Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 21STCV07639, Date: 2023-02-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV07639 Hearing Date: February 7, 2023 Dept: 61
I.       
MOTION
TO COMPEL FURTHER
“A propounding party may demand a responding
party to produce documents that are in their possession, custody or control.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.010.) The responding party must respond to the
production demand either by complying, by representing that the party lacks the
ability to comply, or by objecting to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc., §
2031.210.) If the responding party fails to serve timely responses, the
propounding party may move for an order compelling responses to the production
demand (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300.) “The motion shall set forth
specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the
demand,” and “[t]he motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer
declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b).)
Plaintiff
Maria Gutierrez seeks further responses to requests for production No. 1–55
from Defendant Volkswagen Group of America (Defendant). Requests No. 1–9 seek documents
relating to Plaintiff’s own vehicle and Defendant’s warranty policies and
procedures, while Requests No. 10–55 seek documents indicative of Defendant’s
knowledge of similar defects in other vehicles of the same year, make, and
model. Defendant responded to each request with objections.
Defendant
in opposition contends that the motion is untimely as to Requests No. 1–9, as
these requests are duplicative of requests for production that Plaintiff
previously served, and which Defendant answered in July 2021, long before the
present motions were filed. (Davenport Decl. ¶ 6, Exhs. C, D.) As to Requests
No. 10–55, Defendant contends that these requests are vague and overbroad,
needlessly encompassing consumers and vehicles other than Plaintiff and the vehicle
at issue.(Opposition at pp. 8–14.)
The first argument as to the
duplicative nature of Requests No. 1–9 is persuasive. These requests seek
essentially the same documents concerning Plaintiff’s vehicle and Defendant’s
warranty policies and procedures that were already the subject of other requests
that Defendant answered in 2021. (Davenport Decl. Exhs. C, D.) Any motion
related to those earlier requests is therefore untimely for being brought more
than 45 days after receipt of a response. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd.
(c).) It has been held that a party who fails to bring a motion to compel
further responses within the time appointed by statute may not “avoid the consequences of his
delay and lack of diligence by propounding the same question again.” (Professional
Career Colleges, Magna Institute, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 207
Cal.App.3d 490, 494.) Such is the case with Requests No. 1–9 here.
But good cause exists for
Requests No. 10–55, and Defendant’s objection based on overbreadth are
unpersuasive, as Plaintiff may use evidence of other vehicles to pursue their
Song Beverly claims. To succeed on a claim brought under the Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving several
elements, including nonconformity of a vehicle that substantially impaired its
use, value, or safety, presentation of a vehicle to a manufacturer or
authorized representative for repair, and failure to repair the defect after a
reasonable number of attempts. (Oregel v.
Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. (“Oregel”) (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.) 
A buyer may be entitled to a civil penalty of up to two
times the actual damages upon a showing that the manufacturer willfully failed
to abide by any of its obligations under the Act. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd.
(c).) Evidence that a defendant “adopted internal policies that erected hidden
obstacles to the ability of an unwary consumer to obtain redress under the
Act,” is relevant to a determination of “willfulness” in relation to prayers
for the civil penalty. (Oregel, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105.)
There is case authority for this proposition. The court in Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 967, 993–994, held that Bentley’s failure to turn over customer
complaints regarding defects on other Bentleys to support the plaintiff’s claim
under the Song-Beverly Act was an abuse of discovery so flagrant that the trial
court abused its discretion by not
imposing terminating sanctions. Other cases have embraced a evidentiary rule
similar to that only implicit in Doppes.
In Donlen v. Ford Motor Company
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, the trial court allowed an expert to testify that a
particular transmission was defective 
because he had heard from “others” that the same transmission in “other
vehicle[s]” was “problematic.” The Court of Appeal held that the “other
vehicle” testimony was properly “limited to the transmission model Ford
installed in plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles.”  (Id.
at p. 154.)  The court held that “[s]uch
evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.”  (Ibid.)
And in another case, Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
334, 347, the court held that a manufacturer’s internal emails concerning a
mechanical defect in a lemon law case were relevant to show that the
manufacturer “intentionally chose not to honor the express warranty,” and thus
merited civil penalties. Thus Plaintiff is not limited to requests concerning
the particular vehicle at issue. 
The motion is therefore GRANTED as to Requests No. 10–55,
and DENIED as to Requests No. 1–9.