Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 21STCV19745, Date: 2023-10-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV19745    Hearing Date: October 26, 2023    Dept: 61

Defendants Bob Yari, Dennis Brown, Persik Productions, Inc., YFG Services, Inc., Stratus Film Company, LLC, Bob Yari Music, LLC, Schizophrenic Productions, LLC, BY Equities LLC, and Davand Holdings, LLC’s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs is GRANTED for fees in the amount of $49,601.55

Defendant to provide notice.

I.                   MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Defendants Bob Yari, Dennis Brown, Persik Productions, Inc., YFG Services, Inc., Stratus Film Company, LLC, Bob Yari Music, LLC, Schizophrenic Productions, LLC, BY Equities LLC, and Davand Holdings, LLC (Defendants) seek attorney fees in the amount of $49,601.55, for work performed since the judgment of dismissal entered on June 28, 2022, including the work defending the judgment on appeal.

“Except as attorney's fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties; but parties to actions or proceedings are entitled to their costs, as hereinafter provided.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.)

“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).) “[T]he party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(1).)

As with their previous motion for attorney fees, Defendants cite a provision in the Syndicate operating agreement stating as follows:

If any dispute between the Company and the Members or among the Members should result in litigation or arbitration, the prevailing party in such dispute shall be entitled to recover from the other party all reasonable fees, costs and expenses of enforcing any right of the prevailing party, including, without limitation, reasonable attorney's fees and expenses whether or not actually incurred .

(Ramlo Decl. Exh. E, § 11.10.)

Defendants also cite an indemnification clause within the agreement:

The Company shall indemnify any Person who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending or complete action, suit or proceeding by reason of the fact that he or she is or was a Member, officer, employee or other agent of the . company or that, being or having been such a Member, officer, employee or agent, her or she is or was serving at the request of the company as a manager, director, officer, employee or other agent of another limited liability company, corporation, partnership, joint venture , trust of other enterprise (all such persons being referred to hereinafter as an "agent,”) to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law in effect on the date hereof and to.such greater extent as applicable law may hereafter from time to time permit.

(Ramlo Decl. Exh. E, § 9.1.)

Defendant Davand Holdings, LLC, was a member of Syndicate, who has prevailed in litigation with the company under the operating agreement’s fee provision. Defendant Bob Yari was also Syndicate’s chief executive officer, and thus an officer within the meaning of the operating agreement’s indemnity provision. (Motion at pp. 4–5.)

Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants are not entitled to fees because the fee provision in the operating agreement applies only to disputes between the company and members, or among members, and the only member of Syndiacte in this dispute is Davand Holdings, LLC. (Opposition at pp. 3–4.) This court rejected the argument in granting Defendant’s prior motion for attorney fees, and this ruling was affirmed on appeal, as Plaintiffs brought this case as the Syndicate’s successors-in-interest.

Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants have not presented evidence that any attorney fees were actually incurred. (Opposition at p. 4.) Again, this argument has been twice-rejected, once in this court and once on appeal. The attorney fees provision specifically allows fees “whether or not actually incurred.” (Ramlo Decl. Exh. E.) This is permissible under the applicable law. (See Nemecek & Cole v. Horn (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 641, 651 [discussing cases in which reasonable fees not incurred were awarded].)

Plaintiffs finally contends that the fee invoices that Defendants submit are block-billed. (Opposition at p. 5.) This is no barrier to the motion. Although ““[t]rial courts retain discretion to penalize block billing when the practice prevents them from discerning which tasks are compensable and which are not,” the use of the practice here is not so pervasive or obstructive as to prevent effective analysis of the fees incurred. (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1010.) Here, Defendants’ billing records are reasonably specific, reasonably incurred and do not prevent the court or the parties from assessing the reasonableness of the fees.

The motion for attorney fees is GRANTED in the amount of $49,601.55.