Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 21STCV14580, Date: 2022-08-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV14580    Hearing Date: August 24, 2022    Dept: 61

Plaintiff Armando Torres’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents from Defendant American Honda Motor Co. is GRANTED as to Reqeusts No. 20–22 and 29–31, and DENIED as to Requests No. 51 and 53.

I.                   MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER – PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

“A party may demand that any other party produce . . . a document that is in the possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.010(b).) The demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(a).) “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand,” and “[t]he motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b).)

A motion to compel a further response to an inspection demand must set forth specific facts showing “good cause” justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1); Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Unless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 444.) Once the moving party demonstrates good cause for the discovery, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully respond to the inspection demand.  (Coy v Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220.)

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to requests for production No. 20–22, 29–31, 51, and 53. Requests No. 20–22 and 29–31 seek documents and communications related to specified defects in the transmission and electrical system for vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle in this case. Defendant responded with objections, but offered states of partial compliance indicating that it would produce certain documents related to the history of the subject vehicle, plus tech line contact reports for complaints by owners of the same year, make, and model of vehicle. Request No. 51 sought Defendant’s rules and policies for complying with the Song Beverly Act, to which Defendant responded that such documents do not exist and have never existed. And finally, Request No. 53 sought customer service scripts and prompts used in Defendant’s call centers, to which Defendant offered a statement of compliance in whole, subject to objections.

Good cause supports these requests. To succeed on a claim brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving several elements, including nonconformity of a vehicle that substantially impaired its use, value, or safety, presentation of a vehicle to a manufacturer or authorized representative for repair, and failure to repair the defect after a reasonable number of attempts. (Oregel v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. (“Oregel”) (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.) A buyer may be entitled to a civil penalty of up to two times the actual damages upon a showing that the manufacturer willfully failed to abide by any of its obligations under the Act. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Evidence that a defendant “adopted internal policies that erected hidden obstacles to the ability of an unwary consumer to obtain redress under the Act,” is relevant to a determination of “willfulness” in relation to prayers for the civil penalty. (Oregel, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105.)

Thus discovery as to other vehicles with similar problems may be probative of a manufacturer’s “willfulness” in a Song-Beverly action The court in Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 993–994, held that Bentley’s failure to turn over customer complaints regarding defects on other Bentleys to support the plaintiff’s claim under the Song-Beverly Act was an abuse of discovery so flagrant that the trial court abused its discretion by not imposing terminating sanctions. Other cases have embraced a evidentiary rule similar to that only implicit in Doppes. In Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, the trial court allowed an expert to testify that a particular transmission was defective  because he had heard from “others” that the same transmission in “other vehicle[s]” was “problematic.” The Court of Appeal held that the “other vehicle” testimony was properly “limited to the transmission model Ford installed in plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles.”  (Id. at p. 154.)  The court held that “[s]uch evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.”  (Ibid.) More recently, the court in Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5^th 334, 347, held that a manufacturer’s internal emails concerning a mechanical defect in a lemon law case were relevant to show that the manufacturer “intentionally chose not to honor the express warranty,” and thus merited civil penalties.

Thus Plaintiff may obtain discovery concerning other vehicles with the same defect, as he requested here, and a further response is warranted for Requests No. 20–22 and 29–31, for which Defendant supplied only objections and statements of partial compliance grounded on overbreadth arguments.

A further response is not warranted for Requests No. 51 and 53. With regard to the former, Defendant’s response stated that it had no responsive documents in its possession and that such documents have never existed, in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.230. As for Request No. 53, Defendant offered a statement of compliance in whole under Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.220. These responses comply with statute, and no further response is needed.

The motion is therefore GRANTED as to Reqeusts No. 20–22 and 29–31, and DENIED as to Requests No. 51 and 53.