Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 21STCV11432, Date: 2022-07-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV11432    Hearing Date: July 26, 2022    Dept: 61

Plaintiffs Ramon Galvan and Araceli Ramirez’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production from Defendant General Motors, LLC is GRANTED. Further responses within 30 days. No sanctions are awarded.

Plaintiffs to give notice.

I.                   MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER – PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

“A party may demand that any other party produce . . . a document that is in the possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.010(b).) The demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(a).) “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand,” and “[t]he motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b).)

A motion to compel a further response to an inspection demand must set forth specific facts showing “good cause” justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1); Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Unless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 444.) Once the moving party demonstrates good cause for the discovery, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully respond to the inspection demand.  (Coy v Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220.)

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to Requests for Production No1, 7, 16, 19, 21–23, 25, 38, 40, 53, 54, 56, and 57. The first of these requests asked for documents concerning the subject vehicle, to which Defendant responded with objections and a unilateral statement of partial compliance. Requests No. 16, 19, 21–23, and 25 sought documents related to Defendant’s analysis of the relevant defects (defined by reference to symptoms) in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle, but Defendant responded mainly with objections, in rare cases offering a statement of partial compliance as to the production of TSBs and recall notices. Requests No. 54, 56, and 57 sought Defendant’s communications with different government agencies, to which Defendant offered only objections. And Requests No. 7, 38, 40, and 53 asked for Defendant’s warranty and customer service policies, to which Defendant offered only objections.

Defendant in opposition argues that Plaintiff has failed to meet and confer before bringing this motion. (Opposition at p. 3.) Defendant next contends that the requests are overbroad, as they concern vehicles other than Plaintiff’s own. (Opposition at pp. 4–8.) Defendant finally contends that the requests seek trade-secret information. (Opposition at pp. 8–10.)

Defendant’s meet-and-confer objection lacks merit. The evidence shows that Plaintiff served two meet-and-confer letters regarding Defendant’s discovery responses, and although Defendant characterizes such correspondence as strident and obstinate, the letters show Plaintiff offering to enter a protective order. (Amirian Decl. ¶¶ 17–19, Exhs. 6–8.)

Defendant’s objection based on overbreadth are unpersuasive, as Plaintiffs may use evidence of other vehicles to pursue their Song Beverly claims. To succeed on a claim brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving several elements, including nonconformity of a vehicle that substantially impaired its use, value, or safety, presentation of a vehicle to a manufacturer or authorized representative for repair, and failure to repair the defect after a reasonable number of attempts. (Oregel v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. (“Oregel”) (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.)

A buyer may be entitled to a civil penalty of up to two times the actual damages upon a showing that the manufacturer willfully failed to abide by any of its obligations under the Act. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Evidence that a defendant “adopted internal policies that erected hidden obstacles to the ability of an unwary consumer to obtain redress under the Act,” is relevant to a determination of “willfulness” in relation to prayers for the civil penalty. (Oregel, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105.)

There is case authority for this proposition. The court in Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 993–994, held that Bentley’s failure to turn over customer complaints regarding defects on other Bentleys to support the plaintiff’s claim under the Song-Beverly Act was an abuse of discovery so flagrant that the trial court abused its discretion by not imposing terminating sanctions. Other cases have embraced a evidentiary rule similar to that only implicit in Doppes. In Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, the trial court allowed an expert to testify that a particular transmission was defective  because he had heard from “others” that the same transmission in “other vehicle[s]” was “problematic.” The Court of Appeal held that the “other vehicle” testimony was properly “limited to the transmission model Ford installed in plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles.”  (Id. at p. 154.)  The court held that “[s]uch evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.”  (Ibid.) Thus Plaintiffs are not limited to requests concerning the particular vehicle at issue.

Defendant next argues that the requests seek confidential trade secret information. Defendant argues that disclosing documents related to internal analysis of the vehicular issues concerned in this case risks exposing sensitive information related to its vehicles’ engineering, manufacturing, and root cause analysis, which would cause competitive disadvantage to Defendant if such information was released to the public. (Opposition at pp. 8–9.) But Plaintiff has already offered to execute a protective order in Defendant’s favor, and Defendant does not explain why the execution of such an order, as opposed to total nondisclosure, is insufficient to protect its interests.

The motion is therefore GRANTED.

II.                SANCTIONS

Statute provides that the court shall impose sanctions upon a party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to interrogatories or requests for production of documents, absent substantial justification otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300, subd. (d); 2031.310, subd. (h).)

Plaintiff here asks for $4,500.00 in sanctions, representing 12 hours of estimated attorney work at $375 per hour. (Amirian Decl. ¶ 29.) As this motion represents a good faith dispute over the discoverability of information beyond that of the subject vehicle at issue, no sanctions are warranted.