Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 21STCV18988, Date: 2023-09-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV18988 Hearing Date: September 12, 2023 Dept: 61
Plaintiff
Pedro Olmos Juarez’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for
Production from Defendant General Motors, LLC is GRANTED.
I.
MOTIONS
TO COMPEL FURTHER
“A party may demand
that any other party produce . . . a document that is in the possession,
custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2031.010(b).) The demanding party may move for an order compelling further
response to the demand if the demanding party deems that (1) a statement of
compliance with the demand is incomplete, (2) a representation of inability to
comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or (3) an objection in the
response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(a).) “The
motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the
discovery sought by the demand,” and “[t]he motion shall be accompanied by a
meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
2031.310(b).)
A motion to compel
a further response to an inspection demand must set forth specific facts
showing “good cause” justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1); Kirkland
v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Unless there is a
legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is
met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th
443, 444.) Once the moving party demonstrates good cause for the discovery, the
burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully
respond to the inspection demand. (Coy v Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d
210, 220.)
A motion to compel further
responses to requests for admissions may be made on the grounds that an answer
is incomplete or evasive, or an objection is without merit. (Code Civ. Proc. §
2033.290, subd. (a)(1)–(2).)
Plaintiff Pedro
Olmos Juarez (Plaintiff) seeks a further response to Requests for Production
No. 1–50. Of these, Requests No. 1 and 6 seek Defendant General Motors LLC’s
(Defendant) Song Beverly Policies, while No. 3 and 4 seek documents related to
the subject vehicle. Request No. 5 sought Defendant’s recall policy and
procedure, while the remaining requests — No. 7–50 — seek documents, consisting
of both internal analyses and outward communications, related to several named
“defects” in the engines, steering, brakes, and electrical systems of vehicles
of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle.
Defendant’s
responses to the requests were as follows. To Requests No. 3, 4, 8, 19, 30, and
41, Defendant stated, after myriad objections based on overbreadth, burden, and
privilege, that it would “comply in part” by producing specific named
documents. To the other requests, Defendant responded only with objections,
stating, “No documents will be produced.”
Defendant in
opposition here argues that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer before bringing
the present motion. (Opposition at p. 3.) It argues that its objections are
well-founded, as Plaintiff’s requests use “omnibus” terms, and seek documents
related to vehicles other than Plaintiff’s own. (Opposition at pp. 4–7.)
Defendant argues that it has already produced responsive documents,
specifically as to Requests No. 3, 4, 8, 19, 30, and 41. (Opposition at p. 5.)
And finally, Defendant argues that the documents sought implicate confidential
trade secrets. (Opposition at pp. 7–9.)
Defendant’s
argument as to the inadequacy of the meet-and-confer efforts that preceded this
motion is unpersuasive. Plaintiff sent a meet-and-confer letter prior to
serving this motion which addressed Defendant’s objections and responses, and
which invited further efforts at conference and resolution, to which Defendant
does not claim to have responded. (Yowarski Decl. ¶¶ 35–36, Exh. 5; Valendcia
Decl. ¶¶ 5–6.) The letter was adequate prelude to the motion, and Defendant
does not persuasively contend that the scope of the motion could have been
narrowed by further efforts.
Contrary to
Defendant’s substantive arguments good cause supports the requests at issue
here. This is true for those requests that relate narrowly to the subject
vehicle, those that relate to Defendant’s warranty policies, and those which
relate to pertinent defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model. To
succeed on a claim brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“the
Act”), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving several elements, including
nonconformity of a vehicle that substantially impaired its use, value, or
safety, presentation of a vehicle to a manufacturer or authorized
representative for repair, and failure to repair the defect after a reasonable
number of attempts. (Oregel v. Am. Isuzu
Motors, Inc. (“Oregel”) (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.)
A buyer may be entitled to a civil penalty of up to two
times the actual damages upon a showing that the manufacturer willfully failed
to abide by any of its obligations under the Act. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd.
(c).) Evidence that a defendant “adopted internal policies that erected hidden
obstacles to the ability of an unwary consumer to obtain redress under the
Act,” is relevant to a determination of “willfulness” in relation to prayers
for the civil penalty. (Oregel, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105.)
Because the Song-Beverly Act itself allows for the
imposition of penalties for “willful” violations, this means discovery in a
lemon law case may encompass a manufacturer’s knowledge of a given defect at
the time the plaintiff’s car is presented for repurchase. . (Civ. Code § 1794,
subd. (c).) Thus discovery into that manufacturer’s knowledge of other vehicles
with similar defects may be permissible.
There is case authority for this proposition. The court in Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 967, 993–994, held that Bentley’s failure to turn over customer
complaints regarding defects on other Bentleys to support the plaintiff’s claim
under the Song-Beverly Act was an abuse of discovery so flagrant that the trial
court abused its discretion by not
imposing terminating sanctions. Other cases have embraced a evidentiary rule
similar to that only implicit in Doppes.
In Donlen v. Ford Motor Company
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, the trial court allowed an expert to testify that a
particular transmission was defective
because he had heard from “others” that the same transmission in “other
vehicle[s]” was “problematic.” The Court of Appeal held that the “other
vehicle” testimony was properly “limited to the transmission model Ford
installed in plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles.” (Id.
at p. 154.) The court held that “[s]uch
evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.” (Ibid.)
And in another case, Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
334, 347, the court held that a manufacturer’s internal emails concerning a
mechanical defect in a lemon law case were relevant to show that the
manufacturer “intentionally chose not to honor the express warranty,” and thus
merited civil penalties.
Defendant next argues that disclosing documents related to
internal analysis of the vehicular issues concerned in this case risks exposing
sensitive information related to its vehicles’ engineering, manufacturing, and
root cause analysis, which would cause competitive disadvantage to Defendant if
such information was released to the public. (Opposition at pp. 7–9.) But
Defendant fails to produce authority for the proposition that its
confidentiality concerns warrant an order proscribing their production, as
opposed to a more narrowly tailored protective order limiting the scope of such
materials’ use. Indeed, Plaintiff’s meet-and-confer correspondence, far from
including only objections, invited Defendant to propose just such a protective
order. (Yowarski Decl. Exh. 5.)
The motion is therefore GRANTED.