Judge Gregory Keosian, Case 21STCV09057 2023-03-10 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 21STCV09057, Date: 2023-03-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV09057 Hearing Date: March 10, 2023 Dept: 61

Plaintiffs James White and Dawn Jamadar’s Motion to Compel Deposition of Defendant FCA US, LLC’s Person Most Knowledgeable is DENIED with respect to the production of a second person most knowledgeable, but GRANTED with respect to requests for production No. 7, 20, 22, 25, 32, 33, 37, 41, 44, 53, 55, 58, 65, 66, 70, 73, 77, 86, 88, 98, 100, 122–124, 127–129, 131, 133–135, 137, and 145–148. Further code complaint responses within 30 days.

I. MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION

A party may make a motion compelling a witness’s deposition “after service of a deposition notice” if that witness “fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450, subd. (a).) The motion must include a meet-and-confer declaration and show good cause for the discovery sought. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450, subd. (b)(1), (2).)

Plaintiffs James White and Dawn Jamadar (Plaintiffs) move to compel the deposition of Defendant FCA US, LLC’s person most knowledgeable (PMK) as to categories of examination No. 9–17, 19–28, 30, and 37–39, as well as document requests No. 7, 20, 22, 25, 32, 33, 37, 41, 44, 53, 55, 58, 65, 66, 70, 73, 77, 86, 88, 98, 100, 122–124, 127–129, 131, 133–135, 137, and 145–148. These categories and requests sought information concerning Defendant’s knowledge and analysis of alleged defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle in this case,

A PMK deposition was held on October 20, 2022, for these and other categories, and the witness presented was Tina Williams, Defendant’s customer relations specialist. (Smith Decl. ¶ 30.) Plaintiffs contend that Williams was unable to respond to questions concerning the engine and electrical defects identified in Plaintiffs’ discovery, and for any descriptions of relevant components relied solely on the documents presented to her as exhibits. (Smith Decl. ¶¶ 30–31.)

If the deponent named is not a natural person, the deposition notice shall describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested. In that event, the deponent shall designate and produce at the deposition those of its officers, directors, managing agents, employees, or agents who are most qualified to testify on its behalf as to those matters to the extent of any information known or reasonably available to the deponent.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.230.)

Williams testified that her position as customer relations specialist was to “handle any type of new motor vehicle board complaint that might come through small claims cases” and “prepare[] those for our field staff to attend the hearings.” (Motion Exh. 14 at p. 8.) When asked if she was the person most qualified to testify to the categories at issue, she declined to give an affirmative answer, instead stating that it would depend on the questions asked. (Motion Exh. 14 at pp. 24–40.) When asked concerning individual components of Plaintiffs’ alleged electrical defect, such as the HVAC system and fan module, Williams stated that, beyond knowing that the HVAC referred to air conditioning, she did not know what they were, or what the difference between them was. (Motion Exh. 14 at pp. 87–90.)

No order compelling further deposition is warranted. Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.230 places the responsibility for producing the person “most qualified” upon the responding entity. Plaintiff has presented no evidence or argument concerning the probable existence of a more qualified person or collection of persons available to answer their queries; only that Williams’ answers to their questions were unsatisfactory.

Plaintiffs also argue that, with respect to the categories of documents to be produced, this court already ruled in its order of March 21, 2022, that the same categories of documents were supported by good cause and ought to be produced. (Motion at p. 6.)

Plaintiffs’ arguments are supported as to the requests. Defendant has provided what it contends are statements of inability to comply and statements of full compliance in response to Requests No. 20, 22, 25, 33, 37, 41, 44, 53, 55, 58, 66, 70, 73, 77, 122, 127, 129, and 135. These responses indicate the process through which Defendant searched for responsive documents, including the databases that were searched. (Separate Statement.) But Defendant has indicated in its other discovery responses that it maintains several other relevant databases used by engineers to evaluate post-sale performance of vehicles, which were not searched. (Smith Decl. ¶¶ 46–47.) Further responses are therefore warranted as to these requests.

As to the other requests, Defendant has indicated that it has complied only in part (Requests No. 7, 133, and 145–148) or else is relying on its objections in refusing to provide responsive documents (Requests No. 32, 65, 86, 88, 98, 100, 123, 124, 128, 131, 134, and 137). The nature of these objections and statements of partial compliance are similar to those addressed in this court’s prior order on Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses to requests for production, dated March 21, 2022. Plaintiffs may properly seek documents related to internal investigations of the defects alleged by Plaintiffs with respect to their own vehicle, as such discovery is relevant to the issue of civil penalties.

The court in Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 993–994, held that Bentley’s failure to turn over customer complaints regarding defects on other Bentleys to support the plaintiff’s claim under the Song-Beverly Act was an abuse of discovery so flagrant that the trial court abused its discretion by not imposing terminating sanctions. Other cases have embraced a evidentiary rule similar to that only implicit in Doppes. In Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, the trial court allowed an expert to testify that a particular transmission was defective because he had heard from “others” that the same transmission in “other vehicle[s]” was “problematic.” The Court of Appeal held that the “other vehicle” testimony was properly “limited to the transmission model Ford installed in plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles.” (Id. at p. 154.) The court held that “[s]uch evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.” (Ibid.) And in another case, Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5^th 334, 347, the court held that a manufacturer’s internal emails concerning a mechanical defect in a lemon law case were relevant to show that the manufacturer “intentionally chose not to honor the express warranty,” and thus merited civil penalties. Thus this discovery is supported by good cause.

Accordingly, although the motion is DENIED with respect to the production of a second person most knowledgeable, the motion is GRANTED with respect to requests for production No. 7, 20, 22, 25, 32, 33, 37, 41, 44, 53, 55, 58, 65, 66, 70, 73, 77, 86, 88, 98, 100, 122–124, 127–129, 131, 133–135, 137, and 145–148.