, but merely argues that her testimony on such matters are “problematic” because the most pertinent testimony on such things would come from experts. (Opposition at p. 4.) This argument is not persuasive, however, as Plaintiff’s first-hand testimony concerning her own emotional distress is probative of the issue of distress, and is of a different kind than the testimony that experts would provide. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not challenge Defendant’s claim that the testimony remains lacking as to other matters, particularly her complaints of employment-related misconduct.

Good cause therefore exists to compel Plaintiff’s attendance at a third session of deposition. Given the obstacles by technology and translation, this third session will likely last for seven to eight hours. Plaintiff’s prior offers of a one- or two-hour session are likely inadequate to address the remaining subjects. Nor does Plaintiff contend that a further deposition poses any hardship to her.

Accordingly, the motion to compel deposition is GRANTED.

II.                SANCTIONS

If a motion to compel deposition is granted, the party making the motion is entitled to monetary sanctions against the opposing party, unless the opposing party acted with substantial justification, or other circumstances make a sanctions order unjust. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450, subd. (g)(1).)

The request for sanctions is DENIED.